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DEFENDING CYBERPROPERTY
PATRICIA

L.

BELLIA*

In this Article, Professor PatriciaBellia explores how the law should treat legal
claims by owners of Internet-connected computer systems to enjoin unwanted uses
of their systems. Over the last few years, this question has become increasingly
urgent and controversial,as system owners have sought protectionfrom unsolicited
commercial e-mail and from"robots" that extract data from Web servers for competitive purposes. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, courts utilizing a wide range of
legal doctrines upheld claims by network resource owners to prevent unwanted
access to their computer networks. The vast weight of legal scholarship has voiced
strong opposition to these "cyberproperty" claims, arguing that such property-rule
protection would threaten productive uses of the Internet, inhibit innovation, or
even create an anticommons.
This Article challenges the typical criticisms of property-rule protection, demonstrating that they are based on simplifications or false assumptions about the
behavior of system owners and the nature of the Internet. Most importantly,
scholars have overlooked the use of technical measures to block access, in conjunction with or in place of legal measures. The Article then lays out a wide range of
potential legal rules for network resources,from absolute property-rule protection
to a "technology displacing" approach that actually limits the technical barriers a
system owner can impose, with a number of "loperty" rules-involvingpropertyrule protection triggered by a system owner taking a particular measure-in
between. After examining the existing case law, the Article agrees that courts' recent
trend toward a closed-access property-rule regime is inappropriate. Professor
Bellia, however, demonstrates that attempts to preserve open access by rejecting any
sort of property-rule protection are equally misguided. She points out that tooweak legalprotection will prompt greaterreliance on technical measures that mimic
a property-rule approach, similarly limiting access. Yet, because technology lacks
the flexibility and common sense exceptions inherent to legal application, the results
for the community-at-large could be worse.
The Article concludes that entitling a system owner to property-rule protection so
long as she provides the user with actual notice of permissible uses of the system or
adopts a system configuration making it plain to the user that access is restricted
would better balance the interests of consumers and system owners than rejecting
property-rule protection outright. Although such an approach might be inappropriate in a limited class of cases-as,for example, when a system owner's predominant motive for limiting access is anticompetitive in nature-Professor Bellia
demonstrates that courts and legislaturescan apply technology-displacingmeasures
in such cases to achieve an appropriatelegal balance.
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INTRODUCTION

When can the owner of a computer system connected to the
Internet assert a right to "exclude" unwanted uses of her system?
Disputes typically arise in one of two contexts: when a provider of email services wishes to block unsolicited commercial e-mail, or when
the owner of a web server seeks to restrict how others gather and use
information available on that system. Over the last several years,
system owners have invoked a wide range of legal doctrines as bases
for enjoining unwanted access to their systems, and courts have
largely-and controversially-accepted their claims.
The earliest cases involved claims that objectionable activitiestypically, the sending of large quantities of unsolicited commercial email-constituted a common-law "trespass to chattels." Courts held
that the e-mail provider had a possessory interest in its mail servers,
that the unsolicited e-mails interfered with that interest, and that the
provider was entitled to injunctive relief to block the unwanted activities.1 Courts soon extended the trespass-to-chattels theory beyond
that narrow functional context, to cases in which website operators
claimed that competitors used objectionable methods, such as automated queries, to extract data from their systems, 2 and then to cases in
which e-mail providers sought to block relatively small numbers of
unsolicited, but noncommercial, e-mail messages. 3 More recently, in
1 See CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020-28 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (granting preliminary injunction against sending of bulk e-mail); see also Am.
Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1279-80 (N.D. Iowa
2000) (recognizing trespass based on sending of bulk e-mail, but deferring decision on issue
of corporation's liability for harms caused by individual e-mailer); Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l
Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 897-98 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (finding corporation
liable for actions of individual e-mailer and awarding damages for trespass); Am. Online,
Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998) (granting permanent
injunction against sending of bulk e-mail); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548,
550-52 (E.D. Va. 1998) (granting summary judgment on claim that bulk e-mailer was liable
for trespass but deferring determination of damages to trial). A variant on this claim
involves the use of an account with a particular Internet service provider (ISP) to send
unsolicited e-mail, which results in the ISP being overwhelmed with misdirected replies.
See Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1025 (N.D. Cal.

1998).
2 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(granting preliminary injunction against use of automated software to gather data from
auction pages); see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 396, 404 (2d Cir.
2004) (affirming preliminary injunction against use of automated software to extract information about new domain-name registrants from public database for solicitation purposes); Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724, 2001 WL 1736382,
at *11-*13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001) (declining to dismiss trespass claim based on use of
automated software to copy codes from plaintiff's website).
3 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 246-47 (Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 71
P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
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addition to raising state-law trespass claims, plaintiffs seeking to prevent unwanted uses of their computer systems have brought successful
civil claims under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

(CFAA), 4 which in some circumstances prohibits unauthorized access
to "protected" computers-a category that likely encompasses any
computer linked to the Internet. 5 Plaintiffs have also invoked contract law to enforce restrictions on uses of their systems. 6 Finally,
when a web server holds material entitled to copyright protection, the

Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 7 or even a straightforward copyright infringement claim may provide grounds for owners to
limit access in certain cases. 8
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2000 & Supp. I 2001) (defining "protected computer" to
include any computer "used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication"); see EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581-84 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirming grant
of preliminary injunction under § 1030(a)(4) of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
against use of software program to extract tour codes and prices from website of tour
company); Nat'l Health Care Disc., 174 F. Supp. 2d at 898-99 (concluding that AOL
member's harvesting of addresses of other AOL members for purpose of sending unsolicited commercial e-mail violated § 1030(a)(2)(C) of CFAA); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio,
Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that use of automated queries to
extract information from publicly available database violated § 1030(a)(5)(C) of CFAA),
affid on other grounds, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 450-51
(holding that harvesting of e-mail addresses for purpose of sending unsolicited commercial
e-mail violated § 1030(a)(2)(C) and § 1030(a)(5)(C) of the CFAA); see also eBay, 100 F.
Supp. 2d at 1069 (noting but not deciding claim under CFAA).
6 See, e.g., Register.com, 356 F.3d at 398-404 (affirming grant of preliminary injunction
on claim that use for solicitation purposes of information gathered from publicly available
database constituted breach of contract); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV
99-7654, 2003 WL 21406289, at *1-*2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (denying defendant's
motion for summary judgment on claim that use of automated software breached contractual limitations on use of website); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982
(E.D. Cal. 2000) (declining to dismiss claim that use of information collected from site for
commercial purposes constituted breach of contract); Hotnail, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1025 (finding Hotmail likely to succeed on claim that subscribers' use of Hotmail accounts
to send sparn and pornography violated contractual restrictions).
7 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000) (prohibiting circumvention of "a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected" under copyright law). The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) would apply only if a website used technical
measures to limit access. None of the cases brought thus far under the DMCA's anticircumvention provision, which took effect in October 2000, see id., have involved unauthorized access to a website or similar information-serving system. I therefore do not discuss
the DMCA at length. It is worth noting, however, that interpretive issues under the
DMCA raise some of the same concerns that arise with respect to other cyberproperty
claims. See infra note 143.
8 For an example of an attempt to invoke copyright law to block the use of automated
queries to extract information from a site, see Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *4-*6.
The case involved Ticketmaster's claim that Tickets.com wrongfully used automated
software to extract information from Ticketmaster's website. Because copyright law protects neither facts nor compilations of facts that are insufficiently original, see Feist Publ'ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344, 348 (1991), Ticketmaster could not claim that
4
5
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Although network resource owners have largely been successful
in enjoining unwanted uses of their systems, the law remains very
much in flux. In a recent case that is likely to be influential, the

California Supreme Court rejected a trespass-to-chattels claim
brought by Intel Corporation seeking to bar its former employee,
Kenneth Hamidi, from transmitting e-mail to current employees
through the company's mail servers. 9 The court held that Intel could

not sustain a trespass claim without showing that Hamidi's e-mails
threatened to impair the functioning of Intel's mail servers. 10 While
the Hamidi court attempted to distinguish the case law involving
unsolicited commercial e-mail and the use of automated queries," the
case will likely have repercussions in those contexts as well. In particular, courts applying Hamidi's physical-harm requirement will have

difficulty declaring that objectionable activities that do not clearly
Tickets.com violated copyright law merely by listing Ticketmaster's information on events
and ticket prices. The court thus focused on whether the temporary copying of
Ticketmaster's webpages on Tickets.com's computers, so that Tickets.com could then
extract the unprotected factual data, constituted copyright infringement. Analogizing to
cases holding that reverse engineering of software in order to access unprotected components constitutes a fair use, the court granted Tickets.com summary judgment dismissing
the copyright claim. Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *4-*5 (citing Sony Computer
Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)).
As other commentators have discussed, this aspect of the Ticketmaster court's decision
was likely correct. See, e.g., David Kramer & Jay Monahan, Panel Discussion-To Bot or
Not To Bot: The Implications of Spidering, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 241, 253
(2000) (discussing Sega's implications for copyright claims challenging automated queries);
Maureen A. O'Rourke, PropertyRights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an
AppropriateAnalogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 583 & n.90 (2001) (discussing application of Sony and Sega to extraction of product and pricing information from websites).
Because other copyright claims involving factual information will face similar obstacles, I
do not discuss such claims at length in this Article. Of course, had Tickets.com displayed
the Ticketmaster information in such a way as to capture protectable components of
Ticketmaster's expression, the copyright claim would have been more complicated. Cf
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that search engine's
framed display of full-sized photographic images violated copyright law, but that reproduction of thumbnail-sized images constituted fair use), withdrawn and superseded, 336 F.3d
811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that reproduction of thumbnail-sized images constituted
fair use, but remanding for further consideration of whether framed display of full-sized
images violated copyright law because neither party sought summary judgment on that
claim).
9 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). Because of the high proportion of
technology businesses located in California, disputes over unwanted access are likely to
arise there relatively frequently. Several trespass cases have involved application of
California law. See Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724, 2001
WL 1736382, at *11 n.10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001); eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1072; Hotmail,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023.
10 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 300.
11 Id. at 304-08.
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threaten the computer system itself-such as automated queries to
extract data-constitute a trespass to chattels.
This Article explores how the law should treat a network
resource owner's attempts to prevent unwanted access to her
system.1 2 Although the various legal doctrines that plaintiffs invoke
to block unwanted uses of network computing resources are distinct,
each doctrine involves the same underlying claim: that the system
owner should have the right to set the terms of access to the resource,
a default conventionally known as property-rule protection. Under a
property-rule approach to network resources, a system owner is entitled to enjoin unwanted uses, and thus controls the terms of access. I
refer to the various doctrinal routes to controlling the terms of access
collectively as "cyberproperty" claims. 13 Although plaintiffs have successfully pressed cyberproperty claims in court, the weight of scholar12 In casting the inquiry as how the law should treat a resource owner's attempts to
prevent unwanted uses of her system, I do not intend to obscure the fact that, in a significant number of cases, blocking unwanted uses of a system is equivalent to controlling the
acquisition and use of information. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. There
is significant recent literature pointing out how characterizing a claim as involving access to
a "system" versus access to "information" can profoundly influence how courts resolve the
claim. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REv. 439, 502 (2003) (arguing that courts' focus on cyberspace as "a
place" has led courts to recognize private property rights too readily); Mark A. Lemley,
Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 529 (2003) (arguing that courts treating websites as analogous to real property have ignored that disputes over access to systems "were
really efforts to control the flow of information to or from a site"); Jacqueline Lipton,
Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace: Property in Information and Information Systems, 35
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 235, 244-45 (2003) ("Many instances of complaints about unauthorized
access to a computer system are really premised on the complainant's concerns about unauthorized access to and/or use of data stored within the system."); Michael J. Madison,
Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433, 434-45 (2003) (discussing "Internet-as-place" metaphor and concluding that it has "captured the imagination
of legislators and judges . . . for whom a rule of 'exclusion-from-computer' naturally
assumes a rule of 'exclusion-from-information"'); O'Rourke, supra note 8, at 580
(observing that courts considering claims to exclude unwanted uses emphasize "different
factors depending on whether they focus on the website ... or the tangible server"); see
also Brett M. Frischmann, The Prospectof Reconciling Internetand Cyberspace, 35 Loy. U.
CI. L.J. 205, 205 (2003) (discussing scholars' observations that "the outcome of many
cyberlaw disputes depends significantly, if not entirely, on a judge's perspective of the
Internet and how it works"). I do address at length the consequences that allowing a
resource owner to control uses of her system can have for information policy. See infra
notes 120-53 and accompanying text. I use the "unwanted uses of her system" label simply
to capture cases that involve mail servers, as well as cases that involve web servers.
13 In describing claims that network resource owners should be able to dictate the
terms of access to their systems as "cyberproperty" claims, I am adopting a somewhat
narrower usage of that term than do other scholars. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Several
Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83
MINN. L. REV. 129, 146-47 (1998) (using "cyberproperty" to describe recognition of entitlements in cyberspace, without specifying whether those entitlements would entail property-rule or liability-rule protection).
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ship opposes such claims in favor of a liability-rule approach to
protecting network resources. 14 Under a liability-rule approach,
access is permitted, subject to terms set by a third party, typically a
court or legislature.
This Article argues that property-rule protection for network
resources is more appropriate than scholars have thus far recognized.
15
Commentators favor liability-rule protection for network resources
in part based on a fear that granting system owners the right to
exclude unwanted uses will have disastrous consequences for the
development and growth of the Internet. 16 That view rests on two
My cross-doctrinal approach to cyberproperty claims is not unique; notable works
include Madison, supra note 12, and a series of pieces by Maureen A. O'Rourke, see
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Common Law and Statutory Restrictions on Access: Contract,
Trespass, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 295
[hereinafter O'Rourke, Restrictions on Access]; O'Rourke, supra note 8; Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing
Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965 (2000) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Shaping
Competition]. As will become clear, however, my analysis differs from Madison's and
O'Rourke's in important respects.
14 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.
27, 53 (2000) (favoring "nuisance" approach to website access, under which courts would
weigh whether "the cost of the intrusive activity outweighs the benefit"); Adam Mossoff,
Spam-Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 625, 629 (2004) (suggesting application of existing nuisance doctrine); O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 13, at
2001-03 (proposing balancing test analogous to nuisance); Steven Kam, Note, Intel Corp.
v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and a Doctrine of Cyber-Nuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 427, 448-52 (2004) (advocating "cyber-nuisance" approach); see also Symposium, The
Internet: Place, Property, or Thing-All or None of the Above?, 55 MERCER L. REV. 867,
912 (2004) (comments of Jennifer Stisa Granick, favoring nuisance approach over recognition of right to exclude). For related critiques of courts' approach, see sources cited infra
note 59. For defenses of a property-rule approach, see Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 84 (2003) ("[S]trong property rights for non-network elements function as well in cyberspace as they do anywhere else."); David McGowan, Website Access:
The Case for Consent, 35 Loy. U. Ci. L.J. 341, 375-83 (2003) (explaining benefits of
property-rule approach over damages rule such as nuisance).
15 I later argue that the traditional property rule/liability rule framework does not adequately capture the range of possible legal rules for protection of network resources. See
infra Part II.A. In particular, even those scholars who oppose recognition of a system
owner's right to exclude unwanted uses seem to acknowledge that the system owner should
be able to enjoin evasions of very strong technical measures, such as password protection.
See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. Characterizing these scholars as favoring
"liability" rule protection is therefore somewhat imprecise because they would allow
injunctive relief to back the terms of access the system owner sets through technical measures, independent of any showing of a threat of harm. The point for now is that the
scholars whose arguments I challenge favor recognition of a right to exclude in an
extremely narrow category of cases, if at all.
16 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Mark A. Lemley et al. in Support of Bidder's Edge,
Appellant, Supporting Reversal at 8 & n.7, 9-10, eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., No. 0015995 (9th Cir. submitted June 22, 2000) (arguing that right to exclude threatens to make
search engines and linking illegal); Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Intellectual Property and Computer Law, Supporting Reversal at 10-12, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296
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further premises. First, commentators fear that system owners will
exercise the right to exclude unwanted uses too frequently, blocking
many harmless and productive activities. Indeed, some scholars seem
to treat property-rule protection of network resources as equivalent to
setting a default rule of closed access, with would-be users required to
bargain for any and all access, regardless of a system's technical configuration. 17 Second, commentators assume that liability-rule protection for network resources will be sufficient to preserve open access to
network resources.
As I will argue, however, the view that liability-rule protection
will lead to a greater degree of open access than property-rule protection is questionable. First, although a property-rule approach has prevailed in many contexts, scholars' dire predictions about the effects of
such an approach on the shape of the Internet have not come to
pass. 18 That is no doubt in part because a default rule of closed access
is not an inevitable result of a property-rule approach. Eliminating
the closed-access-default assumption blunts the force of the criticism
of a property rule. Second, it is not clear that a liability approach will
lead to open access. In the absence of property-rule protection,
system owners can deploy technical measures of varying strength in an
effort to achieve the desired level of control. Those measures need
not be foolproof to affect users' access.
In other contexts, scholars have recognized the effect that technical measures will have on access to and use of information. 19 What
the debate over cyberproperty claims overlooks, however, is that the
choice of a particular legal rule is likely to influence the technical
measures that a system owner employs. In particular, a system owner
faced with weak legal protection of network resources can respond by
employing stronger technical measures to control access. That possibility itself may not be troublesome because the access baseline
remains the same under either approach. It quickly becomes
apparent, however, that the balance between legal and technical measures matters. Commentators have suggested that the nature of technical measures makes governmental choices to rely on such measures
rather than legal measures troubling, in large part because regulation
through technical measures produces complete control not available
(Cal. 2003) (No. S103781) (same); Burk, supra note 14, at 49 (arguing that granting network resource owners right to exclude unwanted uses could create "anti-commons
nightmare"); Hunter, supra note 12, at 508-09 (predicting severe constraints on search
engines and disappearance of aggregation products).
17 See infra pp. 2207-08.
18 See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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through law alone. 20 Concerns of this sort apply with equal force
when private parties seek to use technical rather than legal measures
to control access to their systems.
If courts follow the prevailing scholarly sentiment, 21 they will
reject strong legal protection for network resources. Because a
property-rule approach has so often been caricatured as leading to a
default rule of closed access, it seems to have few benefits to offer.
The promise of open access that a liability-rule approach seems to
carry, however, may well be equally illusory. Before we rush to
embrace a liability-rule approach, then, we must consider both the
real scope of property-rule protection and the pressure that the choice
of a particular legal rule may place on the use of technical measures.
This Article seeks to consider this broader range of normative arguments and argues that the liability-rule trend scholars hope to launch
is ill-conceived.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I use electronic trespass cases to introduce the doctrinal and normative complexities of
cyberproperty claims. In electronic trespass cases, courts initially
granted property-rule protection to network resources, recognizing
system owners' rights to enjoin unwanted uses and thus to set the
terms of access. Scholars heavily criticized these decisions, partly on
the ground that courts overlooked or misapplied the requirement that
a plaintiff asserting a trespass-to-chattels claim demonstrate harm. In
Hamidi, the California Supreme Court seized upon this critique,
declaring that a trespass-to-chattels claimant could not secure injunc22
tive relief merely by demonstrating an unwanted use of her system.
Although the Hamidicourt cast its decision as a straightforward application of trespass doctrine, I show that the harm issue is difficult to
resolve at the level of doctrine. I then turn to the normative issues at
stake in cyberproperty claims. Scholars reject property-rule protection for network resources partly out of fear that recognizing a right to
exclude unwanted uses will lead to "overpropertization" of the
Internet, by curtailing the development of useful tools and diminishing the network benefits of the Internet. Although I sympathize
with these concerns, I show that certain assumptions underlying
scholars' arguments are unwarranted.
In Part II, I offer a framework for considering cyberproperty
claims that is more nuanced than the basic property/liability framework. I first set forth four possible legal approaches to cyberproperty
20 See infra notes 391-407 and accompanying text.
21 As I later explain, the California Supreme Court recently did so in Intel Corp. v.
Hamidi. See infra notes 22, 64-99 and accompanying text.
22 See Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 310-11 (discussing commentators' concerns).
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claims. Under three of these approaches, a system owner has a right
to enjoin unwanted uses in some circumstances. In this sense, all
three approaches involve property-rule protection. Only one of these
three approaches, however, involves a default presumption of closed
access. The remaining two approaches differ in what triggers the right
to injunctive relief to back the terms of access the system owner sets:
Under one approach, an appropriate form of notice to would-be users
triggers the system owner's right to exclude; under another, only the
use of technical measures that are actually effective in blocking some
access triggers such a right. I then explore more fully the role of technical measures in protecting access to network resources. Technical
measures can serve as a trigger for legal protection; but, even under a
legal rule that denies injunctive relief for unwanted uses, system
owners may independently use such measures to block some access. I
argue that the availability of technical measures to block access should
affect how we analyze cyberproperty claims in two ways. First, the
fact that system owners can turn to technical protection when legal
protection is lacking means that the absence of legal protection will
not necessarily lead to open access. Second, the choice of a particular
legal approach may induce greater reliance on technical measures
than would be necessary with a stronger legal rule.
Part III applies the framework set forth in Part II. I first explore
the cyberproperty case law. While I point out that, contrary to
scholars' claims, the most important early cases do not reflect a
closed-access approach under which all users must bargain for access
to a system, I argue that courts' more recent drift toward closed access
is both doctrinally and normatively inappropriate. That conclusion,
however, does not provide a basis for choosing among the other possible approaches. I then demonstrate that courts should apply the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act only when a system owner uses
strong technical measures to control access, and argue that courts
have too broadly interpreted that statute by allowing system owners
to invoke it to enforce terms of use and other weak forms of notice.
With respect to other cyberproperty claims, however, the arguments
for requiring technical measures to trigger a right to exclude are
weaker. Turning to the normative considerations, I argue that the
approaches scholars currently favor will not lead to the degree of open
access they predict, for those approaches will induce greater reliance
on technical measures that mimic the effect of the legal rules scholars
oppose. Moreover, because technical measures raise concerns that
legal measures do not, the balance between technical and legal measures matters. The law should not demand technical measures as a
prerequisite to a system owner's ability to exclude unwanted uses. So

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2164

long as the law presumes a default rule of open access and places the
burden on the system owner to adequately convey the limits on permissible uses of her system, property-rule protection for network
resources is appropriate.
I
THE CYBERPROPERTY CONTROVERSY

Plaintiffs seeking to block unwanted uses of network computing
resources have relied on a range of legal doctrines-trespass-tochattels claims, CFAA claims, contract claims, and copyright-related
claims. In this Part, focusing primarily on the tort of trespass to chattels, I introduce the doctrinal and normative complexities of these
cyberproperty claims. Although the claims are doctrinally distinct,
they raise the same competing interests: interests of resource owners
in protecting their investments in equipment and particular business
models; interests of users in open access to information and open avenues for speech; interests of society as a whole in preserving the benefits of a large-scale computer network; and, assuming some limitations
on access are appropriate, interests of users in fair notice of the conditions of access. The question becomes: What sort of legal protection
for network resources best balances these interests?
In Section A, I trace the evolution of electronic trespass doctrine
with respect to claims involving unsolicited e-mail and the use of automated queries to gather data from websites. In Section B, I evaluate
scholars' doctrinal critique of the electronic trespass cases. That critique focuses largely on the question of what harm, if any, a plaintiff
must show to sustain a trespass claim, and argues that courts have
ignored or misapplied the harm requirement. In Intel Corp. v.
Hamidi, the California Supreme Court embraced this doctrinal critique, holding that an electronic trespass claim requires a showing of
threatened damage to or impairment of the functioning of the plaintiff's computer equipment. 23 As I argue, however, the issue of what
harm, if any, a plaintiff must show to sustain a trespass-to-chattels
claim cannot be resolved at the level of doctrine. Section C thus turns
to scholars' normative arguments against recognition of cyberproperty
claims. I argue that scholars tend to caricature approaches that would
grant system owners a right to exclude unwanted uses, and fail to
identify a compelling conceptual basis for choosing among the possible approaches to protecting network resources.
23

Id. at 300.
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The Evolution of Electronic Trespass Doctrine

Under section 217 of the Second Restatement of Torts, a plaintiff
asserting a trespass-to-chattels claim must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's possessory interest in
personal property, either by "dispossessing [the plaintiff] of the
chattel" or by "using or intermeddling with" the property. 24 The tort
was first applied in the Internet context in CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions,Inc.,25 where CompuServe successfully argued that Cyber
Promotions's transmission of unsolicited commercial e-mail to
CompuServe subscribers constituted a trespass to CompuServe's mail
servers. The court's reasoning on three crucial issues formed the
foundation for later decisions.
The first issue was whether transmission of e-mail to a mail server
could constitute use of or intermeddling with that server for purposes
of the trespass tort. Relying on a California case that applied a
trespass-to-chattels rationale to two teenagers' efforts to hack into a
telephone system, the CompuServe court deemed Cyber Promotions's
"contacts" with CompuServe's computer system-that is, Cyber
Promotions's sending of e-mail-to be "sufficiently physically tangible
to support a trespass cause of action. '26 The second issue was
whether Cyber Promotions's activities were in fact unauthorized. The
court rejected the argument that CompuServe, by virtue of connecting
its system to the Internet and configuring it to accept incoming e-mail
on behalf of its subscribers, had impliedly consented to Cyber
Promotions's activities: Because CompuServe sent Cyber Promotions
a cease-and-desist letter, Cyber Promotions had received specific
notice that CompuServe "no longer consented" to Cyber
27
Promotions's use of its system.
The final issue was what kind of harm, if any, CompuServe
needed to demonstrate to obtain an injunction on a trespass-tochattels theory. The Second Restatement of Torts states that a dispossession may be actionable even in the absence of any harm, but that
one is generally liable for using or intermeddling with a chattel only if
the chattel's owner can demonstrate harm. in particular, according to
the Restatement, a defendant is liable only if:
(a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or
(b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or
24 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

TORTS § 217 (1965)

(SECOND)].
25 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
26 Id. at 1021 (citing Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek,
27 Id. at 1024.

[hereinafter

RESTATEMENT

54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996)).
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(c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or
(d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to
some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected
28
interest.
The court found that CompuServe had suffered two kinds of
harm. 29 First, Cyber Promotions's messages consumed CompuServe's
disk space and drained processing power. 30 The court reasoned that
Cyber Promotions's use of CompuServe's resources diminished "the
value of that equipment to CompuServe, ' 3 1 thus satisfying section
218(b) of the Restatement. Second, the court concluded that Cyber
Promotions's activities threatened CompuServe's "business reputation
and goodwill. '32 Because CompuServe's subscribers paid for their
Internet subscriptions in time increments, they would be likely to
cancel their subscriptions if the flow of unwanted e-mail were not curtailed. 33 The court characterized this harm as harm to something in
which CompuServe had a protected interest for purposes of section
218(d).

34

Courts soon applied CompuServe's reasoning in a series of bulk
e-mail cases raising similar facts. 35 But CompuServe's reasoning was
also extended to other contexts. Plaintiffs argued that CompuServe's
trespass-to-chattels approach should also protect web servers from
unwanted uses. In eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.,36 for example, a
district court held that eBay, an auction-hosting service, was entitled
to enjoin Bidder's Edge, a service that gathered data concerning
ongoing auctions from various sites and presented aggregate listings of
those auctions, from using certain techniques to gather data from
eBay's auction pages. Bidder's Edge employed an automated
software tool often referred to as a "robot" to extract data from
24, § 218.
29 For further discussion of the court's handling of the harm requirement, see infra
notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
30 CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022.
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note

31 Id.

32 Id. at 1023.
33 See id.

Id. at 1022-23.
35 See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1277
(N.D. Iowa 2000) (recognizing trespass based on sending of bulk e-mail); Am. Online, Inc.
v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same); Am. Online, Inc. v.
IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same); see also Hotmail Corp. v. Van$
Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020,1025-26 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (granting injunction
because evidence supported finding of trespass where subscriber used account with ISP to
send unsolicited e-mail, which resulted in ISP being overwhelmed with misdirected
replies).
34

36 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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eBay's site: Bidder's Edge's software would retrieve one eBay file,
and would then follow all of the links in that file to retrieve other files,
and so on.37 Just as the CompuServe court found that the sending of
e-mail constituted use of or intermeddling with CompuServe's mail
servers, the eBay court found that Bidder's Edge's repeated requests
for auction data constituted use of or intermeddling with eBay's web
servers. 38 As for whether Bidder's Edge's conduct was authorized,
the court observed that eBay had specifically notified Bidder's Edge
of its objection to the company's use of automated queries after the
39
parties failed to agree on licensing terms.
The most difficult issue for the court was what sort of harm, if
40
any, eBay needed to show to obtain a preliminary injunction.
Bidder's Edge's robots queried eBay's servers approximately 100,000
times a day, but those queries represented at most 1.53 % of the total
load on eBay's servers. 41 eBay also argued that Bidder's Edge's site
provided outdated pricing information, thus making Bidder's Edge's
users less likely to bid on items available on eBay. 42 The court
focused on the burden Bidder's Edge placed on eBay's servers, concluding that, despite the small load that Bidder's Edge's queries
imposed, eBay nevertheless would be likely to demonstrate that
Bidder's Edge's activities "have diminished the quality or value of
eBay's computer systems. '43 The court first reasoned that even if
Bidder's Edge's activities burdened eBay's servers only minimally,
those activities "use[d]" a portion of eBay's property and thereby
"deprived eBay of the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its own purposes. ' 44 eBay was entitled to block that unauthorized use. Second, if Bidder's Edge were allowed to continue
querying eBay's site over eBay's objection, "it would likely encourage
37 For more information on such automated software tools, see, for example, The Web
Robots FAQ, at http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/faq.html (last visited July 27, 2004). The term
"robots" is often used interchangeably with such terms as "spiders" and "crawlers," see,
e.g., O'Rourke, supra note 8, at 570, although some commentators use the term robots to
connote a broader range of software tools of which spiders and crawlers are a subset, see
Stephen T. Middlebrook & John Muller, Thoughts on Bots: The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents, 56 Bus. LAW. 341, 342-44 (2000). I adopt the narrower usage here.
38 See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 ("Conduct that does not amount to a substantial
interference with possession, but which consists of intermeddling with or use of another's
personal property, is sufficient to establish a cause of action for trespass to chattel.").
39 Id. at 1062.
40 See id. at 1064-69, 1071-72.
41 Id. at 1063.
42 See id. at 1062 (noting that eBay wished to permit Bidder's Edge's queries of its
system only when Bidder's Edge user actually queried Bidder's Edge's servers, in part to
"increase[ ] the accuracy" of data Bidder's Edge would provide regarding eBay items).
43 Id. at 1071.

44Id.
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other auction aggregators to crawl the eBay site, potentially to the
point of denying effective access to eBay's customers. ' 45 In granting

injunctive relief, the court thus relied both on Bidder's Edge's use of a
portion of eBay's servers and on the potential for harm to eBay's
servers if others replicated Bidder's Edge's activities.

Although other courts have found trespass liability in similar circumstances, 46 one court questioned the eBay court's approach. In
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., the defendant used robots to

extract data from Ticketmaster's website and aggregated that information on its own site along with event listings involving other ticket
sellers.4 7 The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief and
later granted the defendant summary judgment on Ticketmaster's
trespass-to-chattels claim. In an unpublished opinion explaining the
denial of the preliminary injunction, the district court distinguished
eBay by pointing out that Ticketmaster had made no showing that
others would replicate the defendant's activities and thereby threaten
to overload Ticketmaster's servers. 48 In the subsequent opinion on
summary judgment, the court specifically questioned eBay's suggestion that use of a system, without more, could give rise to a claim for
49
trespass to chattels.
B.

The Harm-Based Doctrinal Critique and Its Challenges

As noted above, the most difficult issue for the CompuServe and
eBay courts was what harm, if any, the plaintiffs had to show to secure
injunctive relief. To evaluate the courts' holdings, we can posit four

approaches to the harm question that a court analyzing an electronic
trespass claim could take. First, a court could hold that trespass to

chattels is actionable only when the plaintiff demonstrates actual or
threatened impairment of the chattel itself-the computer equipment.
45 Id. The court envisioned that if other aggregators began to utilize similar types of
recursive searching, "eBay would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system performance, system unavailability, or data losses." Id. at 1066.
46 See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 396, 404 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming
preliminary injunction against use of automated software to extract information about new
domain-name registrants from public database for solicitation purposes); cf. Oyster
Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724, 2001 WL 1736382, at *11-*13
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001) (declining to dismiss trespass claim based on use of automated
software to copy codes from plaintiff's website).
47 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
48 Id. at *4.
49 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2003 WL 21406289, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) ("This court respectfully disagrees with other district courts'
finding that mere use of a spider to enter a (publicly] available web site to gather information, without more, is sufficient to fulfill the harm requirement for trespass to chattels.").
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Second, a court could take a broader approach to harm and require a
showing that the claimed trespass caused some physical harm to the
possessor or the possessor'sproperty, if not necessarily to the chattel
itself. Third, a court could find a trespass actionable upon the showing
of harm proximately related to the interference with the computer
system; this approach would likely allow a court to recognize consequential economic damages, even in the absence of harm to the
chattel itself or to other property. Finally, a court might conclude
that, for purposes of obtaining injunctive relief, a plaintiff need not
show any harm-that a plaintiff has an inviolable interest in her computer equipment and is entitled to enjoin any unwanted "use" of that
equipment, even if such a use might not give rise to a claim for
damages.
Which approaches are reflected in the CompuServe and eBay
decisions? CompuServe did not involve actual or threatened damage
to CompuServe's mail servers or other property. The CompuServe
court did state that Cyber Promotions's messages consumed disk
space and drained processing power. 50 The court characterized these
effects as a "physical impact of defendants' messages on
[CompuServe's] equipment,"'5 1 but the court did not suggest that
Cyber Promotions's messages had caused or threatened to cause any
impairment to CompuServe's computers or that CompuServe's equip52
ment could not bear the burden the unwanted messages imposed.
Rather, the court viewed this physical impact as affecting "the value of
that equipment to CompuServe. ' 53 Thus, CompuServe did not
involve either of the two narrower harm rules requiring some physical
damage to property. The court instead appeared to take the third
approach, relying on projected economic harms: The unwanted email would affect the value of CompuServe's servers, or would cause a
54
loss of customer goodwill.
In eBay, different portions of the opinion focus on different possible harms. The court at one point suggested that "use" of eBay's
system alone was sufficient to entitle eBay to injunctive relief 5 5-that,
consistent with the fourth approach outlined above, no showing of
harm was required. Elsewhere, it focused on the possibility that other
50 CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
51 Id.

52 Accord McGowan, supra note 14, at 347-48 ("There was no evidence that the plaintiff's servers crashed, that it ran out of disk space, or that its customers were actually
blocked out of the system.").
53 CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 1022-23.
55 eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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aggregators might replicate Bidder's Edge's activities and eventually
overload eBay's servers. 56 eBay can thus be read to have tied injunctive relief to a potential future harm to eBay's servers, a result consistent with the first approach discussed above. At the same time, it was
clear that Bidder's Edge's use itself threatened no harm to eBay's
system, and the court's conclusion that eBay might eventually suffer
harm from the activities of other aggregators depended on numerous
unstated assumptions, including that the market could support the
dozens of other aggregators that would be required to impair the
servers' functioning. Because these assumptions are highly question58
able, 57 eBay seems to rely more on use than on actual harm.
This question of what harm a system owner must show to obtain
an injunction to block unwanted uses of her system forms the central
thread in scholars' doctrinal critique of trespass cases. 59 Commenta-

tors argue that, to sustain a trespass-to-chattels claim, a plaintiff
should be required to show not merely harm, but a harm to the chattel

itself-that is, to the computer system that processes the unwanted
communications. 60 As Professor Burk has explained, the trespass-tochattels tort, like the tort of conversion, protects a possessory interest:
56

Id. at 1066, 1071-72.

57 See, e.g., O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 13, at 1980 ("The optimal

number of spiders indexing a site may be greater than one, but it is likely also to be less
than the number that would cause the system to crash."). Because metasites like Bidder's
Edge rely so heavily on advertising revenue, O'Rourke suggests, "[c]hances are high that
the number of indexing sites that could attract enough money to remain in business is less
than the number that would materially adversely affect system performance." Id. at
1980-81; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Mark A. Lemley et al. in Support of Bidder's
Edge, Appellant, Supporting Reversal at 14, eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., No. 0015995 (9th Cir. submitted June 22, 2000) ("[Tlhe economics of electronic commerce are
such that it is doubtful that a horde of such auction aggregation services are likely to
arise."); Steve Fischer, Comment, When Animals Attack: Spiders and Internet Trespass, 2
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 139, 162 (2001) ("While ... additional aggregators will surface ... the market will not be able to support a multitude of spiders."). But see Kramer &
Monahan, supra note 8, at 250 (comments of Jay Monahan, Senior Intellectual Property
Counsel for eBay, Inc.) (arguing that even small burden on servers is problematic because
"[ilf we ran everything right at capacity, it would be suicidal," and "[e]ven the slightest
slow-down can directly affect trading, and that directly affects the income made by
[eBay]").
58 Accord McGowan, supra note 14, at 351 (suggesting that "the court's speculation
about harm detracts significantly from the normative force of the opinion").
59 The most extended and significant critique of courts' application of the trespass tort
to network resources is Professor Dan Burk's. See Burk, supra note 14; see also Niva
Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude
Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179, 203-06 (2001); Hunter, supra note 12, at 483-88;
O'Rourke, supra note 8, at 593-96; O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 13, at
1993-97; R. Clifton Merrell, Note, Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 675, 687-97 (2002); Laura Quilter, Note, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace
Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 435-43 (2002).
60 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 14, at 34-37.
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"The gravamen of both actions lies in the dispossession of the property from its owner. In conversion, the dispossession is total; in trespass to chattels, the dispossession is only partial. '6 1 Because the tort
protects a possessory interest, Burk argues, a trespass claim should lie
only when the defendant's actions affect the physical condition of the
chattel. When a court recognizes consequential economic harms, such
as a loss of subscriber goodwill, as an actionable harm for purposes of
a trespass-to-chattels claim, it cuts the link between the plaintiff's possessory interest in the chattel and the harm. 62 Relatedly, scholars
argue, to rest liability on mere use of a computer-with only the most
speculative discussion of the possibility of harm-is to ignore the
63
harm requirement of the tort altogether.
The California Supreme Court essentially adopted this harmbased critique in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi.64 The case involved Intel's
efforts to enjoin its former employee, Kenneth Hamidi, from sending
e-mails critical of Intel's employment policies to Intel employees
through Intel's mail servers. 65 Although Hamidi sent each of his emails to several thousand Intel employees, he had done so only on a
handful of occasions. 66 Accordingly, Intel could not plausibly claim
67
that Hamidi's conduct had affected the functioning of its servers.
Intel argued both that it did not need to show harm to enjoin Hamidi's
conduct, 68 and that it could in any event demonstrate two harms: first,
that Intel had expended resources attempting to block and clear its
systems of Hamidi's e-mails; 69 and second, that Hamidi's messages, if
not blocked, would distract employees and cause a loss of
70
productivity.
The two lower courts found Intel's arguments persuasive and
enjoined Hamidi's conduct. 71 The California Supreme Court
reversed. Although broader language appears in isolated places in its
at 33.
62 See id. at 35-37; Quilter, supra note 59, at 429-30, 439-41.
63 See Hunter, supra note 12, at 487; O'Rourke, supra note 8, at 596-97.
64 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
65 Id. at 299.
66 Id. at 301.
67 Id. ("Nor is there any evidence that the receipt or internal distribution of Hamidi's
electronic messages damaged Intel's computer system or slowed or impaired its functioning."); id. at 303-04 (reviewing evidence on this issue).
68 Id. at 303.
69 See id. at 301 (noting Intel's "uncontradicted evidence ... that staff time was consumed in attempts to block further messages from FACE-Intel").
70 See id. at 307-08 (discussing Intel's claim that messages caused loss of productivity).
71 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 247-53 (Ct. App. 2001).
61 Id.
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opinion,72 the Hamidi court adopted the first of the harm approaches
outlined above, finding 'that Intel's trespass claims failed because Intel
could not show actual or threatened damage to its computer system or
impairment of its functioning. 73 The Hamidi court characterized its
74
approach as a straightforward application of common-law doctrine,
but in fact the question is far more complicated than the Hamidi court
suggests.
There are three main problems with the Hamidi court's approach.
First, although the court purported to adhere to the approach
reflected in bulk e-mail and robot cases, it ignored or mischaracterized
key aspects of those cases. Second, the court adopted an extremely
narrow and textualist reading of the Second Restatement of Torts,
treating it as if it were a statute rather than a synthesis of an adaptive
common-law doctrine. In doing so, the court downplayed the underlying interests that trespass-to-chattels doctrine protects. Third, the
Hamidi court's harm-to-system test obscures the court's tacit judgment on the value of Hamidi's speech.
The Hamidi court purported to follow the approach to harm used
in the earlier cases concerning unsolicited commercial e-mail and the
use of robots to extract data from websites, but it was not faithful to
those cases. For example, in attempting to reconcile its decision with
that of the district court in eBay, the Hamidi court focused heavily on
eBay's suggestion that other aggregators, mimicking the activities of
Bidder's Edge, could overwhelm eBay's system. 75 It thus concluded
that the eBay holding required a showing of harm or threatened harm
to physical computer equipment. 76 In fact, however, the eBay court
believed. that Bidder's Edge had no right whatsoever to use eBay's
system, regardless of harm: The court explicitly stated that Bidder's
72 See Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 307 n.6 (raising possibility that trespass-to-chattels claim
could be sustained upon showing of harm to possessor or possessor's other property, but
stating that Intel raised no claim of such harm).
73 See id. at 300 (stating that trespass to chattels does not cover "an electronic communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning,"
because tort requires "interfere[nce] with the possessor's use or possession of, or any other
legally protected interest in, the personal property itself' (emphasis added)); id. at 303
(stating that dispositive issue is whether Hamidi's actions "caused or threatened to cause
damage to Intel's computer system, or injury to its rights in that personal property"
(emphasis added)).
74 See id. at 302 (discussing "[c]urrent" California tort law); id. at 306 (stating that portions of eBay decision did not reflect "correct statement of California or general American
law"); id. at 308 (characterizing claim that no showing of harm should be required to sustain injunctive relief as proposing "[e]xtension" of California tort law).
75 Id. at 306.
76 Id.
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Edge's "use" of eBay's system "deprived eBay of the ability to use
'77
that portion of its personal property for its own purposes.
Similarly, the Hamidi court characterized CompuServe as
involving potential harm to CompuServe's mail servers. CompuServe,
of course, recognized certain economic damages attributable to Cyber
Promotions's alleged trespass, including the Internet service prov78
iders's (ISP's) loss of business reputation and customer goodwill.
While acknowledging that CompuServe involved economic harm, the
Hamidi court strained to link that harm to some physical harm to
CompuServe's property. The Hamidi court noted that CompuServe's
"system" was "inundated with unsolicited commercial messages." 79
The court thus implied that the unsolicited e-mail affected the functioning of CompuServe's computer system-that is, CompuServe's
mail servers. The court then observed that CompuServe's asserted
injuries were more closely connected to CompuServe's personal property than were the asserted injuries in Hamidi, since it was "the functioning of CompuServe's electronic mail service" that prompted
CompuServe's customers' complaints. 8 0 By subtly shifting its focus
from CompuServe's servers to CompuServe's service, the Hamidi
court obscured the fact that the harm CompuServe claimed was not
actual or threatened impairment of its computer system, but rather
the loss of customer goodwill. Because CompuServe's customers'
complaints were truly about the cost of sifting through e-mail, 81 and
there was no evidence that CompuServe's servers could not bear the
burden that Cyber Promotions's e-mails imposed, 82 the link between
the economic damages and the chattel in CompuServe is functionally
equivalent to the link between Intel's claimed economic damages and
the chattel in Hamidi. In both cases, quite apart from any physical
effect on the computer system, the unwanted communications allegedly had an economic effect on the system owners' businesses.
Indeed, although the Hamidi court went to great lengths to distinguish
the bulk e-mail cases by establishing that it was the "content" of
Hamidi's messages that prompted Intel's objection, providers' objec-

77 eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

78 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
79 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 307 (noting that "CompuServe's customers were annoyed
because the system was inundated with unsolicited commercial messages, making its use
for personal communication more difficult and costly" (emphasis added)).
80 Id.
81 CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
82 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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tions in the bulk e-mail cases were likewise based on the content of the
83
e-mail rather than on some physical effect to the computer system.
The fact that Hamidi mischaracterized eBay and CompuServe
does not itself suggest that the court's approach was wrong. eBay

involved a federal district court applying California law, a subject on
which the California Supreme Court has the last word; and, of course,
the Hamidi court was free to reject the interpretation of Ohio law
reflected in the CompuServe case. But the Hamidi court also took an

extremely narrow view of the trespass-to-chattels tort. As noted earlier, according to section 218(b) of the Second Restatement of Torts,

one is liable for trespass to chattels if one dispossesses another of a
chattel or causes some kind of harm, including impairing the chattel
"as to its condition, quality, or value."'84 The court held that only
actual or threatened impairment of the functioning of the system
could affect its "condition, quality or value." 85 One could argue, however, that a server's "value" is tied to the contributions the equipment
makes to the owner's revenue model. When the foreseeable conse-

quence of interference with the computer system is a cost imposed on
the owner, perhaps the concept of "value" of the chattel should cap86
ture the cost.
Section 218(d) of the Restatement also links liability to harm "to
some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected
interest. ' 87 Although the Hamidi court did not specifically cite that
clause, its conclusion that a trespass claim will lie only upon a showing

of impairment to the computer system necessarily rested on the pre83 See Burk, supra note 14, at 37 (noting that "impairment" in CompuServe amounted
to "no more than the receipt of annoying content").
84 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
85 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 304 (rejecting Intel's contention that its interest in physical condition, quality, or value of its computers was harmed and concluding that "the decisions
finding electronic contact to be a trespass to computer systems have generally involved
some actual or threatened interference with the computers' functioning").
86 Professor Burk, like the Hamidi court, adopts a narrow interpretation of "value." In
particular, he suggests that when unwanted contacts cause no damage to the equipment,
the value of the equipment is not impaired because the owner could sell it for just as much
after the unwanted contacts as before. See Burk, supra note 14, at 35 (linking concept of
"value" under § 218(b) of Restatement to market price). His conception of injury, however, is incomplete. If one purpose of applying trespass to chattels in this context is to
preserve incentives for productive uses of computer resources, see infra notes 106-07 and
accompanying text, the market-price approach alone is clearly insufficient, for even the
most extreme forms of hacking might not alter the market price of computer equipment.
A market-price approach to "value" could be appropriate, so long as economic injuries are
actionable elsewhere within the trespass-to-chattels tort. As discussed in the text, however, the Hamidi court narrowly interpreted the other prongs of section 218 as well and
thus seemed to reject any relief for economic injury.
87 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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mise that consequential economic damages such as loss of productivity
or loss of goodwill do not qualify as something in which the system
owner has a "legally protected interest." 8 It is worth noting, however, that the Hamidi court's approach to economic damages creates
some perverse incentives. Because only actual harm (or the threat of
harm) to the computer system triggers liability, liability depends not
on the character of the defendant's activities, but on the (in)ability of
the plaintiff's computer system to absorb the effects of those activities.
The greater the processing power of a company's computer system,
the less likely it is that unwanted contacts will impair its functioning.
In other words, if the trespass-to-chattels tort protects a resource
owner's possessory interest in her equipment, that possessory interest
is surely an odd one because the interest of a computer owner with a
large system receives less protection than the interest of a computer
89
owner with a small system.
Even if the Hamidi court's interpretation of the language of the
Restatement is correct, the broader point is that one cannot parse the
language of the Restatement as if it were a statute. The Restatement
merely synthesizes an adaptive common law doctrine, and more
important than the Restatement's specific language is the underlying
interest the Restatement seeks to protect. Indeed, just as it is possible
to read the Restatement to foreclose liability for purely economic
harms arising from interference with a chattel, it is possible to read the
Restatement to permit injunctive relief for a trespass-to-chattels claim
even when a plaintiff shows no harm at all. The commentary accompanying section 218 on harm states that one cannot sue on a trespassto-chattels theory for nominal damages, offering the following
explanation:
The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the
similar interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection
by an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with
the chattel .... Sufficient legal protection of the possessor's interest
in the mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to
use reasonable force to protect his possession against even harmless
interference. 90
88 Cf Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 307 (noting assertion in CompuServe that loss of business

reputation and customer goodwill constituted harm to "the ISP's legally protected interests
in its personal property"); id. at 308 (stating that Intel could not assert property interest in
its employees' time).
89 As David McGowan points out, this result is especially odd if capacity is costly
because the system owner who sinks the most money into her network has the least ability
to control it. McGowan, supra note 14, at 369.
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 218 cmt. e.
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The Hamidi court read this passage to foreclose liability for trespass to chattels in the absence of a showing of some harm 91-as suggesting that a possessor has no legally protected interest in the
inviolability of her chattel. The passage, however, supports precisely
the opposite conclusion. First, the comment does not in fact suggest
that a possessor lacks a legally protected interest in the inviolability of
a chattel; indeed, it acknowledges that interest and deems it "similar"
to the interest of a possessor of land. Rather, the comment says that,
unlike with trespass to land, one is not entitled to nominal damages to
protect that interest in inviolability. The unavailability of a nominaldamages remedy for past, harmless intermeddling with a chattel says
nothing about whether a possessor is entitled to injunctive relief to
prevent future activities-and injunctive relief was the only relief that
the Hamidi court considered. 92 More fundamentally, the comment
presupposes that a possessor can protect the interest in inviolability of
a chattel through exercising a privilege of self-help. 93 All of the electronic trespass cases involved self-help. The particular self-help
efforts the plaintiffs chose, however, were only temporarily effective
or were altogether unavailing because the defendants found a way to
evade them, and because escalating them would have affected other
legitimate customers. For example, Intel attempted to block Hamidi's
e-mail, but Hamidi evaded its efforts by sending his e-mails from different computers; 94 likewise, Cyber Promotions circumvented
CompuServe's blocking mechanisms by falsifying the point-of-origin
information in its e-mail headers and concealing the IP addresses of its
computers. 95 Such cat-and-mouse games-with plaintiffs attempting
to erect technical barriers to block certain activity and defendants
finding ways to evade them-are common to all of the major Internet
96
trespass-to-chattels cases.
91 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 302-03.
92 Intel initially sought damages, but later waived the claim. Id. at 301.
93 For similar arguments, see Epstein, supra note 14, at 78-81 (suggesting that privilege
to use reasonable force to protect chattel ordinarily preserves possessor's "inviolate"
interest in chattel, but that "pressure on these rules has mounted with the rise of the
internet"); McGowan, supra note 14, at 356 (arguing that Internet trespass cases "do not
alter the real-world results that would occur if, as the Restatement contemplates, self-help
worked").

94 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 301.
95 CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
96 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 896
(N.D. Iowa 2001) (noting defendant's awareness that "his e-mailers were the subject of
anti-spam efforts by ISPs such as AOL"); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d
1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that eBay blocked 169 IP addresses it believed
Bidder's Edge was using to query eBay's systems, but that Bidder's Edge used proxy
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Indeed, it is worth noting that the Hamidi court's apparent conclusion that a system owner does not have an inviolable interest in her
computer system leads to some odd results. The Hamidi court's
approach would in theory permit a defendant to evade technical
restrictions on access to a computer system so long as the defendant
caused no harm to the system. 97 Suppose that, rather than sending
employees e-mail, Hamidi had hacked into Intel's web servers and
briefly replaced the main web page with that of his anti-Intel organization, FACE-Intel-a practice known as "graffiti hacking." While such
action would have both interfered with Intel's web servers and
deprived Intel of the use of some portion of its web server, under the
Hamidi court's reasoning, such graffiti hacking would not be tortious

because it threatened no physical harm to or impairment of the functioning of Intel's web servers.
A defender of the Hamidi court's approach might argue that

evading a technical restriction to replace content on a server is more
troublesome than merely sending e-mail to servers configured to
receive e-mail. That conclusion, however, depends on an assumption
that the law should enforce access restrictions coded into software, but
should not enforce limitations a system owner conveys by other
means, such as actual notice (a point I challenge in Part III).98 The
defender might also suggest that other sources of law, including computer crime statutes, sufficiently regulate activities like hacking.
servers to evade blocks); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (E.D.
Va. 1998) (noting defendants' efforts to "evade AOL's filtering mechanisms").
The back-and-forth between Ticketmaster and Tickets.com appears to have gone
through numerous rounds. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654,
2003 WL 21406289, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (noting Ticketmaster's significant expenditure of "time and effort" to "frustrate" Tickets.com's spider); Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (discussing Ticketmaster's thwarted efforts to redirect incoming Tickets.com traffic from its
interior pages to its main pages); Appellants' Opening Brief at 10, Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc., 2 Fed. Appx. 741 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-56574) ("Tickets.com designed
its spiders to deceive Ticketmaster's computers into believing that the electronic signals
generated by Tickets.com's spiders were generated by a Netscape browser utilizing a
Windows 95 operating system; when they do not."). In addition, according to Ticketmaster,
Tickets.com used other methods to elude Ticketmaster's blocking technology, including
accessing Ticketmaster's servers through various ISPs. Id. It would have been impossible
for Ticketmaster to exclude the spiders without also excluding Internet users utilizing the
same ISPs.
97 For a case that seems to reach precisely that conclusion, see Pearl Invs., LLC v.
Standard I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 349-50, 353-54 (D. Me. 2003) (dismissing claim
that unauthorized connection of server to plaintiff's virtual private network, thus creating
"tunnel" into network, constituted trespass to chattels).
98 Cf McGowan, supra note 14, at 371 (posing question as "whether the law should
require password protection as a condition of recognizing the right to exclude, or whether
it should [also] recognize that right when 'open' websites object to particular uses").
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Perhaps so, but the point for now is that Hamidi's harm-to-system
approach implies that even breach of these sorts of technical restrictions should not be actionable as trespass.
Finally, even if the harm-to-system approach is correct, its application in the Hamidi decision serves as a rather transparent cover for
a quite different rationale: that Hamidi's message was sufficiently valuable that its distribution should be permitted. Assume, for example,
that Hamidi had distributed pornographic e-mails to Intel's employees
rather than e-mails concerning Intel's review and promotion policies.
Under the Hamidi court's approach, Intel could not enjoin such communications. Any harm that such messages cause would be functionally equivalent to the harm of Hamidi's messages; and, as in Hamidi,
Intel's objection would have been based on the content of the e-mail.
In other words, the harm-to-system approach prevents Intel from
excluding not only e-mails that are critical of its policies but also other
communications that it might find objectionable based on content.
It nevertheless seems doubtful that the court would have denied
Intel an injunction if Hamidi had attempted to distribute pornography. That point highlights the distinction between the harm-tosystem approach the Hamidi court nominally adopted and the "nuisance" approach some commentators have favored. 99 Under a nuisance approach, a court would weigh the social value of the
tortfeasor's use against the harm to the system owner. A nuisance
rationale explains why a court might assign liability for the transmission of pornographic e-mails but not for e-mail such as Hamidi's-a
pornographic e-mail has limited social value, while an e-mail criticizing employment practices may have significant social value. But
the consequences of shifting from a harm-to-system approach to a
true nuisance approach are significant. Denying Intel the legal means
to block Hamidi's e-mail at first seems to be a victory for free speech,
but, importantly, it limits Intel's speech by preventing the company
from tailoring its space to particular uses. 100 In addition, at least in a
case involving the transmission of e-mail, a nuisance approach necessarily places a court in the position of making content-based judgments about the social value of different uses of a system. To the
extent that the Hamidi court's decision reflects the court's conclusion
that Hamidi's use was socially valuable, the decision is all the more
troubling for its silence on that point.
99 See supra note 14.
See McGowan, supra note 14, at 360-66 (arguing that right to exclude "plays a vital
role in constituting the social function of different spaces" and allows for "[m]anagerial
discretion over the expressive environment of the workplace").
100
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None of this, of course, establishes that the Hamidi court's conclusion was incorrect. Rather, the point is that, from a doctrinal perspective, the matter is far more complicated than has been portrayed
by the Hamidi court and those scholars who oppose application of
trespass to chattels in the Internet context. A court faced with an
electronic trespass claim seeking injunctive relief must choose a particular approach to the question of harm. The Hamidi court, in essentially embracing commentators' critiques of the bulk e-mail and robot
cases, adopted an approach that requires a plaintiff alleging a trespass
to chattels to demonstrate that a defendant's actions threaten to
damage or impair the functioning of her computer system itself. As
will be discussed later, carrying that approach to its logical conclusion
would be a risky step.
C. Normative Critiques
In order to truly understand the potential significance of the
Hamidi opinion for the shape of the Internet and for the development
of access control technologies, we must examine why, among the different rules for harm, commentators have advocated harm-to-system
or nuisance approaches. The remainder of Part I considers the normative ideas that underlie scholars' objection to utilizing trespass-tochattels doctrine in the Internet context. More broadly, setting aside
the doctrinal requirements for particular cyberproperty claims, it asks
how the law should protect network resources.
By way of introduction, it is useful to begin our examination of
potential regulatory approaches to unwanted use of network systems
by introducing the classic dichotomy between "property" and "liability" rules.10 1 Under a property rule, the law recognizes an entitlement holder's right to enjoin any unwanted uses of a protected asset,
whether or not the use will cause harm. 10 2 Because the entitlement
101 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). For discussion
and refinements of the Calabresi and Melamed framework, see, for example, Ian Ayres &
Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean
Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability
Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, PropertyRules Versus
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV, 713 (1996); James E. Krier &
Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedralin Another Light, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149 (1997); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The
Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997).
102 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 101, at 1092 ("An entitlement is protected by a
property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its
holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.").
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holder can block any unwanted use, she can set the terms of access to
a resource, requiring potential users of the system to negotiate for
access. 10 3 Protecting network computing resources under a property
rule would allow the resource owner to weigh the costs and benefits of
particular uses and determine which uses to allow. In contrast, under
a liability-rule approach, the would-be user has the right to utilize the
entitlement holder's asset, subject to terms determined by a third
party (typically, a court or legislature). 1°4 A liability-rule approach to
network resources would allow access against the property owner's
wishes but might require payment of damages for certain harmful
activities. 10 5 Applying either type of rule with respect to network
resources could in theory yield the same level of access. For example,
even if a website owner can set the terms of access (a property-rule
approach), she may choose to allow all access that does not impair her
system, on the theory that such access will be beneficial. This
approach would result in the same degree of openness as would a liability rule that allowed access but required a user to pay for any harm
to the system. Thus, in choosing between property-rule protection
and liability-rule protection for resources, the issue is not only what
level of access to network resources is appropriate, but also who
should decide what level of access is appropriate-the resource owner
or a third party (such as a court or legislature).
The Hamidi court rejected a property-rule approach: Under the
court's trespass-to-chattels framework, companies like Intel would
lack the ability to enjoin unwanted e-mail or to set the terms of access
to their mail servers. Most scholars addressing the cyberproperty controversy concur, arguing that property-rule protection for network
resources is wholly inappropriate; and this line of argument guided the
court's decision in Hamidi. The remainder of this section explores
scholars' arguments and shows that those arguments do not make a
conclusive case against a property-rule approach. I do not seek to
make an affirmative case for a property-rule approach here. By
exposing certain gaps and weaknesses in the prevailing normative critiques of cyberproperty claims, however, I hope to set the stage for a
fuller analysis of the issues in Parts II and III.

103 Id.

See id. ("Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay
an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.").
105 The classic example of a liability rule is a nuisance: A factory owner may pollute a
nearby resident's air, but must pay damages. See id. at 1116.
104
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The Competing Interests in Cyberproperty Claims

Before evaluating the normative arguments against granting a
network resource owner a right to exclude unwanted uses, we should

identify the competing interests at stake in cyberproperty disputes.
These competing interests are well illustrated by the trespass-tochattels cases considered in Sections A and B.
First, the law must provide sufficient protection of a network
resource owner's investments-both in physical equipment and in the
development of a business model-to generate appropriate incentives
for productive activities. 106 The CompuServe and eBay decisions
reflect courts' sensitivity to this problem. In CompuServe, the defen-

dants had essentially shifted to CompuServe (and its subscribers)
some of the costs of transmitting bulk e-mail, and CompuServe's lawsuit reflected an effort to shift those costs back to the defendants. If
the law required ISPs to bear the full cost of the transmission of unsolicited commercial e-mail, they would be less likely to provide such
services.10 7 Similarly, companies such as eBay are less likely to
develop online business models if they cannot protect against a competitor's free riding.
Second, the public has an interest in open access to information
and open avenues for speech. If a company such as eBay can control
access to its servers, it can also control access to the information those
servers hold. eBay may have objected to Bidder's Edge's extraction
and aggregation of its data in part because it feared that Bidder's

Edge (though not a direct competitor) would draw customers away
from its site.108 But search engines and comparative shopping utilities
106 See Madison, supra note 12, at 436 (noting that various doctrines invoked to protect
access to systems share policy goal that "investments in efforts to produce and distribute
intangible information should be legally protected as a way to preserve incentives to make
those investments"); Jane K. Winn, Crafting a License to Know from a Privilege to Access,
79 WASH. L. REV. 285, 285 (2004) (noting that application of trespass-to-chattels doctrine
to Internet raises competing interests in protecting "incentives to invest in the kind of
commercial facilities that now largely constitute the Internet" and "the public interest in
knowledge gleaned from information posted on the Internet").
107 The recently enacted federal statute regulating unsolicited commercial e-mail practices is premised in part on this fact. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, § 2(a)(6), 117 Stat. 2699, 2699-700
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(2)(6)) (noting "significant monetary costs" imposed
on providers of Internet access services).
108 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 59, at 182 (arguing that eBay objected to Bidder's
Edge's activities because "eBay sought to preserve its dominance in the online auction
industry" and that, if Bidder's Edge prevailed, eBay's users would "no longer be captured
and restricted to a single site"). As I argue below, however, the claim that eBay's motive
for denying access to Bidder's Edge was anticompetitive is difficult to square with eBay's
willingness to license other aggregators, as long as they would agree to post only current
price data. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
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work in precisely the same way as Bidder's Edge, by using software
programs to recursively query sites and aggregating and organizing
the resulting data for users. Granting a website owner the power to
block a competitor's robots also grants the site owner the ability to
block a search engine's robots, thus raising the possibility that property-rule protection for systems will curtail one of the most publicly
beneficial features of the Internet. 109 Likewise, as evidenced by the
Hamidi case, power to control access to mail servers can translate
easily into a power to curtail objectionable speech. The California
Supreme Court's sympathy with Hamidi's defense appeared to stem
from its concern that Intel was seeking to suppress dissent about its
policies-that the case implicated free-speech interests, albeit at the
level of policy rather than at the level of the Constitution.' 1 0
Third, even setting aside questions about how information available on the Internet is ultimately used and about the extent to which
the Internet provides open avenues for speech, society has an interest
in the scale of the network itself. The Internet reflects what economists term "network effects" or positive "network externalities":
Access to the network becomes more valuable as it becomes more
widespread."' Consider an analogy to a telephone system. With only
a few subscribers, such a system has very little value. As subscribership grows, however, the value of the system to each subscriber
increases. 112 Similarly, each user's access to the Internet becomes
more valuable as use of the Internet becomes more widespread.
When a service provider or website owner blocks unwanted access,
the service provider essentially closes a portion of the network and
113
thereby limits the network's scale.
Finally, assuming the law does permit system owners to enforce
some restrictions on the use of network resources, users have an
interest in fair notice of the conditions of access. Most Internet
resources appear to users to be available without any restrictions on
access, in the sense that there is no technical impediment (such as a
109 See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
110 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 307-08 (Cal. 2003) ("Intel's position represents a further extension of the trespass to chattels tort, fictionally recharacterizing the
allegedly injurious effect of a communication's contents on recipients as an impairment to
the device which transmitted the message.").
111 For discussion of the theory of network effects, including its distinct variants and
their manifestation in several different fields of law, see generally Mark A. Lemley &
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479

(1998).
112 Burk, supra note 14, at 50-51 (explaining theory of network effects through example
of telephone system); Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1281 (1998) (same).

113 See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
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password restriction) to users sending e-mail to most mail servers or
retrieving files from most web servers. Because the lack of any technical impediment to access can signal the resource owner's consent to
the use in question, the law must require a resource owner to provide
adequate notice of deviations from an open access condition. In
CompuServe and eBay, of course, the defendants had actual notice of
the system owners' objection to the unwanted use.' 14 Both cases also
raised, but did not resolve, questions about the adequacy of alternative forms of notice-in CompuServe's case, a policy available on its
network prohibiting unsolicited commercial e-mail, and in eBay's
case, a user agreement that prohibited automated queries of its
1 15
system.
2.

"Overpropertization" Critiques and Their Limitations

The question then becomes: What sort of legal protection for
network resources best balances the competing interests identified
above? To date, most scholars have rejected property-rule protection
in the Internet context. The next two subsections evaluate the arguments against property-rule protection.
As noted earlier, both property rules and liability rules in theory
can yield an optimal amount of access. Which sort of rule is preferable often depends on how likely it is that the rules will in fact yield a
socially optimal amount of access. According to the conventional
view of how the legal system should protect entitlements, property
rules are favored when transaction costs-including the costs of identifying and bargaining with the parties to a dispute, and the costs of
obtaining information on how the parties value a particular entitlement-are low. 116 When transaction costs are low, bargaining will
lead to an efficient distribution of entitlements, and there is no need
(from an efficiency perspective) for legal intervention to influence
that distribution. When transaction costs are high, and the parties
cannot easily identify and bargain with one another, bargaining will
not occur, and the result will be an inefficient distribution of entitle11 7
ments. In this context, liability rules may be preferable.
Although it is fair to describe this account as the conventional
1
one, 18 significant law-and-economics scholarship is devoted to chal114 See supra notes 27, 39 and accompanying text.
115 See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
116 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 101, at 1127.
117 Id.

118 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 101, at 1037 (describing transaction costs account as
"folklore" among law-and-economics academics); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 101, at
718 (challenging "conventional wisdom" on the virtues of property versus liability rules);
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lenging it. 119 As a result, it is not surprising that some arguments
against courts' recognition of cyberproperty claims come from within
this framework, while others come from outside the framework. I
turn first to general arguments against property-rule protection for
network resources, and then to arguments that depend more directly
on the costs of bargaining and problems of valuation. What all of the
arguments have in common is a concern that recognition-of cyberproperty claims will lead to "overpropertization" of the Internet-that
system owners' ability to assert a strong property right to exclude
unwanted uses will curtail productive uses of the Internet.
a.

Cyberproperty Claims as Enclosure of Intellectual Property

As noted, one of the difficulties raised by cyberproperty claims is
that a right to control access to the physical equipment of a network
translates into far broader powers-for example, the ability to block
speech or to control access to and uses of information. 120 It is intellectual property law-specifically copyright law-that ordinarily establishes the extent to which one can control uses of informational goods.
12 1
The control that copyright law provides, moreover, is incomplete.
Accordingly, scholars fear that recognizing a system owner's right to
block unwanted uses of network resources will shift informational
goods from a copyright regime of incomplete protection to a property
regime of complete protection.12 2 As I will show, however, there are
two problems with this argument. First, the argument assumes that
the incentives that intellectual property law provides for the development of informational goods are sufficient for the development of
online business models. Second, taken to its logical conclusion, the
anti-enclosure position points to a fully mandatory access approach,
under which sites could not use password protection or any other sort
of technical self-help to block unwanted uses. Scholars do not seem to
embrace that conclusion.12 3 Yet, in accepting that system owners may
use some technical measures to "close" access to a site, scholars do
not explain why technical limitations on access are permissible, but
other limitations are not.
Krier & Schwab, supra note 101, at 447-55 (criticizing as "simplistic conventional wisdom"
notion that liability rules are always appropriate when transaction costs are high).
119 See generally Ayres & Talley, supra note 101; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 101;
Krier & Schwab, supra note 101.
120 See supra note 12 and accompanying text; infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
123 See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

December 20041

DEFENDING CYBERPROPERTY

A significant and growing body of literature on developments in
copyright law suggests that the public domain is shrinking, as informa-

tional goods traditionally treated as part of the "commons" achieve
legal protection as private property. 124 As Professor James Boyle has

put it, we are in the midst of a "second enclosure movement," a
phrase intended to evoke comparison with the conversion of common
areas into private property in England from the fifteenth through the
nineteenth centuries. 125 Copyright law traditionally has not granted
creators of informational goods so-called "strong" property rightsthat is, clear and undivided entitlements. 1 26 Because uses of informa-

tional and other intangible goods are non-rival, one of the main justifications for recognizing strong property rights-the threat that
resources available to all will be overused-does not apply to intellectual property. 27 Accordingly, the law recognizes a copyright holder's
exclusive rights to control uses of her work only for a limited period of

time,

28

and subjects those rights to particular limitations, such as the

public's right to make fair use of the work and a range of compulsory
licenses. 12 9 Moreover, because copyright law only protects original

works of authorship-a standard that requires some modicum of creativity-not all works achieve copyright protection. 130 In particular,

facts do not warrant copyright protection, nor do insufficiently orig13
inal compilations of facts. '

124 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 354-55 (1999); James
Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discriminationand DigitalIntellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2010 (2000); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CoNrrEMP. PROBS. 33,
37-40 (2003) [hereinafter Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement]. For a discussion of the
origins of the overpropertization critique with respect to copyright law, see Benkler, supra,
at 354 n.2.
125 See Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 124, at 33-36 & nn.2, 9
(describing first enclosure movement).
126 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 136
(1999) (observing that federal copyright system recognizes variety of weak entitlements,
including "muddy" and divided entitlements).
127 See Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 124, at 41 (noting that "informational or innovational commons" does not involve same threat of overuse as physical commons); Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public
Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 89, 90 (2003) (observing that
"Tragedy of the Commons" argument does not apply with respect to intangible property
b cause "there is no physical resource to be ruined by overuse").
'128 See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
129 See id. §§ 107-112, 115.
130 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("The sine qua
non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection a work must be original
to the author.").
131 Id. at 344, 348. For opposing perspectives on the implications of Feist for protection
of databases, compare Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Pro-
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Critics of recent trends in copyright law suggest that copyright's
limited protection for informational goods strikes a delicate balance
between providing incentives for the creation of such goods and preserving public access to them. 132 That balance, the critics argue, is
threatened by a range of legal developments permitting purveyors of
informational goods to achieve greater protection than copyright law
has traditionally recognized-that is, to secure strong property rights.
To take one example, providers of information in digital form can use
"rights management systems"-technical mechanisms that allow a
provider to dictate what uses are and are not permitted, and at what
price-to control uses of a digital work, effectively deploying a technical fence around the information, regardless of whether copyright
law or related doctrines would protect it. 133 The permissions the
information provider sets effectively become a self-enforcing substitute for the provisions of copyright law.13 4 Relatedly, if copyright law
does protect the work, and technical measures control access to it, the
135
Digital Millennium Copyright Act prohibits their circumvention,
even if the user seeks to make fair use of the work.1 36 Commentators
tection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 176 (1997),
favoring additional protection of databases, with J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 137-38 (1997), criticizing proposals for sui generis protection of databases.
132 See Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 124, at 42-44 (explaining incentive argument for intellectual property protection and innovation benefits from public
access to information); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095,
1098 (2003) ("[T]he use of intellectual property law is always a balancing act between
allowing the greatest number of people to enjoy works at low cost, without lowering the
cost so much that the works will never be created in the first instance."); see also Benkler,
supra note 124, at 401-08 (opposing expansion of copyright and related rights on ground
that such expansion is unlikely to increase information production in aggregate).
133 Compare, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 48 (2001) (arguing that rights management systems "will allow copyright owners to appropriate far more protection than copyright law now provides"), and Lemley, supra note 112, at 1291-92 (commenting that
"[t]here is no reason to expect that technological protection systems designed for the benefit of copyright owners will preserve" uses that copyright law always permitted), with Tom
W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 561 (1998) (identifying public benefits of
rights management systems). For a discussion of how rights management systems work,
see id. at 565-67 & nn.31-40.
134 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 135-36 (1999).
135 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
0
136 See Benkler, supra note 124, at 415 (noting that anticircumvention prohibition "operates irrespective of whether the access gained ... infringes a property right in the work");
Burk, supra note 132, at 1102 ("Anticircumvention laws used as an adjunct to technological
controls confer upon content owners a degree of control never attainable under a regime
of traditional copyright."); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813,
839-40 (2001) (noting that violation of DMCA does not depend on whether access led to
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treat these and a range of other developments, from copyright term
extensions 137 to proposals aimed at protecting uncopyrightable
databases, 138 as part of this "unprecedented" enclosure trend.
The normative concerns scholars raise with respect to cyber-

property claims fit within the context of this larger debate. Applying
trespass-to-chattels doctrine in a dispute over access to a web server
or similar system may allow the system owner to restrict access to and
use of material made available on that system, regardless of whether
copyright law protects the material. 139 For example, as mentioned

above, copyright protection does not extend to facts or insufficiently
original compilations of factual information, such as the white pages
of a telephone directory. 140 If similar information were held on a

website, and a court recognized a system owner's right to block
unwanted uses through trespass to chattels or another claim, the court
would effectively grant to system owners a right to control information broader than that granted by copyright law. Likewise, the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the federal analogue to state trespass claims, prohibits unauthorized access to "information,"' 14 1 regardless of whether intellectual property law protects the material in
question. 142 If a system owner can block any use of material on a
website based on the objection that the system owner did not
authorize access to its computer system, the CFAA provides an alter43
native cause of action when copyright protection is unavailable.
infringement or fair use); see also Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519, 543-46 (1999) (describing legitimate reasons for circumvention that
DMCA does not recognize).
137 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 106 (2001) ("The distinctive feature of modern American copyright
law is its almost limitless bloating-its expansion both in scope and in duration.").
138 See Benkler, supra note 124, at 440-46 (outlining and criticizing proposed Collections of Information Antipiracy Act (CIAA), which would prohibit extraction or use of
data from databases and collections of information that are currently uncopyrightable).
139 Cf.Burk, supra note 14, at 39-40, 43-44 (alleging that Internet-based trespass-tochattels claims are an attempt to gain protection copyright law will not provide).
140 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
141 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2000).
142 See Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L.
REV. 320, 324 (2004) (arguing that "by allowing website owners to protect information that
is not protectable under copyright law, the CFAA unconstitutionally overrides the delicate
balance of rights between authors and the public").
143 Similarly, although the DMCA's anticircumvention provision covers only works protected by copyright law, it raises some of these same difficulties. To the extent that a
system owner uses a technical protection measure to control access to a work with copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements, the DMCA appears to prohibit circumvention to
gain access to the noncopyrightable portions. Moreover, as noted, the law validates an
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Similarly, if a court applies contract principles to enforce a system
owner's "terms of use," and allows the agreement to govern even
when its terms are inconsistent with copyright law, the terms of use
displace more limited copyright protections. 144 In such a case, the
owner's right may sound in contract rather than property, but if courts
do not carefully scrutinize whether the user had notice of and manifested assent to the contract terms, the owner's contract rights take on
1 45
the characteristics of property rights.
Scholars thus argue that if intellectual property law does not protect particular material, then other doctrines and methods should not;
otherwise the balance that intellectual property law strikes between
providing incentives to create and preserving public access will be
undermined. 146 In other words, by granting protection above and
beyond intellectual property law, a cyberproperty rule grants benefits
to producers that go further than necessary to incentivize production
of the underlying work. It effectively becomes a transfer of wealth
from consumers to producers.
To counter this concern that tort and contract law are "enclosing"
otherwise unprotected digital material, critics argue for rejecting
owner's use of technical protection measures regardless of whether a user seeks to make
fair use of the work. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
144 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudenceof Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1089, 1095-96 (1998) (noting that "legal protection against unauthorized copying and distribution is incomplete, and is so by design," and discussing courts' treatment,
as a matter of contract law, of mass-market standard forms, which share some features with
terms of use); Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract,Regulation by Machine, 160 J.
INSTITUTioNAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 6 (2004) (noting that provision of terms of use

can "supersede[ ] copyright law by extending control of the property owner to information
that the copyright law delimits as non-property").
145 See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 119-21 (1999) (arguing that because proposed uniform
law governing transactions in information "abandon[s] the focus on offer and acceptance .... contracts [under that law] are really more akin to property rights"); cf Julie E.
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management,"
97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 496 n.118 (1998) (noting convergence of contract reasoning and
property reasoning); Lemley, supra note 112, at 1259 n.7 (discussing property/contract
convergence).
146 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 14, at 39-40 (arguing that trespass to chattels reflects "a
novel, hybrid form of a property right" that shares "the same concerns as previous
attempts to subject Internet activity to a strict regime of exclusory rights"); id. at 43 (criticizing trespass to chattels on ground that it reflects "an attempt to address the same issues
that copyright has allowed to pass unsanctioned in web linking"); Elkin-Koren, supra note
59, at 208-09 (arguing that because copyright law "was designed to regulate use and information, and ... includes some checks and balances informed by the unique character of
informational works and their social significance[, t]he displacement of copyright law by
other common-law doctrines for establishing a right to control access to information is
worrisome"); O'Rourke, Restrictions on Access, supra note 13, at 296 (arguing that courts
evaluating cyberproperty claims "have been less receptive than they should be to considerations of copyright policy").
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cyberproperty claims and thereby preserving application of copyright
law to define the scope of the system owner's rights.1 47 Scholars urge
courts to use one of several tools to achieve this preservation of copyright law. Some scholars argue that copyright law should be understood to preempt application of state trespass 148 and contract
principles. 1 49 Others claim that there are constitutional limits on

enclosure of the public domain, either in the First Amendment 150 or in
the Copyright Clause itself.15 1 On this view, the perceived excessive
enclosure of the public domain that application of cyberproperty
claims would entail is unconstitutional.
Scholars typically acknowledge, however, that courts would have

to adjust the current contours of copyright preemption 152 and adopt a
more expansive view of the role of the Constitution in policing the
boundary between intellectual property rights and the public
domain 153 to preserve the application of copyright principles where
scholars believe they should apply. The argument, quite simply, is

normative rather than doctrinal, and measuring it against the competing interests outlined in Part I.C.1 above reveals its weaknesses.

Cyberproperty critics attach paramount importance to the
interest in preserving open access to information. As for the role of
147 See, e.g., O'Rourke, Restrictions on Access, supra note 13, at 296 ("Courts should not
adopt a perspective that cedes all questions of terms of access and use to laws other than
copyright.").
148 See O'Rourke, supra note 8, at 590 ("If 'accessing' is synonymous with 'copying,'
then the Copyright Act is the exclusive rule of decision under its preemption section.
There is simply no room for a state law 'trespass to a website' cause of action." (citation
omitted)); O'Rourke, Restrictions on Access, supra note 13, at 306-07 (suggesting that
implied preemption analysis might find trespass tort preempted by copyright law); see also
Burk, supra note 14, at 40 (labeling trespass cause of action "[c]opyright's [c]ousin").
149 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 59, at 200 ("A license that restricts the use of (otherwise
unprotected) information could be preempted under copyright law."); O'Rourke, Restrictions on Access, supra note 13, at 300-04 (proposing and working through preemption
analysis for contract terms).
150 See Benkler, supra note 124, at 393 (arguing that "all property rights in information
conflict with the 'make no law' injunction of the First Amendment").
151 See Galbraith, supra note 142, at 358 (arguing that "it is highly unlikely that Congress
even has the power to create private property rights in factual information").
152 See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 59, at 200 n.80 (noting holding in ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), that contractual restrictions on use of information
are not preempted by copyright law); Lemley, supra note 145, at 139-44 (discussing fact
that Copyright Act's preemption provision, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000), "does not seem to preempt most contractual provisions," and that, despite potential for implied conflicts preemption based on conflict between copyright policy and state contract enforcement, law
remains inconsistent and underdeveloped in this area).
153 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional

Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 198 (2003)

(describing "decidedly contested" view "of the constitutional framework that constrains
Congress from regulating information and cultural production too greatly").
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the law in providing incentives for investments in the development of
an online business, however, the anti-enclosure position simply seems
to presume that the incentives copyright law supplies are sufficientthat any incentives above those copyright law provides simply transfer
wealth from consumers to producers. When we focus on the interest
in open access to the exclusion of the interest in providing incentives,
however, it becomes difficult to say why the law should even grant a
system owner a right to block uses that cause physical harm to a
system. In other words, if all websites should remain part of a "commons," it is unclear why a private party should have a right of action
even if her computer system is harmed. 154 The fact that most scholars
do accept that a system owner can block uses that will cause harm to
her system suggests that scholars are in fact more sensitive to the
incentive issues than their predominant focus on the preservation of
open access would at first suggest. But once we recognize that some
protection of a system is necessary to guard investments in an online
business model, it is unclear why the law should recognize physical
harm and not economic harm. The anti-enclosure position simply
provides no basis for accepting one harm rule and rejecting another.
Second, even if intellectual property law does provide the relevant incentive structure, relying on intellectual property law to displace application of cyberproperty claims faces another problem. In
particular, taken to its logical conclusion, the anti-enclosure position
would suggest that systems connected to the Internet cannot use password protection to control access to their websites. I know of no
scholar who advocates this sort of fully mandatory open-access
approach. Scholars do criticize the DMCA on the ground that, in
prohibiting circumvention of technical measures to control access to a
copyrighted work, it puts the force of law behind a copyright holder's
terms of access; some scholars go so far as to argue that would-be
users should have the right to circumvent technical measures to gain
access to a work to make a fair use. 155 Scholars do not, however, suggest that a website must remain open to all would-be users. Rather,
they seem to view the decision to disallow some access-by "closing"
sections of the site-as a permissible and legitimate choice. 156 The
See McGowan, supra note 14, at 368.
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 144, at 1141-42 (suggesting that recognizing right to
"hack" digital rights management systems "simply reaffirms the balance between authors
and users, and between information ownership and the public domain").
156 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 14, at 54 (noting that "any consent to system usage that
might be implied from connection to the Internet surely does not include 'hacker' intrusion"); see also id. at 38 (focusing critique of trespass-to-chattels claims on cases in which
connection to Internet gives rise to inference of "invitation" to engage in certain conduct,
such as transmission of files over e-mail system).
154
155
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question is why the decision to limit access through password protection is permissible, but the decision to impose other kinds of limitations is not. 157 The anti-enclosure story simply cannot answer that
question.
Relatedly, an approach that relied wholly on the contours of
intellectual property law to establish when access to a system is permissible would prohibit a website owner from using other sorts of selfhelp measures to control the circumstances under which others gain
access to the site. For example, eBay's and Ticketmaster's efforts to
block requests for data based on the IP address of the computer
seeking the data, or efforts to redirect requests for information to a
main page rather than an interior page,'158 would be illegitimate
because, like a legal right to exclude unwanted uses, such self-help
measures allow enclosure of information that copyright law does not
protect. Again, I know of no scholar who suggests that these sorts of
self-help measures are impermissible. Here, the anti-enclosure argument reaches another logical impasse: Scholars remain wedded to the
notion of open access but ignore its implications.
In sum, although arguments challenging enclosure trends make
many compelling points with respect to intellectual property law,
those arguments ultimately cannot explain why courts should reject
cyberproperty claims. Scholars seem to assume that intellectual property law provides adequate incentives for the development and
delivery of web content. Even if they are correct, their argument
points to a position that no one ultimately takes-that system owners
cannot use even the most basic technical protections.
b.

Bargaining and Valuation Problems Under a Property-Rule
Approach

As the discussion above suggests, arguments relying on the balance intellectual property law strikes between control and access do
not conclusively establish the case for rejecting cyberproperty claims.
I turn here to other normative arguments scholars offer to explain
why granting system owners the right to exclude unwanted uses will
result in overpropertization. In particular, scholars offer three main
reasons why recognizing cyberproperty claims will curtail productive
uses of the Internet. First, they claim, Internet transactions are sufficiently complex that granting resource owners a right to exclude
157 1 return to one plausible answer below-that a system owner who does not password-protect but who otherwise seeks to control access is free-riding on the network by
taking advantage of its openness but refusing to contribute to its scale. See infra notes
170-76 and accompanying text.
158 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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unwanted uses of their systems will prevent optimal uses.' 59 Second,
if resource owners are left to balance the competing interests at stake,
160
they will be likely to undervalue the benefits of open access.
Finally, scholars fear that if system owners are granted a right to
16 1
exclude, they will exercise that right in an anticompetitive manner.
I highlight problems with each of these arguments.
First, scholars seem to assume that protecting network resources
through a property-rule approach is the equivalent of setting a default
rule of closed access, regardless of a system's technical configuration.
That assumption, of course, factors heavily into scholars' assessment
of when users must negotiate for access and thus of whether productive uses of the Internet are likely to occur. A default rule of closed
access, however, is not an inevitable feature of a property-rule
approach. 162 Removing that assumption undermines much of the
force of the scholarly critiques. Second, like the intellectual property
critique, some of the arguments logically lead to a fully mandatory
access rule that few commentators actually would advocate. Finally,
although it is difficult to gauge the risk of anticompetitive conduct,
concerns about such conduct are difficult to reconcile with existing
cyberproperty cases. In addition, it is possible to respond to such concerns without entirely rejecting property rule forms of protection.
In arguing that the law should not grant network resources
owners a right to exclude unwanted uses of their systems, scholars
claim that recognizing cyberproperty rights will force potential users
to bargain for access in such a wide range of circumstances that productive uses simply will not occur. Some critics go so far as to suggest
that validation of access controls, particularly through the application
of trespass doctrine, will lead to the creation of an "anticommons"-a
form of property in which rights are "so finely divided" that it is
impossible to make optimal use of a resource. 163 The argument draws
upon Professor Michael Heller's work on post-Soviet Russia, which
attributed suboptimal uses of certain property to the excessive division in the "bundle" of rights typically associated with ownership of
private property, resulting in parties' inability to bargain to efficient
uses of resources. 16 4 Some scholars suggest that recognition of access
See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
162 See infra pp. 2207-08.
163 Burk, supra note 14, at 49; accord Hunter, supra note 12, at 511.
164 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons]. For articles applying the concept of the anticommons and
exploring its effects, see generally Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Com159
160
161
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controls will create a digital anticommons: If system owners have a
right to exclude unwanted uses, then users must negotiate licenses
with the owners of each system they wish to access on the Internet.
As Professor Burk has put it, "One can imagine the anti-commons
nightmare that could ensue on the Internet in web linking, indexing,
and other routine functions if every owner of equipment attached to
the network were granted a cause of action for the trespass of
unwanted electrons on her equipment."' 65 Similarly, Professor Dan
Hunter has suggested that, if the law recognizes a right in system
owners to exclude unwanted uses, search engines "will be severely
constrained" and aggregation products will disappear. 166 He even
asks, only somewhat rhetorically, whether application of a trespass
cause of action to unsolicited e-mail might imply
that one must read the "Terms of Acceptable Email Usage" of
every email system one emails in the course of an ordinary day[.] If
the University of Pennsylvania had a policy that sending a joke by
email would be an unauthorized use of its system, then under the
logic of [trespass-to-chattels case law], you would commit "trespass"
167
if you emailed me a Calvin and Hobbes cartoon.
Even those who do not specifically invoke the anticommons
problem suggest that recognizing a right to enjoin unwanted contacts
will curtail productive uses of the Internet. Professor Lawrence Lessig
argues that under the approach of the eBay court, if "individual sites
begin to impose their own rules of exclusion," the costs of using the
Internet will climb because "machines must negotiate before entering
any individual site."' 68 Likewise, a brief filed by dozens of intellectual
property and cyberlaw professors in the Hamidi case suggested that,
under a trespass approach, "each of the hundreds of millions of
[Internet] users must get permission in advance from anyone with
whom they want to communicate and anyone who owns a server
169
through which their message may travel."
Apart from concerns about the range of circumstances in which
bargaining must occur for productive activities to go forward, scholars
seem to raise a second concern: that system owners will tend to
undervalue the system-wide benefits of granting access. This concern
emerges from scholars' claims that the Internet itself is a "commons"
mons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property,
108 YALE L. 1163 (1999); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698 (1998).
165 Burk, supra note 14, at 49.
166 Hunter, supra note 12, at 508.
167 Id. at 508-09.
168 LESSIG, supra note 137, at 171.
169 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 310 (Cal. 2003).
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that is increasingly being enclosed.170 Commentators point to the fact
that the Internet developed and flourished with open access to the
communications protocols needed to transmit information and nondiscriminatory access to the Internet backbone. 171 Recall the observation that the Internet is a prime example of "network effects"-that a
connection to the Internet becomes more valuable as use of the
Internet becomes more widespread. 172 Those who connect computer
systems to the Internet, whether they offer subscribers capabilities to
send and receive mail or host information, benefit from the scale of
the network,1 73 and as individual sites "begin to impose their own
1 74
rules of exclusion, the value of the network as a network declines."'
It is unfair, scholars suggest, for system owners to reap the benefits of
a large-scale network while refusing to bear costs associated with it.175
Moreover, because system owners cannot fully internalize the benefits
that derive from the scale of the network, they will be likely to
1 76
exclude uses that might contribute to the scale.
Third, scholars suggest that system owners have incentives to
block access to their systems for anticompetitive reasons. This argument has been most thoroughly developed by Professor Maureen
O'Rourke. She observes that, although many websites are unlikely to
object to uses such as indexing by a search engine's robots, the bestknown sites "may prefer that users travel directly to them rather than
first going to a search engine from which they may choose to go to a
competitive site."1 77 In essence, firms wish to preserve market power,
and dispersal of product and pricing information by a search engine
may erode brand power and bring markets closer to perfect competition. 178 Although O'Rourke concedes that the choice between recogSee Hunter, supra note 12, at 503-04.
See, e.g., id.; Lemley, supra note 12, at 534-36.
See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
See LESSIG, supra note 137, at 171 (noting that sites such as eBay benefit greatly from
open network); Burk, supra note 14, at 51 (describing positive network externalities
involved in companies' use of Internet).
174 LESSIG, supra note 137, at 171.
175 See Burk, supra note 14, at 48 (noting that companies such as Intel "derive[ I benefit
from the public nature of network"); id. at 51 ("[Piropertization in a networked environment encourages the holder of the exclusive right to attempt to free-ride upon the external
benefits of the network, while at-will avoiding contribution of such benefits to others.");
Hunter, supra note 12, at 502 (arguing that "'cyberspace enclosure movement"' began
when "online actors, who had cheerfully reaped the benefits of the online commons,
decided to stake out their own little claims in cyberspace").
176 Burk, supra note 14, at 48 (arguing that "there are public benefits to be had in a
cyberspace network that are not captured, and indeed may be destroyed by overpropertization").
177 O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 13, at 1975.
178 Id. at 1977-78.
170
171
172
173
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nizing strong or weak property rights in network resources presents a
"close" question, she argues that strong exclusionary rights are inappropriate in the early stages of development of electronic
commerce.179
How persuasive are these arguments against a property-rule

approach to protecting network resources? Several of the claims
seem overbroad. Consider, first, commentators' claim that the
Internet itself is a "commons" that is increasingly being enclosed. It is
true that the functioning of the Internet relies on access to common

resources donated to transferring and relaying information and to protocols that enable all parties connected to the Internet to communicate with other systems. 180 But to make the case that recognizing a
network resource owner's right to exclude unwanted access will

enclose the Internet commons, one must argue that network
endpoints, such as mail servers and web servers, have historically been

part of the commons as well. That is a far more difficult case to
make."" To the extent that we do treat network endpoints as part of
the commons, moreover, these resources may be subject to the same
forces that justify property rights in other contexts. For example, mail
servers face a fairly typical "tragedy of the commons" problem:
Because those who transmit e-mail do not bear the cost of the use,
they are likely to overuse the resource. The solution to a "tragedy of
the commons" problem, in most instances, is to propertize it.182
179 Id. at 2005.

See Hunter, supra note 12, at 503-04.
181 In a recent article, for example, Professor Dan Hunter argues that application of
trespass to chattels in the Internet context results in enclosure of the Internet commons.
But Hunter's concept of what forms the Internet "commons" is unclear. Hunter first
focuses on the communications protocols that allow computers to communicate with others
on the network and the resources donated to relaying and transferring information. Id. at
503-04. To the extent that he treats network endpoints such as mail servers as part of the
commons, he focuses on the role of mail servers in relaying e-mail messages on behalf of
other systems. Id. at 503. That mail servers sometimes performed these functions on
behalf of other systems, however, does not mean that mail servers granted unfettered
access for any and all uses. When discussing the problem of the "enclosure" of the Internet
commons, Hunter is careful to focus on the communications protocols and network
resources donated to relaying and transferring information-he asks that we "[clonsider
the 'property' at issue not as individual websites or mail systems, but rather the commons
property of the network resources." Id. at 511 (emphasis added). Despite having never
made the case that "individual websites or mail systems" were open to any and all uses,
however, Hunter then suggests that "[w]e used to enjoy a general and untrammeled 'right'
of access to websites, email systems, fileservers, and so forth" and that a right to exclude
unwanted uses from a web server or a mail server will therefore constitute "enclosure" of
the commons. Id.
182 See, e.g., Rose, supranote 127, at 90 (presenting "tragedy of the commons" argument
as one rationale for exclusive property rights).
180
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Web servers may not be subject to the same tragedy of the commons. The argument that web servers should remain part of the commons, however, still encounters the same difficulties as the general
concern about enclosure of information on web servers. 183 The argument begs the question of whether intellectual property law provides
the only appropriate incentive structure for encouraging investment in
productive activities online. In addition, the Internet-as-commons
position cannot support any rule short of mandatory open access: If
web servers and mail servers are a "commons," they should be open
to any and all uses. It quickly becomes impossible for system owners
to justify the use of any technical measures such as passwords to protect their sites.
Another claim that seems exaggerated is that granting a system
owner a right to block unwanted access will result in the development
of a digital "anticommons." In identifying the anticommons as a form
of property, Professor Heller described situations in which rights with
respect to a single piece of property are divided among many parties,' 84 and in which a particular parcel of land is fragmented into
unusable portions (as in the case of successive devises).18 5 Recognition of access controls on the Internet simply cannot be compared to
the first situation: The Internet is not a single piece of property, the
efficient use of which is prevented by dispersal of the typical rights of
ownership. An Internet in which access controls are validated might
be closer to the fragmented parcel of land. Fragmentation of real
property, however, presents problems that do not exist in the Internet
context. Where consolidation of the property cannot be achieved by
operation of law, parties must negotiate to re-form the parcels into a
usable piece of land; one party can hold out and prevent the efficient
use of the resource.1 86 But no similar holdout problem exists on the
Internet. The fact that one site blocks a search engine's recursive queries from retrieving information for indexing purposes does not mean
that recursive queries cannot retrieve information from sites that do
permit such activities. It is obvious that enforcing access controls
might make a search engine less useful than it otherwise might be, but
to state that concern in the form of an appeal to the "anticommons" is
183 See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
184 Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 164, at 680 ("Privatization
broke up the socialist bundle of corporate governance rights among a heterogeneous set of
managers, workers, and local governments. These new owners may now hold excessive
rights of exclusion, such that each prevents the others from restructuring corporate
assets.").
185 Id. at 685-87 (discussing "anticommons" problems associated with congressional
allotment of Native American communal lands).
186 See Burk, supra note 14, at 49 (describing holdout problem).
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to take as a given that the entire Internet must be open, when that is
precisely the question in dispute.
Even if we trim away these broader claims, we are still left with a
core argument that cyberproperty rights will reduce the availability of
information on the Internet-that bargaining must but will not occur
in a wide range of circumstances. Recall the arguments of Professors
Burk, Hunter, and Lessig, as well as those of the dozens of intellectual
property and cyberlaw professors in Hamidi: that routine functions
such as linking and indexing would be blocked by recognition of trespass to chattels; 18 7 that the logical extension of applying trespass to
chattels to mail servers is that one must consult the terms of use for
every system to which one transmits e-mail;188 that "machines must
negotiate before entering any individual site"; 189 that "each of hundreds of millions of [Internet] users must get permission in advance
from anyone with whom they want to communicate and anyone who
owns a server through which their message may travel."' 9 In short,
commentators suggest that recognizing access controls will convert a
range of seemingly mundane activities into tortious conduct.
But is this necessarily so? It is worth observing that over the several years during which scholars have made dire predictions about the
harmful consequences of recognizing cyberproperty claims, the predictions have remained just that. Although numerous courts have recognized cyberproperty claims, no scholar to my knowledge has yet
offered evidence that electronic commerce has been harmed in any
way.' 9 ' As a matter of logic, moreover, the view that recognizing
cyberproperty claims will bar routine uses is counterintuitive; the fact
that system owners connect their computer systems to the Internet
indicates that they desire those systems to be used in some way.
Under these circumstances, it is fair to presume that system owners
who connect their systems to the Internet implicitly consent to certain
uses of those systems. In other words, saying that the law should grant
the owner of a network resource the right to block unwanted uses
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
191 A comparison of the amicus brief filed by a group of law professors in the eBay case
and that filed in the Hamidi case is instructive. Despite the two-year gap in filing dates,
during which several courts recognized cyberproperty claims, the arguments are virtually
identical. Compare Brief of Amici Curiae Mark A. Lemley et al. in Support of Bidder's
Edge, Appellant, Supporting Reversal at 8-11, eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., No. 0015995 (9th Cir. submitted June 22, 2000), with Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Intellectual Property and Computer Law, Supporting Reversal at 10-12, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71
P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (No. S103781).
187
188
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does not mean that users must proceed from a default presumption of
closed access.
Scholars' concerns that users must proceed from a default presumption of closed access must therefore be based on a prior premise-that even if a network resource owner consents to some uses of
her system, a user is poorly positioned to identify the contours of that
consent and must therefore either bargain for access or forgo the
desired use. If, for example, a search engine developer must consult
the terms of use of any site it wishes to index before using automated
software to extract the contents of the site, it is unlikely that the project will go forward. Put another way, to recognize a right to exclude
unwanted uses of network resources is to grant a right to control property with boundaries that are unclear, through an invitation with
murky terms. On this view, recognizing a cyberproperty right raises
both efficiency concerns and fairness concerns because users will not
know the conditions of access.
These efficiency and fairness concerns, however, do not necessarily point toward a rejection of cyberproperty claims. In fact, the concerns point in two possible directions: toward rejecting property-rule
protection, or toward recognizing a right to exclude only if system
owners provide meaningful notice of the terms of access or employ
technical measures that block access. Indeed, concerns about the
clarity of notice may explain why even those scholars who generally
oppose recognition of cyberproperty claims stop short of arguing that
system owners cannot use password restrictions to segregate and control access to content. 192 Password protection provides a very clear
signal to a potential user concerning restrictions on use of the system.
Other kinds of limitations on permissible uses of a system-such as
limitations included in a policy posted at some location on a network-do not signal the terms of access as clearly.
These responses to the broad efficiency and fairness concerns do
not resolve the final concern that prompts scholars to resist strong
property protection for network resources: that system owners will
disallow access for anticompetitive reasons. 193 At the outset, it is
worth noting that most of the cases in which courts have recognized
cyberproperty claims do not appear to involve anticompetitive concerns. The case most often cited as demonstrating an anticompetitive
use of a cyberproperty claim is the eBay case. 194 In fact though, eBay
See supra text accompanying note 157.
193 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
194 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 59, at 182 (arguing that "eBay sought to preserve its
dominance in the online auction industry"); O'Rourke, supra note 8, at 607 (exploring
Bidder's Edge's arguments that eBay sought to control information so as to maintain its
192
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both licensed other aggregators to index its site and agreed to allow
Bidder's Edge to do so; eBay simply insisted that Bidder's Edge's queries occur in real time. 195 It is difficult to reconcile eBay's willingness

to allow dispersal of its pricing information with concerns about
196
anticompetitive conduct.
Even if certain system owners do have incentives to use a right to
exclude in anticompetitive ways, it does not necessarily follow that

property-rule protection for network resources is always inappropriate. Current law generally responds to anticompetitive conduct
through antitrust law-from within the existing framework of prop-

erty rights, not by divesting firms of property rights. Moreover, in
advocating rejection of strong property rights, most scholars do not
embrace a rule that would respond directly to anticompetitive concerns by requiring system owners simply to bear certain costs of competition. Rather, scholars embrace far broader rules-rules that, for
example, would require system owners to bear any economic harm,
197
not merely those costs most directly associated with competition.
As this discussion suggests, the case against property-rule protection for network resources is far less compelling than it appears at first
glance. The issues, at least with respect to trespass to chattels, cannot
easily be resolved at the doctrinal level. Normatively, arguments
based on "overpropertization" of informational goods or of the
Internet fail to explain why the law nonetheless should protect against
uses that cause physical harm to a computer system; why, if the law
does protect against such physical harm, it should not also protect
monopoly in online auction market); O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 13, at
1975-76 (noting eBay's "vociferous" opposition to auction indexing sites).
195 eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
196 In this regard, O'Rourke's arguments are quite balanced. She acknowledges that a
rule giving a system owner the ability to control access to product and pricing information
does not raise concerns "if sites have no practical incentive" to exercise that control.
O'Rourke, supra note 8, at 601. She argues, however, that there are "[s]cenarios ... in
which a monopolist may use its power to control the flow of information in an anticompetitive and inefficient way." Id. at 609.
197 For example, under the nuisance approach advocated by Professor Burk and others,
the law would require open access so long as the public benefits of access outweigh the
costs to the system owner. See supra note 14. This response is far broader than required to
address concerns about anticompetitive conduct. Professor O'Rourke's approach is perhaps the most closely tailored to anticompetitive conduct. She advocates a misappropriation model, under which courts could consider, among other things, both the cost to the
objecting site of gathering the information that would be taken through the unwanted use,
and whether the free-riding at issue in the unwanted use would threaten the system
owner's incentives to engage in an online business. See O'Rourke, Shaping Competition,
supra note 13, at 2001-02. An approach like O'Rourke's could allow courts to police
anticompetitive behavior without destroying the incentives of companies to develop online
business models and protect the security of their systems.
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against economic harms; why it is permissible to use password protection to "close" a website; or why, if it is permissible to use password
protection to limit access to a system, other sorts of limits are impermissible. Moreover, the normative account is clearly based on the
premise that a property rule will lead to closed access, while a liability
rule will lead to open access. In the next Part, I offer a broader normative framework for considering cyberproperty claims that calls this
premise into question.
II
REGULATORY APPROACHES IN LAW AND CODE

Part I illustrated the doctrinal and normative complexities of network resource owners' claims to control unwanted access to their systems. I argued that such claims cannot easily be resolved at the
doctrinal level. Examining the question within the standard framework of property-rule and liability-rule protection for entitlements
illustrated that the case against a property-rule approach is not as
compelling as scholars have assumed it to be. This Part attempts to
offer a more nuanced normative framework for exploring how the law
should protect network resources. I first argue that the property rule/
liability rule dichotomy is fundamentally incomplete in this context.
A variety of possible approaches to protecting network resources
combine both property-rule and liability-rule features, in that access is
allowed unless and until a system owner takes certain steps to trigger
a right to block unwanted uses. These approaches are conceptually
equivalent; they differ only in what kind of steps the system owners
must take to trigger the right to exclude. The challenge for those who
would reject certain approaches is to explain why, despite the conceptual similarity, some approaches are preferable to others.
Second, I argue that in favoring certain kinds of legal rules,
scholars have not fully considered the relationship between law and
technical measures in producing regulatory outcomes. As scholars
have suggested in other contexts, technical measures can supplement
or supplant law in producing regulatory outcomes. 198 The issue of
control over network resources illustrates that point: A technical control over use of network resources can be combined with legal protection to give a system owner a significant degree of control; and even in
the absence of any legal protection, a system owner can still exercise
some control through technical measures. Although these issues have
been explored in other contexts, 199 the cyberproperty controversy
198 See infra notes 391-96 and accompanying text.
199 See infra notes 391-407 and accompanying text.
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illustrates another important facet of the relationship between law and
technical measures. If technical measures and law both affect regulatory outcomes, and if system owners are free to choose the technical
measures that protect their systems, then we must be concerned about
the effect that the choice of particular legal rules will have on a system
owner's selection of technical measures. In other words, it is not
merely the case that law and technical measures supplant or supplement one another as regulatory forces. Law may actually produce a
greater reliance on protective technology.
Section A introduces four possible legal approaches for protecting network resources. Section B further refines this analysis by
providing concrete examples of each and illustrating that the
approaches overlap to some extent. Sections C and D explain the
relationship between law and technical measures in producing particular regulatory outcomes and reconceptualize the debate over cyberproperty claims in light of that relationship.
A.

Four Legal Approaches to Protecting Network Resources

To expand the normative framework for analyzing claims to control access to network resources, it is useful to describe four possible
approaches the law could take to protecting such resources. Each of
the first three approaches contemplates recognizing a system owner's
right to enjoin unwanted uses and thus to control the terms of access;
in that sense, each involves property-rule protection. The approaches
differ only in what triggers the right to injunctive relief to enforce the
access conditions the system owner establishes. Under the fourth
approach (a commons approach), the law will not back the system
owner's terms of access with injunctive relief, thus reflecting rejection
of property-rule protection.
Closed Access Default. First, the law might simply treat all access
that has not been bargained for as illegitimate-that is, presume a
default rule of closed access. Under this approach, the user would
bear the full burden of identifying the contours of permissible use and
would bear the full risk that her activities might be inconsistent with
restrictions the network resource owner places on access. This
approach is not unlike how trespass doctrine applies to land when the
would-be trespasser has no basis to presume that a landowner consents to particular activities. To be liable for trespass, a person need
not even know that he has entered onto someone else's land, as long
as he intends to be where he is. 2 °° The presumption in law is that all
200

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND),

supra note 24, § 163 cmt. b. The comment reads in

full:
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uninvited entry onto property is unlawful. If the law applied an analogous presumption in the Internet context, then users would have to
bargain for access to any system.
Notice-Based Approach. Under an alternative approach, the law
would presume a default rule of open access, but would nevertheless
allow a network resource owner to enjoin unwanted uses of her
system once he or she identified limitations on the contours of permissible use. Rather than placing the full burden and risk of identifying
appropriate uses on the user, the law would require system owners to
"signal" limitations on use of the system, through measures reasonably calculated to give users notice of those limitations. I defer the
question of what measures would meet the standard. 2 1 The point for
now is that under this approach, the system owner would have to take
some steps to secure a right to enjoin unwanted uses, but would not
need to resort to technical measures actually designed to block access
before receiving legal protection.
Code-Based Approach. Under a third approach, the law would
require a network resource owner to do more than merely give clear
notice of what uses of her system are permissible. To achieve legal
protection, the system owner would need to use technical mechanisms
designed to limit access-essentially to "fence" or otherwise segregate
information. Technical mechanisms-such as password protection or
re-routing all requests for data to a main page-designed to control
access might also serve the purpose of signaling the contours of permissible access; but to trigger a system owner's legal right to enjoin
unwanted uses, those mechanisms would actually have to control
access to some degree. Just as a system owner can use a range of
measures of varying strength to notify users of the contours of permissible access, so too can a system owner use a range of technical mechanisms of varying strength to block access. I defer the question of
how effective a technical measure must be to trigger a right to enjoin
unwanted uses. The point for now is that under this approach the law
would back mechanisms that are actually effective in controlling some

If the actor intends to be upon the particular piece of land, it is not necessary
that he intend to invade the other's interest in the exclusive possession of his
land. The intention which is required to make the actor liable under the rule
stated in this Section is an intention to enter upon the particular piece of land
in question, irrespective of whether the actor knows or should know that he is
not entitled to enter.
Id.
201

See infra notes 326-43 and accompanying text.
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access, but not mechanisms that merely signal limitations on permis20 2
sible uses of a system.
Commons Approach. Finally, the law might not afford the
system owner any power to enjoin unwanted uses; the law would
instead permit users to access any and all network resources, even
over the objection of the resource owner. Even evading a technical
limitation on access would not give rise to liability. I refer to this
approach as a "commons" approach, to signify the absence of strong
property rights in network resources.
B.

Variance Within and Blurring Between Legal Approaches

In identifying the four possible approaches under which the law
could protect network resources, I do not intend to suggest that there
is a clear line of demarcation separating each approach from the
others. Rather, the categories reflect ranges along a spectrum, and
there is a considerable variance within each category and blurring
between categories.
For example, it should be obvious that if the law backs relatively
"weak" signaling mechanisms-mechanisms unlikely to provide
notice of the range of permissible uses of a system-the result will be
similar to that produced by a default rule of closed access. Consider a
202 A recent article by Professor Orin Kerr addressing the scope of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004), distinguishes
between "contract-based" and "code-based" restrictions on use of a computer system. See
Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in Computer
Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1596, 1599-1600, 1644-46 (2003). I use the term "codebased" restriction in a broader way than Kerr, to encompass any technical measure
designed to restrict access, regardless of its strength. Kerr does not specify how strong a
technical restriction must be for its circumvention to trigger a violation of the CFAA's
prohibitions on unauthorized access, but the examples he offers involve fairly strong technical measures (such as password protection and encryption). See id. at 1664, 1666. Kerr's
"contract-based" restrictions also seem to represent a subset of my category of "noticebased" restrictions. As I discuss below, disputes over unwanted access often involve
"terms of use" that present difficult questions of notice and assent, see infra notes 239-46,
264-305, 316-24 and accompanying text, and it may be inappropriate to treat such terms as
part of a binding "contract." In addition, as Kerr recognizes, it would be inappropriate to
treat a system owner's mere objection to an unwanted use as a contractual restriction. See
Kerr, supra, at 1639-40 (discussing Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004)). That begs the question, however,
whether a system owner is limited to contractual or code-based restrictions on use of a
system-or whether the owner has a "property" interest in her system that can be controlled simply by revoking any implied consent to use the system. Kerr confines his discussion to the CFAA, and thus does not address the broader normative questions raised by
cyberproperty claims generally. With respect to the unauthorized access provisions of the
CFAA, however, I ultimately arrive at the same conclusion as Kerr-that those provisions
should be interpreted to reach only the circumvention of strong code-based restrictions.
See infra Part III.C.1.
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system owner who simply places a policy statement at some location
on her network where a user is unlikely to encounter that statement,
and requires no manifestation of assent to its terms. If a court nevertheless permits such a statement to govern the terms of access, then
the system owner can, at very little cost, achieve nearly the same level
of protection as would be achieved through a default presumption of
closed access. If, on the other hand, the law requires actual and specific notice to a would-be user that particular uses are unwelcome,
then a system owner must take certain significant, affirmative stepssuch as policing the system to detect unwanted uses and notifying
would-be users of impermissible conduct-before benefiting from
legal protection.
In between these two points are other degrees of signaling that a
system owner could use to convey legally enforceable limitations. As
I will discuss below, one of the most difficult questions in this context
is how the law should treat "terms of use" by which system owners
typically purport to restrict access to their systems. 20 3 With no inquiry
into whether terms of use are reasonably calculated to provide notice
to users of the contours of permissible access, terms of use are analogous to the sort of policy statements discussed above, and a system
owner receives a great deal of legal protection with little effort. If, on
the other hand, such terms of use are permitted to govern only when a
defendant clearly had notice of and assented to those terms, then a
system owner must do more to earn legal protection.
In a similar vein, consider the use of the "robot exclusion standard" to deter automated queries of computer systems. The robot
exclusion standard is a protocol by which system owners can signal
from what files, if any, robots are permitted to extract data. The
server owner creates a simple text file, labeled "robots.txt," that
includes directives on what portions of the server may and may not be
recursively queried. 20 4 For example, the robots.txt file may instruct all
robots not to query any of the files available on the server, may
instruct all robots not to query certain directories or files, or may
20 5
instruct specific robots not to query all or some directories or files.
See infra notes 239-46, 264-305, 316-24 and accompanying text.
See Web Server Administrator's Guide to the Robots Exclusion Protocol, at
http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/exclusion-admin.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2004). The robot
exclusion standard requires that the robots.txt file be placed in the top level of a server's
document space-as, for example, http://www.domainname.com/robots.txt. Id. Because
the robots.txt files appear in consistent locations, a compliant robot knows which files on a
server to query.
205 Server owners take a wide range of approaches. For example, eBay currently allows
all robots access to all but three of its directories, although it includes a comment (unreadable by robots) in its robots.txt file purporting to disallow them. See http://www.ebay.com/
203
204
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Software developers who adhere to the robot exclusion standard
simply program their agents to access and follow the instructions in
the robots.txt file at every site they visit. Adherence to the robot
exclusion standard is "voluntary" in the sense that the web server will
not actually deny access to a robot that ignores the information in the
robots.txt file.20 6 The standard nevertheless serves as a means to pro-

vide technical but very specific notice about permissible uses of a
system. Assuming the law gives effect to limitations on access if the
system owner uses measures that clearly convey them to would-be
users, the question is whether limitations conveyed through terms of
use or the robot exclusion standard qualify as such measures.
We can also identify some blurring between notice-based and
code-based approaches. For example, a system owner might set forth
terms of use and require users to click an "I Agree" button before
proceeding-perhaps even requiring the user to scroll through all of
the terms before clicking "I Agree." In this context, the system owner
may merely be attempting to signal limitations on use of the system,
but the requirement to click "I Agree" also acts as a very weak technical control on access.
Just as there are a range of signaling mechanisms that vary in how
likely they are to provide users with notice of the permissible uses of a
system, there are a range of code-based mechanisms that vary in how
likely they are to actually block access to a system. Consider the
example of a system owner who wishes to control access to her site
based on the address of the page from which the user was referred to
the site. The Ticketmaster case provides a useful example. Because
Ticketmaster wished to preserve the value of its site to advertisers,
Ticketmaster sought to prevent users from following "deep links"
20 7
directly from Tickets.com's site to Ticketmaster's "interior" pages.
When a web browser contacts a server to retrieve a particular page,
the browser conveys several pieces of information, including the contents of the "Referer" variable-a variable the user's browser typirobots.txt (last visited Aug. 20, 2004). For further discussion, see infra notes 382-85 and
accompanying text. The CNN website provides an illustration of relatively detailed
robots.txt instructions, with several specific robots disallowed from dozens of directories.
See http://www.cnn.com/robots.txt (last visited Aug. 20, 2004).
206 When a robot ignores the robots.txt instructions, a server owner may be able to
detect that its site is being queried recursively. Even if she can detect the robot, she cannot
modify her robots.txt file to exclude that particular robot unless the robot's developer has
assigned it a unique user agent name-something that Hypertext Transfer Protocol version
1.1 (HrrP/1.1), the communications protocol currently used by web servers, permits but

does not require. The robot exclusion standard is therefore effective only against "compliant" robots.
207 See supra note 96.
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cally sets to contain the address of the previously accessed web
page. 20 8 The Referer variable benefits web server owners in a number
of ways, by allowing the server to identify pages with links to the
209
server, to trace obsolete or mistyped links, and to optimize caching.
For a site owner wishing to prevent deep linking, knowing the contents of the Referer variable allows the server owner to restrict access
to certain files on the basis of the referring page and/or redirect users
to the website's homepage. In other words, the site owner can allow
or disallow access based on the site or page most recently visited by
the user. Although reliance on the Referer variable allows a site
owner to redirect some traffic to the main page, the site owner's control is not complete. The Referer variable can be "spoofed" to make
it appear that the referring site was a trusted site when in fact it was
not. 2 10 Tickets.corn apparently exploited this fact to defeat
2 11
Ticketmaster's efforts to block deep links.
There are other technical measures a network resource owner can
use to control access to her server. She may, for example, allow or
deny access based on the network identity of the "host"-that is, the
computer that originates the request for a web page. The server
owner simply creates a file in the directory where the files to which
the owner wishes to control access are located, and specifies, by
domain name or IP address, which hosts are allowed or denied access
to the files. 212 If a website owner wishes to block the use of robots, for
example, she may be able to detect the IP address of a computer that
is transmitting recursive data requests, and may then configure her
system to block queries originating from that IP address. eBay used
this approach in attempting to block Bidder's Edge's recursive que208 "Referer" is a misspelling of referrer. See R. Fielding et al., Hypertext Transfer Protocol-HTI'P/1.1 Request for Comments 2616, § 14.36, at 86, at http://www.faqs.org/ftp/rfc/
rfc2616.pdf (1999).

209 Id.
210 A simple Internet search reveals multiple sites discussing how to spoof the Referer
variable.
211 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99 CV-7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (discussing Ticketmaster's inability to block deep linking);
Appellants' Opening Brief at 12 n.9, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2 Fed. Appx.
741 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-56574) (explaining that Ticketmaster "attempted to block
Tickets.com's deep-links, but Tickets.com circumvented those blocks the very same day").
Neither the district court opinion nor Ticketmaster's brief on appeal specifies that
Tickets.com spoofed the Referer variable, but that is the most likely basis for
Ticketmaster's inability to block the deep links.
212 For one of many server guides explaining access control options, see, for example,
iPlanet Web Server, Enterprise Edition Administrator's Guide, Chapter 8: Controlling
Access to Your Server, at http://docs.sun.com/source/816-5691-10/esaccess.htm (last visited
Aug. 20, 2004).
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ries, 213 and Intel also sought to block Hamidi's e-mails on this basis. 214
When a system relies solely on host authentication as a means of
access control, however, it is vulnerable to IP address spoofing-that
is, to the intentional misrepresentation of a source IP address to conceal the sender's identity or to impersonate a trusted computer
21 5
system.
Finally, a system owner can control access to an information
server through some combination of username and password authentication. Such an approach is the most effective technical means of
controlling access, but it is the most costly to maintain and gives the
system owner the least flexibility.
There also may be a blurring between the code-based and commons approaches, depending on what sort of "commons" rule the law
reflects. As noted earlier, I use the "commons" label to describe circumstances in which a system owner lacks the right to enjoin
unwanted uses, irrespective of the notice she provides or the technical
measures she employs. There are really two different types of "commons" rules, and they can result in quite different levels of access.
Under one rule, which I label the "pure" liability rule, the law simply
does not intervene to back a system owner's efforts to limit access.
Even if a system owner attempts to use technical measures to block
access, she is not entitled to an injunction to enforce those measures.
Under the other rule, which I label the "technology displacing" rule,
the law actually restricts the technical measures that a system owner
could use to close access. The pure liability rule might lead to roughly
the same level of access as an approach that requires a system owner
to use a very strong technical measure in order to trigger the legal
right to block unwanted uses. Under either the "strong" code-based
approach or the pure liability approach, what kind of technical measure the system owner employs will determine the openness of a
system. A brief example will explain why. If a system owner chooses
a weak technical measure (such as using host authentication to block
access from IP addresses suspected of robotic activity), access will
nonetheless remain open to some users: under the code-based
approach because the law does not back weak technical measures, and
their circumvention is permissible; and under the pure liability
approach because the law does not back technical measures at all. If
the system owner chooses a strong technical measure (such as pass213 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
215 See, e.g., CERT Advisory CA-1995-01, IP Spoofing Attacks and Hijacked Terminal
Connections, at http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1995-Ol.html (last visited Aug. 21,
2004).
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word protection), most access will be blocked. The difference is that
under the code-based approach, those who have the technical ability
to gain access may not do so because the law blocks such conduct,
while under the pure liability approach, circumvention of even the
stronger technical measure is permissible.
The situation is quite different for the technology-displacing rule.
Because various types of technical measures are displaced under such
an approach, the resulting level of access likely will exceed what
would exist under the code-based or pure liability approaches.
Indeed, the technology-displacing rule is the only one that actually
would result in an open-access regime.
C. Regulatory Effects of Law and Code
I have thus far focused mainly on the legal components of a
system owner's efforts to control unwanted uses of network resources.
As the discussion makes clear, however, legal measures are not the
only kind of measures on which system owners can rely to control
access. We have seen that system owners have a range of technical
options as well. I discussed those measures above in terms of whether
system owners had to use them to take advantage of legal protection,
but it should be obvious that system owners can achieve varying
degrees of protection through technical measures alone. The degree
to which a system owner controls access thus depends on the combined effects of legal and technical measures. A few examples illustrate the point. To maximize a system owner's control over uses of his
or her system, the law might proceed from a closed-access default and
allow a system owner to block unwanted uses, even without providing
notice of limitations on use of the system. With such strong legal protection, the system owner could achieve a closed-access conditionthat is, block any and all unwanted uses-by operation of the legal
rule alone. If we do not choose such a strong legal rule, the system
owner might still be able to achieve the same degree of control by
using technical mechanisms to control access (assuming the law allows
for those technical mechanisms and provides an injunctive remedy if
they are circumvented). Thus, by employing technical mechanisms,
supplemented by law, a system owner could achieve access control
nearly equivalent to the strongest legal rule.
Figure 1 represents this point schematically for the various
approaches we have considered thus far. For each legal approach
described in Sections A and B (except the commons approach), the
figure shows how a system owner might combine legal and technical
protection to achieve a closed-access condition-that is, full control
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over unwanted uses over her system. The grey blocks signify the
strength of the signaling mechanism necessary to trigger legal protection under various notice-based approaches, whereas the black blocks
represent the strength of the technical measures necessary to trigger
legal protection under various code-based approaches. The hash
marks represent the legal protection necessary to achieve a closedaccess condition; the greater the size of the hashed area, the greater
the gap that must be filled by legal protection. Under each of the
approaches, if the law recognized and backed up the validity of the
mechanism, the system owner could, by utilizing that mechanism, control access to her system. (Because Figure 1 represents only those
rules under which a system owner is entitled to injunctive remedy to
control access, I defer illustration of the commons-based approaches,
under which injunctive relief to control access is unavailable.)
As the figure illustrates, there are a number of different ways to
achieve particular regulatory outcomes-through strong legal protection in the absence of any technical measure, through a strong technical measure supplemented by a relatively weak legal rule, and many
possible approaches in between.
FIGURE 1
POSSIBLE REGULATORY OUTCOMES ACHIEVED BY LEGAL
RULES AND TECHNICAL MEASURES
Access Condition
Rule
IClosed-Access Default

[]

Closed

Open

Neither notice nor technical
measure required. Closed
access enforced by law.

I

Signaling mechanisms of

2 Policy Statement

varying strength (grey)
to triggerlegal
(hash marks);
technical measure not
required.

3 Rrequired
R oE lo.dprotection
Z

4 Actual Notice
5 Refe

5 Referer Variable
6 Host Authentication
7 Password/User Authentication

.

Legal protection (hash

marks) is triggeredby, and
supplements, technical
measures of varying strength
(black), by prohibiting their
circumvention. Strength of
signaling mechanism is
irrelevant.

A second point about the relationship between law and code in
producing regulatory outcomes emerges from Figure 1. If strong technical mechanisms are nearly as effective as legal protection, then
system owners will still be able to achieve certain regulatory outcomes

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

2220

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2164

even when we reject strong legal protection. Put another way,
because system owners will always have the option to use technical
mechanisms to block access, even a conclusion that a system owner
should have no legal right to enjoin unwanted uses will not necessarily
lead to open access. Figure 2 below illustrates the level of access control a system owner would have under the "commons" approachesthat is, if the law afforded a system owner no right to enjoin unwanted
uses of her network resources. Attempting to signal limitations on
permissible uses of the system would have no effect on access because
the law would not enforce those limitations. Even under a pure
liability-rule approach, however, a system owner would still have
some control because she could use technical measures to block
access: the stronger the technical mechanism, the closer a system
owner would come to achieving full control over uses of her system.
There would always be some users who could circumvent the technical
measures and thus gain access, but fewer and fewer users would be
able to do so as the technical measures became stronger. The possibility of circumvention means that a system owner's control over
access is incomplete. Nevertheless, because technical measures are
available, a pure liability approach would not lead to open access. To
achieve a true open-access condition, the law would have to displace
technical measures that would otherwise block access; in other words,
a technology-displacing rule (as represented by Rule 8a in Figure 2
below) would be required.
D. Property and Liability Rules Revisited
Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that, in considering
from a normative perspective how the law should protect a network
resource owner's right to control unwanted uses, we do not face a
simple, binary choice between property rules and liability rules.
Rather, we actually have a complex array of legal rules from which to
choose. Returning to Figure 1, the legal rule proceeding from a
closed-access default presumption (illustrated as Rule 1) provides the
system owner with property-rule protection in all circumstances: It
would allow a system owner to enjoin all unwanted uses of her system,
even if she neither alerts potential users in advance of the scope of
permissible uses nor actually tries to block unwanted uses. The legal
rules that would give a system owner the right to enjoin unwanted
uses of her system so long as she appropriately signaled the permissible uses of that system (illustrated as Rules 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 1)
do provide property-rule protection, but they also reflect a feature of
liability rules: Access is open unless and until the system owner pro-
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FIGURE

2

POSSIBLE REGULATORY OUTCOMES IN ABSENCE OF
PROPERTY-RULE PROTECTION
Access Condition
Rule

Open

Closed

2a

Policy Statement

IAbsence

3a

Robot Exclusion Header

].

Actual Notice

J

technical measure controls

4a
5a

Referer Variable

'

Technical measures restrict

of any property-

rule protectionproduces

open-access condition tf no

access,
even in the absence
of legal reinforcement;

a

6a

access

Host Authentication

only some users
fewer) can

__(increasingly

7a

8.1 T

n

7

Ru

circumvent

f

Password/User Authentication

To achieve open-access
law must displace
I4-------------condition,
technical measures

vides the notice specified by each rule. In other words, until the
system owner provides adequate notice, the only remedy for
unwanted access would be damages for certain harms caused
(liability-rule protection). The provision of notice, however, would
trigger an opportunity for the system owner to enjoin unwanted access
(property-rule protection).
Similarly, the legal rules that would give a system owner the right
to block unwanted uses of her system so long as technical mechanisms
provide an appropriate level of actual control over uses of the system
(illustrated as Rules 5, 6, and 7 in Figure 1) have both liability-rule
and property-rule features. Unless and until a technical measure
blocks access, access is open, with the system owner's sole remedy
being damages for harms caused. If the system owner employs a sufficiently strong technical measure, however, she can rely on the law to
enjoin uses that evade those controls.
All of these hybrid liability/property rules approaches might
appropriately be described as "loperty" rules-a term that Abraham
Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have used to describe liability rules
216
that spring into property rules when certain conditions are met.
With respect to all of these hybrid rules (Rules 2-7 in Figure 1), the
default is a zero-order liability rule-that is, access is permitted, and
the price of access is set at zero. 217 Once the system owner meets the
216 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 101, at 53.
217 See id.
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requisite condition, by signaling restrictions on access (for Rules 2-4)
or blocking access with a mechanism of appropriate strength (for
Rules 5-7), the law restores to the system owner the right to dictate
the terms of access. In identifying the "loperty" rule as a form of legal
protection, Bell and Parchomovsky provide the example of "fencing

out" statutes that governed ranging property in the United States in
the 1800s, 2 18 and that still apply in certain states. 219 Rather than
applying the English common-law rule that prevented cattle from
grazing on a neighbor's land, the fencing-out rule permitted cattle to
roam freely on others' property until the property owner erected a
fence meeting certain specifications. 2 20 Once the landholder erected
the fence, "the landholder could exclude cattle grazers by means of
' 221
injunction, and could collect damages in the event of a trespass.
Note the similarities between the fencing-out rule and code-based
approaches to server access: The use of an appropriate technical mea218 Id. at 53-54; see, e.g., Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 328 (1890) ("It has never been
understood that in [sparsely populated] regions [of] this country ... a man was bound to
keep his cattle confined within his own grounds, or else would be liable for their trespasses
upon the unenclosed grounds of his neighbors."). As the Buford court recognized: "Such
a principle was ill-adapted to the nature and condition of the country at that time." Id.
Although the "fencing out" rule is often presumed to have predominated only in western
states, during the nineteenth century a number of northern and eastern states adopted that
rule as well. See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 660 n.94 (1986); Coby Dolan, Comment, Examining the Viability of Another Lord of Yesterday: Open Range Laws and Livestock Dominance in the Modern West, 5 ANIMAL L. 147, 157 (1999).
219 Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming all have some form of open-range provision, in some cases permitting municipalities to create herd districts in which fence-in rules apply. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31427 (West 2002) (prohibiting recovery of damages resulting from animal trespass unless
land is enclosed within lawful fence, except in no-fence districts); COLO. REV. STAT. § 3546-102(1) (2003) (allowing recovery if livestock breaks through lawful fence in good
repair); IDAHO CODE § 25-2118 (Michie 1990) (defining open range as "uninclosed lands
outside of cities, villages and herd districts, upon which cattle by custom, license, lease, or
permit, are grazed or permitted to roam"); id. § 25-2401 (allowing creation of herd districts
in which open-range doctrine does not apply); MON-. CODE ANN. § 81-4-203 (2003)
(defining "open range"); id. § 81-4-215 (allowing recovery if, outside of herd district,
animal breaks through lawful fence and owner of animal was negligent); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 77-12-5 (Michie 1999) (allowing recovery of damages for trespass within designated herd
law district); id. §§ 77-16-1, -3 (requiring persons with "lands or crops that would be injured
by trespassing animals" to use lawful fencing and requiring that landowners have appropriate fencing in order to recover for trespass committed by animals); TEX. AGRIC. CODE
ANN. § 143.082(a) (Vernon 2004) (imposing liability for permitting livestock to run at large
in county with range restrictions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-24-10(1)(a) (2003) (requiring livestock foraging on open range or outside enclosure to bear brand); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 16.60.015 (West 1992) (imposing liability for damages for trespass on land if fence is in
good repair); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 11-28-108 (Michie 2003) (imposing liability if animal
breaches lawful enclosure).
220 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 101, at 53.
221 Id.
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sure that actually blocks some access is the triggering event that transforms the regime from a zero-order liability-rule baseline to a
property rule; the difference between Rules 5, 6, and 7 in the illustration is that a different technical measure (of increasing strength)
would be required under each rule to trigger the property-rule protection. Similarly, under the notice-based approaches, it is the use of an
appropriate signaling measure that triggers property-rule protection;
the difference between Rules 2, 3, and 4 in the illustration is that different signaling mechanisms (of increasing strength) would be
required under each rule to trigger the property-rule protection.
Returning to Figure 2, we see that the matter is still more complicated. Even if we reject all of the approaches that involve the possibility of injunctive relief to block unwanted uses, it is not clear that
open access will result. In the absence of sufficient legal protection, a
system owner might use stronger technical protection. Some users
may be able to circumvent the technical protection, but some will not.
In other words, even if we remove the property owner's ability to use
the threat of an injunction to dictate the terms of access by embracing
a pure liability rule, the system owner still has the ability to use technical measures to restore her control-at least as to those who cannot
circumvent. If the law is to achieve the desired level of open access,
more than a liability rule may be required: The law must actually displace technical measures.
The observation that technical measures can supplement or supplant legal measures is not a new one. Scholars have made a similar
point with respect to copyright law, observing that digital rights management systems allow copyright holders to appropriate greater protection than copyright law itself allows. 222 In addition, scholars have
observed in other contexts that computer "code" can produce regulatory effects similar to law. 223 These points, however, have not been
brought to bear on the cyberproperty debate, which seems to presume
that an absence of legal protection will translate into open access.
It is especially important to consider the relationship between law
and technology in the cyberproperty context because doing so reveals
an important facet of that relationship that has largely been overlooked. System owners do not select technical measures in a legal
vacuum. The choice of a particular legal rule can influence a system
owner's choice of a technical measure to control access. 22 4 Consider,
222 See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
223 See infra notes 391-407 and accompanying text.
224 Professor Polk Wagner makes a similar argument in a forthcoming article. See R.
Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=582422.
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for example, a website that wishes to block robots. If the law does not
allow the site owner to enjoin robotic activity that disregards either
the owner's robot exclusion directives or her provision of actual notice
that the robotic activity is unwanted, then the site owner must turn to
some technical measure, such as attempting to block the source of the
robotic activity altogether. In the absence of legal protection, system
owners can simply strengthen their technical measures in an attempt
to achieve the equivalent effect.
This analysis refines our inquiry into how the law should protect
network resources. The choice is not merely between property-rule
and liability-rule approaches, but between a property rule based on a
default of closed access; two classes of rules perhaps best described as
"loperty" rules because of the necessity for some event to trigger
property-rule protection; a liability rule that would accept the existence of some technical mechanisms to block access, even though
those technical mechanisms could in many cases prevent achievement
of an open-access condition; and a rule that displaces technical mechanisms that block access (i.e., a technology-displacing rule). In
weighing the choice among these possible approaches, moreover, it is
important to keep in mind that the selection of a too-weak legal rule
may prompt greater reliance on technical measures. With these
refinements in place, the next Part examines the current state of the
law and which of these approaches is most appropriate for protecting
network resources.
III
RETHINKING CYBERPROPERTY CLAIMS

In this Part, I draw upon the more complete framework of Part II
to explain current legal approaches to protection of network resources
and to consider what legal approaches are most preferable. Section A
shows that the problem with current case law is that courts have
drifted toward a default presumption of closed access. That trend has
resulted from a flawed reading of the early Internet trespass cases,
such as CompuServe and eBay. The early case law, I argue, actually
reflects a "loperty" rule approach to protection of network
resources-it is consistent with a default presumption of open access,
where a system owner then takes certain steps (either notice-based or
code-based) to trigger property-rule protection. In Section B, I argue
that courts must curtail this drift toward a closed access approach.
Section C considers the more difficult choice among notice-based,
code-based, and commons approaches. Analyzing the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), I argue that, as a doctrinal matter,
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courts should only validate technical restrictions on access. For other
cyberproperty claims, the issue is normative rather than doctrinal. In
weighing the relevant normative considerations, I focus both on the
degree of open access that different rules are likely to produce and on
the relative balance of legal protection and technical protection.
Because technical measures lack the flexibility of legal measures and
have uneven effects on users, the balance between technical and legal
measures is important. The relative effects of technical and legal measures should lead us to favor legal protection over technical protection. A pure liability-rule approach or a code-based approach
requiring strong technical measures is likely to induce greater reliance
on technical measures to mimic property-rule protection. As a result,
the law should neither deny injunctive relief for unwanted access nor
require a system owner to employ strong technical measures to trigger
a right to injunctive relief. As long as courts proceed from a default
assumption of open access and place the burden on the system owner
to clearly convey the contours of permissible use, property-rule protection should prevail.
A.

Current Legal Approaches

In this Section, I explore the various legal doctrines network
resource owners have invoked to block unwanted uses of their systems. For trespass-to-chattels claims and claims under the CFAA, a
distinctive pattern emerges. Cases raising these claims under the
CFAA typically involve requests for injunctive relief against defendants who had actual notice of the plaintiff's objection to the conduct
in question but refused to cease their activity. Courts have allowed
actual notice to trigger a plaintiff's legal right to block unwanted uses
of her system. In other words, under trespass doctrine and the CFAA,
courts have taken an approach consistent with Rule 4 in Figure 1. But
broader pronouncements in these cases suggest that far weaker notice
mechanisms might also be sufficient to trigger a legal right to block
unwanted uses. In particular, courts have stated that activities inconsistent with policy statements or terms of use posted at some location
on a network are sufficient to trigger liability under trespass-tochattels doctrine and the CFAA. Because courts have not evaluated
whether the policy statements or terms of use are likely to give users
actual notice of limits on use of the system, or whether users agreed to
the terms, this approach has the potential to produce results very close
to those produced by a default rule of closed access. The legal protection for network resources that this approach affords-close to that
depicted as Rule 2 in Figure 1-has liability-rule and property-rule
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components, but it takes very little for the system owner to trigger
property-rule protection. Courts considering contract claims have
more explicitly assessed whether users had notice of and assented to
terms of use purporting to set forth permissible uses of a system.
Despite this more explicit analysis, courts have tended to find enforceable the same sorts of weak signaling mechanisms that have provided
the basis for trespass-to-chattels and CFAA claims.
Although a number of courts have drifted toward a default rule
of closed access, a handful of courts have rejected the view that even
strong forms of notice can trigger a system owner's right to enjoin
activities inconsistent with that notice. 225 Because those cases also
involved certain (weak) technical measures designed to block some
access, courts' denial of injunctive relief implicitly suggests that even
(weak) code-based controls would not trigger a right to enjoin
unwanted uses. I examine trespass-to-chattels, CFAA, and contract
claims in turn.
1.

Trespass to Chattels

As discussed earlier, to sustain a trespass-to-chattels claim in the
case of network resources, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's possessory interest in personal property, by "using or intermeddling with" the property. 226 The
defendant's conduct, of course, must be without the plaintiff's consent. As I will show, several successful trespass-to-chattels cases
involved requests for injunctive relief when a defendant had actual
notice of the plaintiff's objection to the conduct in question. Courts in
such cases have thus allowed system owners to exclude unwanted uses
when they have provided strong signals that the use is unwanted. On
a handful of occasions, however, courts have assumed or held that
policy statements or terms of use posted on the network are sufficient
to establish the range of permissible uses of the system, without any
inquiry into whether users had notice of or assented to the relevant
terms. Such an approach is dangerously close to a default presumption of closed access.
a.

Actual Notice Cases

One of the central premises of the case that launched the electronic trespass line, CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,227
225 See infra Part III.A.l.c.
226 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 217; see also supra note 24 and accompa-

nying text.
227 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
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was that even though CompuServe had connected its servers to the
Internet, Cyber Promotions's transmission of e-mail to those servers
was without CompuServe's authority. 228 The court concluded that
CompuServe had specifically notified Cyber Promotions that its
messages were unwelcome, 229 and that whatever consent CompuServe

might have conveyed by opening its mail servers was thereby limited
or revoked. Other bulk e-mail cases have followed this approach. In
America Online, Inc. v. IMS, for example, a district court held a bulk

e-mailer liable for trespass when the e-mailer continued to transmit email after receiving a cease-and-desist letter.230 Similarly, the lower
court's decision in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi observed that Intel instructed
Hamidi to stop sending messages to Intel's employees through Intel's

mail server. 231 Cases involving websites reflect a similar analysis. In
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., for example, in finding that Bidder's

Edge made unauthorized use of eBay's system, the court relied in part
on eBay's explicit notification to Bidder's Edge that its actions were
232
unauthorized.
In holding that explicit notice is sufficient to indicate that a

system owner does not consent to particular uses, and thus to trigger a
system owner's right to enjoin such uses, these cases are unremarkable, and they produce a legal rule for protecting network resources
consistent with Rule 4 in Figure 1. Before proceeding further, however, we should consider an alternative, narrower reading of the cases.
In all three cases-CompuServe, eBay, and the lower court Hamidi
decisions-the courts noted that the system owners sought to block
the defendants' activities through technical measures. 233 It might thus

be argued that the courts sustained the plaintiffs' trespass claims not
because the plaintiffs supplied notice of their objections, but because
228 Id. at 1024; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
229 CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1024.
230 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998).
231 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 246, 250 (Ct. App. 2001).
232 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
233 The CompuServe court observed that CompuServe had attempted

to block receipt of
Cyber Promotions' messages, but that Cyber Promotions had configured its computers "to
conceal their true domain name and appear on the Internet as another computer."
CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1019. Although the court did not specify the particular
screening procedure CompuServe implemented, the discussion of the procedure is consistent with host authentication-that is, screening communications in or out based on the IP
address or domain name of the originating computer. In eBay, having identified Bidder's
Edge's unauthorized robotic activity, eBay used host authentication to block queries from
Bidder's Edge, but Bidder's Edge defeated that technology by relying on third-party proxy
servers to disguise the origin of its data requests. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061-63. Similarly, Intel attempted to block transmission of Hamidi's messages, but Hamidi "us[ed] different sending computers" to evade the blocks. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 301
(Cal. 2003).
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the plaintiffs in fact used code-based measures-albeit weak ones-to
control access to their systems. In other words, rather than treating
the cases as endorsing a notice-triggered injunction rule, we might
view them instead as supporting a code-triggered injunction rule. The
difficulty with this argument is that only one of the three courtsCompuServe-actually attached any legal significance to the plaintiff's
use of technical measures, stating simply that "the implementation of
technological means of self-help.., is particularly appropriate.., and
should be exhausted before legal action is proper. ' 234 Even in
CompuServe, the court did not suggest that notice-based measures
were incapable of triggering legal protection or that technical measures provide a more appropriate trigger; rather, the court's point was
that, if the system owner could successfully block unwanted communications through technical measures, an award of injunctive relief
might be improper. CompuServe, eBay, and the lower court decisions
in Hamidi, along with similar cases, are thus best read as holding that
actual notice can trigger a system owner's right to exclude unwanted
uses.
b.

Policy Statements and Terms of Use

Although CompuServe, eBay, and the lower court decisions in
Hamidi may be unremarkable insofar as they suggest that explicit
notice is sufficient to trigger trespass liability, they do contain broader
language suggesting that system owners also can rely on policy statements posted at some location on their networks to establish limits on
access to their systems. The CompuServe court, for example,
observed that CompuServe had a bulk e-mail policy stating that
"CompuServe does not permit its facilities to be used by unauthorized
parties to process and store unsolicited e-mail. ' 235 The court questioned whether that statement had been sufficiently communicated to
third parties sending messages to CompuServe's mail servers, 236 but
because it found that Cyber Promotions had actual notice of
CompuServe's objection, the court did not need to resolve the issue.
Similarly, the eBay court noted that eBay's user agreement prohibited
the use of robots or crawlers.2 37 Because eBay had specifically
objected to Bidder's Edge's conduct, however, the court again did not
234 CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023.
235 Id. at 1024.
236 Id. ("It is arguable that CompuServe's policy statement, insofar as it may serve as a
limitation upon the scope of its consent to the use of its computer equipment, may be
insufficiently communicated to potential third-party users when it is merely posted at some
location on the network.").
237 eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.
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need to pass on whether activities inconsistent with eBay's user agreement were sufficient to establish Bidder's Edge's liability. Indeed, the
court observed that the record did not indicate whether that agreement was in force at the time Bidder's Edge's robots began crawling
the site, or whether Bidder's Edge ever manifested assent to it.238
Although CompuServe and eBay did not rest liability solely on
activities inconsistent with policy statements, some decisions purporting to follow the reasoning of CompuServe and eBay have focused
more heavily on such mechanisms. In these cases, many of the relevant restrictions appeared in terms of use that purported to bind subscribers, but the failure of the courts to inquire into issues of notice
and assent indicates a willingness to permit weak forms of notice to
trigger legal protection. In other words, by failing to inquire into
issues of notice and assent, courts essentially converted user agreements into mere policy statements. In America Online, Inc. v. LCGM,
Inc., for example, the court found an e-mailer liable for trespass
because the e-mailer's actions-harvesting e-mail addresses of AOL
members and sending bulk e-mail to those members-violated AOL's
terms of service and bulk e-mail policy. 239 The court noted in a footnote that AOL also premised its claim that the defendants' activities
were unauthorized on the defendants' continued sending of bulk email after receiving cease-and-desist letters from AOL. 240 The court
did not, however, attach legal significance to the cease-and-desist letters. Similarly, in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., the court
premised the defendant's liability for trespass on its sending of spam
from a Hotmail e-mail account, an activity that Hotmail's terms of
241
service prohibited.
In both LCGM and Hotmail, because the senders of the e-mails
maintained accounts with the objecting service provider, 242 the courts
could have inquired whether the terms of service were presented in
such a way as to give the subscribers sufficient notice of the restrictions or whether the subscribers agreed to those terms. The courts did
not engage in this sort of analysis, instead assuming that any activities
inconsistent with the service providers' announced policies would
238 Id.

239 Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (E.D. Va. 1998).
240 Id. at 452 n.4.

241 Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1025 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
242 See LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 448 (observing that bulk e-mailers were AOL members); Hotmail, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021 (finding that e-mailers maintained Hotmail
accounts).
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trigger liability. 243 One could argue that the plaintiff's filing of a suit
for injunctive relief necessarily provides the defendant with notice

that the system owner objects to the defendant's use; if continued use
of the system by the defendant constitutes unauthorized use for purposes of a trespass claim, then the contents of the system owner's
terms of use or policy statements ought to be irrelevant to the
inquiry. 244 In LCGM, however, the court focused on AOL's terms of
service and the bulk e-mail policy not only as a basis for injunctive
relief to prevent further trespasses, but also as a basis for damages for

past activities (apparently including activities that pre-dated AOL's
sending of the cease-and-desist letter).245 That approach necessarily
depended on the conclusion that breach of policies limiting use of a
system can form the basis for a trespass claim. In focusing heavily on
policy statement-based limitations, the courts adopted an approach
close to that reflected in Rule 2 in Figure 1.246
c.

Cases Rejecting Trespass Claims

Although most courts have allowed actual notice, or weaker

forms of notice, to trigger a system owner's right to block unwanted
uses, two courts-the district court in Ticketmaster Corp. v.
248
Tickets. com, Inc.247 and the California Supreme Court in Hamidi ?have explicitly rejected that approach. Ticketmaster, like Com243 See LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 452 ("Because AOL's Unsolicited Bulk E-mail Policy
and Terms of Service prohibit the sending of such e-mails, defendants' actions were unauthorized."); Hotmail, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025 ("[D]efendants intentionally trespassed
on Hotmail's property by knowingly and without authorization creating Hotmail accounts
that were used for purposes exceeding the limits of the Terms of Service .... ").
244 Cf Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding, for purposes of applying federal prohibition on unauthorized access to computer
system, that "it is clear since at least the date this lawsuit was filed that Register.com does
not consent to Verio's use of a search robot, and Verio is on notice that its search robot is
unwelcome"), affd, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
245 The court did not award damages at the summary judgment phase because the
amount of damages presented a question of fact. LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 552. In recognizing that damages would be appropriate, however, the court obviously rested its conclusion that LCGM's conduct was unauthorized on something other than the notice provided
by AOL's filing of the lawsuit, for that notice could have supported only an injunctive
remedy. Moreover, in discussing LCGM's liability, the court drew no distinction between
conduct pre-dating and post-dating AOL's cease-and-desist letters. See id. at 452 & n.4
(focusing on defendants' violation of terms of service and mentioning, without further discussion, AOL's allegations that cease-and-desist letters "further demonstrated" that defendants' conduct was unauthorized).
246 I discuss the doctrinal and normative implications of this approach in Part IlI.B,
infra.
247 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2003 WL 21406289 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 7, 2003).
248 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
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puServe and eBay, involved actual notice to Tickets.com that
Ticketmaster objected both to Tickets.com's use of robots to recursively query Ticketmaster's site and to Tickets.com's use of "deep
links" to Ticketmaster's internal pages. 249 In denying Ticketmaster's
trespass claim, the district court rejected the notion that actual notice
of unwanted activities could trigger Ticketmaster's right to exclude
unwanted uses. 250 Similarly, in Hamidi, the California Supreme Court
did not view Intel's actual notice to Hamidi of limitations on use of its
system as a sufficient basis for injunctive relief. 251 Both Ticketmaster
and Hamidi, then, reject the approach reflected in Rule 4 of Figure 1.
Because both cases also involved the evasion of technical measures designed to thwart the defendants' activities, we might also view
those cases as implicitly rejecting the possibility that (weak) codebased mechanisms can trigger a right to injunctive relief.
Ticketmaster unsuccessfully sought to block queries from
Tickets.com's robots 252 and to redirect traffic from its interior pages to
its main pages. 253 Although the court did not discuss the significance
of Ticketmaster's technical efforts to block recursive queries and deep
linking, its conclusion that Ticketmaster could not sustain a trespass
claim at least implicitly suggests that evasion of the particular codebased mechanisms Ticketmaster used in an attempt to control
access-presumably host authentication for robots and restrictions on
referring sites via the Referer variable-could not trigger a right to
exclude unwanted uses. Similarly, although the Hamidi court noted
that Intel had attempted to block Hamidi's messages, 254 the court did
not discuss the significance of Hamidi's evasion of Intel's measures.
Whether that evasion involved "spoofing" the IP address of the computer from which Hamidi sent messages or actually switching computers is unclear from the facts of the case. Under an approach
allowing implementation of code-based controls on access to trigger a
system owners' legal right to exclude unwanted access, that distinction
might well matter because a court might consider only the spoofing to
249 Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *2 (indicating that Tickets.com was familiar with
Ticketmaster's terms of use and that Ticketmaster had made its objections clear in letter to
which Tickets.com responded).
250 Id. at *3 (granting summary judgment to Tickets.corn on trespass claim);
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *4-*5 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (denying preliminary injunctive relief).
251 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 301, 311 (denying trespass claim in spite of Intel's explicit demand
that Hamidi stop sending e-mails to Intel's system).
252 Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *3 (noting Ticketmaster's efforts to "frustrate"
Tickets.com's spider).
253 Ticketmaster, 2000 WL 1887522, at *2 (discussing Ticketmaster's thwarted efforts to
redirect traffic from its interior pages to its main pages).
254 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 301.
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constitute circumvention of the technical measure. In rejecting Intel's
trespass claim, however, the Hamidi court did not discuss the issue,
and thereby implicitly rejected an approach under which a (weak)
code-based access control would trigger trespass liability. The
Ticketmaster and Hamidi courts thus implicitly rejected approaches
such as those reflected in Rules 5 and 6 of Figure 1.
In sum, although courts considering trespass claims have relied
on system owners' specific objections as a basis for enjoining
unwanted contacts, several courts have also suggested or assumed that
policies posted on the network can adequately signal limitations on
use of a system. For the most part, courts have not considered
whether any policy statements or terms of use are reasonably calculated to give users notice of permissible uses, or whether users
assented to the relevant terms. These approaches pave the way for
adoption of a legal rule that requires only weak signaling mechanisms
to trigger a system owner's right to exclude unwanted uses. Even
though some of the cases also involved technical measures designed to
block access, courts did not rely on evasion of these technical measures as the basis for enjoining the defendants' conduct. Finally, a
handful of courts have rejected trespass claims, even though the
defendants had actual notice of objections to their use of the systems
and evaded technical measures to gain access. I depict the courts'
positions schematically, along with those of courts considering CFAA
and contract claims, in Figure 3 (found in Part III.A.4).
2.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

In addition to raising trespass claims, plaintiffs objecting to
unwanted uses of their systems have increasingly brought civil claims
under the federal computer crime statute, often referred to as the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.2 55 As in the trespass context, civil
claims under the CFAA were first brought in an attempt to curtail
unwanted bulk e-mail. Courts later applied the statute to disputes
over recursive queries. As in the trespass context, most of the claims
have involved injunctive relief in circumstances in which a defendant
has actual notice of the plaintiff's objection to her activities. Courts
have nevertheless assumed that violations of the CFAA can be predicated on a range of activities, including access to a computer system in
violation of policy statements purporting to outline the permissible
255 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004). Technically, the title Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act refers to the 1986 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1030, see Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213-16, but courts commonly
use it to describe 18 U.S.C. § 1030 as a whole.
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uses of a system. Courts' application of the CFAA in this context has
thus produced a body of federal law that closely parallels cases based
on state law trespass-to-chattels claims.

The CFAA criminalizes certain conduct with respect to a "protected computer," defined to include any computer "used in interstate

or foreign commerce or communication. '256 In 1994, Congress
amended the statute to provide a civil cause of action for injunctive
relief or damages when the challenged activities cause "damage" or

"loss."257 Most of the CFAA's provisions prohibit unauthorized

"access" to a protected computer, 258 coupled with some other con-

duct. Unauthorized access can take one of two forms. First, a defendant might have authority to engage in certain activities with respect
to a computer system, but he might "exceed" that authority. The
statute defines "exceed[ing] authorized access" as: "to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter

information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to
obtain or alter. '259 Second, a defendant might have no authority
whatsoever to gain access to a computer system; any access would be
"without authorization." The statute does not define that phrase, nor
does it define the term "access." Several of the criminal provisions of
the statute require only "access without authorization, '260 while other
provisions target both "access without authorization" and
"exceed[ing] authorized access."' 261
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
257 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 290001(d), 108 Stat. 1796, 2098 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000 &
Supp. I 2001)).
258 The exceptions are § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), which prohibits one from knowingly transmitting "a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct ...
caus[ing] damage without authorization, to a protected computer"; § 1030(a)(6), which
prohibits trafficking in an access code or password; and § 1030(a)(7), which prohibits transmitting a threat to cause damage to a protected computer for purposes of extortion.
259 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2000).
260 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3), (5)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
261 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-( 2 ), (4) (2000). The distinction has led defendants
charged or sued under provisions referring only to access without authorization to argue
that they in fact had authority to gain access to a computer system; they merely exceeded
authorized access. In other words, defendants argue that provisions containing the
"without authorization" language apply only to "outsiders"-those with no authority to
gain access to the system-whereas provisions containing both phrases apply to "insiders"
as well as "outsiders." The Second Circuit, however, rejected such an argument in United
States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991), which involved transmission of a worm that
caused significant damage to a number of computers. At the time, the CFAA did not have
a prohibition equivalent to what is now § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), which bars the transmission of
a file that causes damage without authorization, regardless of whether the sender is authorized to access the system in the first place. More recently, courts have tended to accept the
256
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Each provision of the CFAA requires some further showing. For
our purposes, the two most relevant provisions are § 1030(a)(2)(C),
which prohibits a party from intentionally accessing without authorization or exceeding authorized access to a computer and thereby
obtaining information from

a protected computer;

and

§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii), which prohibits one from intentionally accessing
a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such
conduct, causing damage.

As a cursory reading of the CFAA reveals, the crucial question in
applying the statute to a network resource owner's efforts to curtail
unwanted uses of her system is what it means for access to a system to
be "without authorization" or to "exceed[ ]" what has been authorized. Is access unauthorized merely because it is inconsistent with
permissible uses a system owner has outlined in a policy statement
posted at some location on the network? Is access unauthorized if a
system owner notifies a user that his actions are unwanted? Or must a
system owner employ some sort of technical mechanism to block
access-and if so, how effective must that mechanism be for its evasion to trigger liability under the statute? As in the trespass context,
we can fruitfully examine this issue with reference to the rules represented in Figure 1. In this Section, I consider how courts have
resolved this issue thus far. As in trespass cases, courts have veered
towards a closed-access default, by taking an approach consistent with
Rule 2 and giving effect to policy statements and terms of use without
inquiry into issues of notice and assent. 262 I discuss the current state
of the law under the CFAA here. I later argue that, under a proper
interpretation of the CFAA, only breach of a code-based control on
access should trigger liability.2 63
a.

Bulk E-Mail Cases

Service providers challenging the activities of bulk e-mailers have
invoked both the prohibition in § 1030(a)(2)(C) against extracting
information and the prohibition in § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) against causing
damage. 264 Claims under § 1030(a)(2)(C) are usually based on use of
insider/outsider distinction. See, e.g., In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig.,
168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1370-71 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
262 I discuss the implications of courts' movement toward a closed-access default in Part
11.B, infra.
263 See infra Part III.C.1.
264 Most cases were actually decided under the former § 1030(a)(5)(C), which contained
language identical to that now appearing in § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii). A 2001 amendment
renumbered § 1030(a)(5)(A)-(C) as § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii) and imported into
§ 1030(a)(5)(B) language substantially similar to that previously appearing in the definition
of "damage" in § 1030(e)(8). See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
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a service provider's system to acquire e-mail addresses in order to
create a bulk e-mail recipient list.265 For example, in America Online,
Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 2 6 6 the defendants maintained AOL memberships
and used software to harvest addresses of AOL subscribers, albeit
from sources accessible to AOL users generally.2 67 AOL's policy on
unsolicited e-mail and terms of service prohibited use of AOL membership to harvest e-mail addresses.2 68 The court found that the
defendants' activities were therefore unauthorized for purposes of
§ 1030(a)(2)(C). 269 In other words, because AOL's policy and terms
of service prohibited the harvesting of e-mail addresses, the defendants' use of AOL's system for that purpose constituted unauthorized
access to a protected computer, by which the defendants obtained
"information" in violation of the statute. Similarly, in America
Online, Inc. v. National Health Care Discount, Inc.,270 an AOL
member collected addresses of other AOL members for the purpose
of sending unsolicited commercial e-mail. AOL successfully claimed
that the conduct violated its terms of service, and that the defendants
therefore exceeded authorized access for purposes of
§ 1030(a)(2)(C). 271 Despite the fact that the primary defendants in
both LCGM and National Health Care Discount were AOL members,
who would have been required to agree to AOL's terms of service, the
court did not focus on the defendants' knowledge of AOL's termsessentially converting what purported to be a user agreement into a
mere policy statement.
Both LCGM and National Health Care Discount also raised
claims that the defendants had gained unauthorized access to AOL's
2 72
system and had caused damage for purposes of § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii).
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814(a), 115 Stat. 272, 382-83 (2001). To avoid confusion, I refer to
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) in the text, even with respect to those cases actually decided under
former § 1030(a)(5)(C).
265 Recent federal legislation addressing unsolicited commercial e-mail contains similar
language dealing more directly with the harvesting problem. See Controlling the Assault
of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187,
§ 5(b)(1)(A)(i), 117 Stat. 2699, 2708 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7704(b)(1)(A)(i))
(prohibiting sending of commercial message if sender has reason to know that recipient's
e-mail address was obtained using "automated means from an Internet website or proprietary online service operated by another person," if such website or online service included
certain limitations on use of e-mail addresses).
266 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998).
267 Id. at 448.
268 See id.
269 Id. at 450.
270 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
271 Id. at 1276.
272 Id. at 1272-75; LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 450-51.
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The courts approached these claims in different ways, both on the
issue of what "access" allegedly violated the statute and on the issue
of when such access would be unauthorized. The National Health
Care Discount court focused on the actual sending of the unsolicited
commercial e-mail to AOL's system: If the transmission of e-mail to
AOL's mail servers was unauthorized within the meaning of the
statute, then that activity would trigger liability. 273 Section
1030(a)(5)(A)(iii), however, only covered "access without authorization," not "exceed[ing] authorized access." Since the primary e-mailer
was an AOL member, the court was reluctant to conclude that he had
sent e-mail "without authorization," even though he clearly had
"exceed[ed] authorized access" in doing S0.274 Defendants other than
the primary e-mailer were not AOL members, and the statute's prohibition on access without authorization therefore might have reached
their conduct. Again, the court was wary, this time questioning
whether AOL's policies on bulk e-mail could restrict the activities of
non-members sending mail to AOL members. 275 Because the court
imposed liability under § 1030(a)(2)(C), the court found it unneces2 76
sary to resolve these issues.
The LCGM court took a different approach. Rather than analyzing the sending of unsolicited commercial e-mail to determine
whether that activity constituted access without authorization that
caused damage, the court again focused on the harvesting of e-mail
277
addresses as satisfying the "access without authorization" predicate.
That unauthorized access, the court reasoned, enabled the defendant
to send large quantities of unsolicited e-mail to AOL members,
thereby causing damage to AOL's computer system, reputation, and
goodwill. 278 Unlike the National Health Care Discount court, the
LCGM court did not consider the possibility that liability under
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) should be confined to non-AOL members.
Taken together, LCGM and National Health Care Discount suggest that the extraction of e-mail addresses by subscribers in violation
273 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
274 Id. at 1273 ("[I]t is not clear that a violation of AOL's membership agreements
results in 'unauthorized access.' If AOL members are 'insiders' rather than 'outsiders' for
purposes of section 1030(a)(5), then subparagraph [(A)(iii)] does not apply at all .... ");
see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 899 (N.D.
Iowa 2001) (noting that additional development of record at trial did not clarify issue).
275 Nat'l Health Care Disc., 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (asking if "by imposing restrictions
on its members, [AOL can] deny or restrict the rights of non-member Internet users with
respect to sending any type or volume of e-mail to AOL members").
276 Nat'l Health Care Disc., 174 F. Supp. 2d at 899.
277 LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
278 Id.
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of terms of service and other policy statements will constitute unauthorized access for purposes of § 1030(a)(2)(C), which targets the
gathering of information. NationalHealth CareDiscount also suggests
that, under § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii), the sending of e-mail itself will constitute unauthorized access, creating a parallel to state-law trespass cases
that have held that sending unwanted e-mail can constitute unauthorized use or intermeddling. National Health Care Discount, however,
creates a potential outer limit on the reach of § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) by
introducing the possibility that only an "outsider" can violate it, and
that a violation must be based on something other than a policy statement or terms of service (which, the court implied, could not bind
outsiders).
In both cases, of course, the e-mailers had actual notice of AOL's
objection to their conduct because AOL sent cease-and-desist letters
and ultimately sued. 279 To the extent that the cases involved injunctive relief, the courts need not have looked to terms of use or policy
statements to signal limitations on use of AOL's system: If indeed
extracting e-mail addresses from the AOL network constitutes
"access" within the meaning of the CFAA, and if actual notice of an
objection suffices to make that access unauthorized, the courts could
have granted prospective relief based on AOL's objection alone.
Both cases, however, also involved damages claims for conduct that
pre-dated AOL's explicit notices, and in both cases the court found
the defendants liable for damages. 2 80 As a result, AOL's terms of service and policy statements were necessary to the disposition of the
cases: The notice that appears to have triggered legal protection came
281
from those online documents.
b.

Automated Query Cases

Courts applying CFAA claims in cases involving automated or
recursive queries have likewise given effect to online terms and found
liability in circumstances analogous to those in trespass cases. In
279 Nat'l Health Care Disc., 174 F. Supp. 2d at 896; LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
280 In LCGM, the sending of unsolicited e-mail began approximately June 17, 1997, and
AOL sent its first of two cease-and-desist letters on December 8, 1997. 46 F. Supp. 2d at
448. The LCGM court did not award damages at the summary judgment phase because
the amount of damages presented a question of fact. Id. at 452. The opinion, however, in
assessing liability, draws no distinction between LCGM's conduct before and after the
cease-and-desist letters. See id. at 450-51. In National Health Care Discount, the sending
of unsolicited e-mail began in the fall of 1997, see 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1263, and AOL sent its
first cease-and-desist letter on July 1, 1998, see 174 F. Supp. 2d at 896. The court based its
damage award on conduct occurring from 1997 through May 30, 1999. See id. at 896-97.
281 Because the disputes involved subscribers, the courts could have looked to whether
the terms of service were enforceable against subscribers as a matter of contract law. The
courts did not, however, specifically inquire into the elements of notice and assent.
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Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,282 a case raising trespass, CFAA, and
contract claims, a domain-name registrar sought to enjoin Verio from
using automated queries to gather information from its public
database. To receive accreditation from the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as a registrar, Register.com
was required to maintain a database of information about its registrants and to make that database available to the public. 28 3 Verio used
a series of automated requests to extract information about
Register.com's new registrants. Verio would then use the information
to offer services to the new registrants-including some services in
28 4
competition with those offered by Register.com itself.
Register.com claimed that Verio's automated queries to
Register.com's system violated § 1030(a)(2)(C) and § 1030(a)(5)(A)
28 5
(iii) of the CFAA.
Register.com had terms of use, but those terms did not purport to
restrict automated queries of its publicly available system. 286 The
terms did, however, prohibit the use of information extracted from its
database for purposes of sending unsolicited e-mail or making unsolicited phone calls. 287 Despite the fact that the terms of use were devoid
of relevant restrictions on access to the computer system itself, the
district court found Verio's access to Register.com's system unauthorized for purposes of § 1030(a)(2)(C)'s prohibition on gaining unauthorized access and thereby obtaining information. Prior to its access
to Register.com's system, Verio knew that the data sought would be
used for an unauthorized purpose; 28 8 that fact, the court reasoned,
made its initial access to the system to acquire the data unauthorized.
Considering the claim under § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) that Verio's
access without authorization had caused damage, the court simply
held that Register.com's objection to Verio's activities-an objection
282 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). The Court of
Appeals did not address the CFAA claim on appeal, finding sufficient basis to affirm on
the trespass and breach-of-contract claims. 356 F.3d at 406. The case is unusual in that it
contains as an appendix an unadopted opinion drafted by Judge Fred I. Parker, a member
of the court of appeals panel who died before the case was resolved. See id. at 394 n.*, 406.
In the unadopted opinion, Judge Parker would have reversed the grant of injunctive relief
on the CFAA and contract claims. Id. at 407. With respect to the CFAA claim, Judge
Parker focused on Register.com's inability to meet the damage threshold, not the district
court's application of the substantive standard. Id. at 440.
283 Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 241-42.
284 Id. at 243.
285 Id. at 251.
286 Id. at 249 (stating, in context of trespass-to-chattels claim, that "the Court does not
believe that Register.com's terms of use forbid the particular use of the search robot at
issue here").
287 Id. at 242.
288 Id. at 253.
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made clear by Register.com's filing suit-rendered any further access
by Verio unauthorized. 28 9 On the basis of Register.com's claim that
Verio's activities, if replicated by others, would diminish its server
capacity and slow its system, the court concluded that Register.com
was entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. Apart from the fact that
the court gave effect to Register.com's policy on use of its system,
even though the policy did not purport to restrict access to the system
itself, Register.com is interesting because the court presumably could
have inquired whether Verio had notice of and manifested assent to
Register.com's terms. It conducted precisely that inquiry in connection with Register.com's contract claim. 2 90 For purposes of the CFAA
claim, however, the court gave effect to Register.com's terms without
an inquiry into issues of notice or assent.
An equally broad, if not broader, approach to finding unauthorized access is manifested in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica,
Inc.,291 a case involving a dispute between a tour company and one of
its former employees over use of information available on EF's website. The former employee established a rival company and sought to
undercut EF's prices by using a "scraper"-a program designed to
292
extract certain publicly available information from EF's website.
To assist in the tool's development, the former EF employee provided
a software developer with certain information about tour codes used
on EF's website. Although the codes themselves were publicly avail293
able on the site, they were not readily understandable to the public.
Nothing in EF's terms of use prohibited use of an automated tool such
as a scraper.2 94 The question was whether Explorica's access to EF's
site was nevertheless unauthorized for purposes of § 1030(a)(4), which
prohibits one from "knowingly and with intent to defraud, access[ing]
a protected computer without authorization, or exceed[ing] authorized access, and by means of such conduct further[ing] the intended
fraud and obtain[ing] anything of value. '295 The district court concluded that the scope of authorization to use EF's website should be
determined by the "reasonable expectations of both EF and its ordi289 Id. at 249, 251 (noting that access to information is unauthorized because
Register.com objected to it; referring back to trespass discussion, in which court concluded
that filing of lawsuit signaled Register.com's objection).
290 Id. at 248 ("Nor can Verio argue that it has not assented to Register.com's terms of
use.").
291 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
292 Id. at 579.
293 Id. at 579, 583.
294 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2003).
295 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2000).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

2240

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2164

nary users. '2 96 The court found several indications that Explorica's
use of the scraper was inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of
the parties, in light of copyright, contractual, and technical restrictions
on the site. 297 On appeal, the First Circuit found it unnecessary to rule
on the district court's "reasonable expectations" test because it found
an alternative basis for concluding that Explorica's scraper was unauthorized under the CFAA: Its development depended on the former
employee's use of proprietary information-the tour codes-in violation of a confidentiality agreement. 298 In other words, even where no
policy restricted access to EF's publicly available website, a court
found access to be unauthorized based solely on an external contractual agreement. That agreement, however, did not explicitly relate to
use of EF's publicly available website; thus, the former EF employee
did not actually assent to restrictions on use of that site. Accordingly,
reading the confidentiality agreement to curtail access to the website
is somewhat analogous to validating a policy statement that purports
to limit uses of a system, without inquiry into issues of notice and
assent.
In a separate appeal arising from the same set of facts but
involving the company that actually developed the scraper, EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp.,299 the First Circuit more explicitly
embraced an approach validating limits on access embodied in a
policy statement. The scraper's developer urged that it had no knowledge that the scraper was based on confidential information, and that
the injunction against its use of the scraper therefore could not be
affirmed on the same basis as the injunction against the former EF
employee. 3°° The court of appeals agreed and therefore necessarily
had to consider the propriety of the district court's "reasonable expectations" test. The court rejected that test, 30 1 concluding instead that
lack of authorization for purposes of the CFAA could be established
30 2
"by an explicit statement on the website restricting access.
Because EF had no such explicit prohibition at the time of the developer's use of the scraper, that use did not violate the CFAA. 30 3 The
significance of this second decision lies in the court's suggestion in
296
297
298

Explorica, 274 F.3d at 580.
Id. at 580-81.
Id. at 581-82.

299 318 F.3d 58.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id.
The court of appeals nevertheless affirmed issuance of the injunction on the theory
that any use of the scraper would assist Explorica in violating the injunction against it. Id.
at 63.
300
301
302
303
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dictum that violation of policies purporting to limit access to EF's
system could form the basis of an unauthorized-access claim: The
court announced that "[i]f EF wants to ban scrapers, let it say so on
'30 4
the webpage or a link clearly marked as containing restrictions.
The court mentioned that public policy might displace certain
terms, 30 5 but appeared to assume that a policy announcing permissible
uses would provide sufficient notice of what conduct was prohibited to
trigger liability under the CFAA.
In sum, just as courts have looked to policy statements to signal
limitations on access in trespass claims, so too have courts focused on
such mechanisms to conclude that defendants' conduct violates the
CFAA. I depict courts' approaches to CFAA claims, along with those
of courts addressing trespass and contract claims, in Figure 3 in Part
III.A.4. In the bulk e-mail cases, the disputes typically involve actual
notice of a plaintiff's objection to the defendant's conduct; but courts
have nevertheless assumed that actions inconsistent with terms of use
or general policy statements are sufficient to trigger liability. In cases
seeking damages, that conclusion has been critical to courts' holdings.
In cases involving recursive queries or similar tools, courts likewise
focused on violations of terms in policy statements as forming the
basis for unauthorized-access claims.
3.

ContractLaw

Although network resource owners wishing to block unwanted
uses of their systems have relied mainly on trespass-to-chattels and
CFAA claims, they have also raised contract claims on occasion. Of
course, to argue that particular activities breach contractual limitations on uses of a system, the system owner must be able to make a
plausible claim that a user had notice of and assented to the limitations. Contract claims typically arise in one of two contexts: when a
bulk e-mailer is a subscriber of a particular service and uses that service either to transmit unwanted e-mail or to extract e-mail addresses
in violation of a subscriber agreement; or when a website contains
terms of use to which a web server owner claims that a user assented,
either by affirmatively clicking "I Agree" where necessary or merely
by using the site.

Id.
Id. at 62 (observing, after stating that explicit terms on website could establish lack of
authorization, that "[w]hether public policy might in turn limit certain restrictions is a separate issue").
304
305
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Hotmai30 6 provides an example of the former type of case. The
court there found that the bulk e-mailers who maintained Hotmail
accounts had assented to restrictions on the sending of unsolicited
commercial or pornographic e-mail. 30 7 Similar claims presumably
could have been made in the cases involving the harvesting of e-mail
addresses and transmission of bulk e-mail to AOL users, since it was
acknowledged that the defendants were AOL subscribers.
Register.com 30 8 and Ticketmaster30 9 are examples of the latter "terms
of use"-based rationale for contract breach. Register.com alleged that
its terms of use forbade Verio from using information from its
database for solicitation purposes. Verio's submission of a search
query to its database, Register.com argued, constituted its acceptance
310
of those terms of use, and Verio breached the contract so formed.
Similarly, in Ticketmaster, Ticketmaster claimed that Tickets.com, by
using its site, agreed to terms that forbade the sort of automated que311
ries in which Tickets.com engaged.
Unlike trespass doctrine and the CFAA, which are silent as to
what triggers a system owner's right to exclude unwanted uses, a contract claim requires the system owner to show that the user had notice
of and assented to certain limitations on use of the system. 3 12 As with
trespass and CFAA claims, however, there has been variance in the
strength of the notice provided and the clarity with which assent has
been manifested. To understand the situations in which courts might
enforce limitations on use of a system, it is helpful to examine the
controversial issues of notice and assent that have arisen from the
enforcement of standard form licenses that often accompany software.
For example, manufacturers often include licenses inside software
boxes and seek to treat the consumer's act of breaking the shrinkwrap
as assent to the governing terms. 313 The trend among courts is to
enforce such "shrinkwrap" licenses, so long as the consumer has a
306

Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1025 (N.D. Cal.

1998).
Id.
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 356
F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
309 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2003 WL 21406289 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 7, 2003).
310 Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 244, 248.
311 Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *2.
312 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28-30 (2d Cir.
2002) (discussing notice and assent requirements).
313 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). For discussion of the
contract formation and copyright preemption issues such licenses raise, see generally
Lemley, supra note 145, and Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap
307
308

Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.

REV.

1239 (1995).
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right to reject the terms by returning the product. 314 Extending this
reasoning to the online context, courts have enforced "clickwrap" or

"click-through" licenses that require a user to click "I Agree" or "I
Accept" before downloading a particular product, at least so long as
the user has reasonable notice of the existence of the governing
license terms and the "offer" makes clear that clicking the button will
signify assent to those terms. 31 5 No court finding that these conditions
have been met has declined to enforce a clickwrap agreement purporting to govern the download of a software product on grounds of
3 16
insufficient assent.
For purposes of this Article, the question is how the reasoning of
these cases involving the purchase or download of software products
314 See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53 (finding license included in software package
binding, where license terms also appeared on user's screen every time software ran, user
could not proceed without indicating acceptance, and user had opportunity to return
software for refund if terms were unacceptable); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147,
1149-50 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding list of terms contained inside computer box enforceable,
when purchaser had option to return computer within 30 days of receipt if terms were
unsatisfactory). A handful of cases pre-dating the ProCD decision had refused to enforce
shrinkwrap agreements. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105-06
(3d Cir. 1991) (refusing to enforce warranty limitations printed on outside of software
package, where terms differed from those in purchase order; treating limitations on
package as additional terms proposed by manufacturer and never accepted by purchaser);
Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993) (following Step-Saver); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269-70 (5th
Cir. 1988) (concluding that federal copyright law preempted provisions of state law on
which shrinkwrap license relied, thus rendering license unenforceable). For decisions
questioning or distinguishing ProCD, see SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,
171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1087-88 (C.D. Cal. 2001), holding that a software distributor was not
bound by license terms because the reseller did not actually run the software, and thus
never agreed to terms, and Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan.
2000), refusing to enforce terms contained inside a box for a personal computer because
plaintiffs did not expressly agree to the terms and were not informed of the manufacturer's
policy that failure to return the computer within five days constituted agreement.
315 Compare i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D.
Mass. 2002) (enforcing license where terms appeared on screen prior to software installation and defendant checked "I Agree" box), Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 805
A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002) (enforcing forum selection clause where terms were displayed in scroll box and plaintiff subscriber clicked "Accept" button), Caspi v. Microsoft
Network, L.L.C., 723 A.2d 528, 530-31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (enforcing forum
selection clause contained in agreement with ISP, where prospective subscriber could only
access service by clicking "I Agree"), Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (App.
Div. 2002) (dismissing claim against software manufacturer where plaintiff user clicked on
"I agree" icon before downloading software and claim was barred by license agreement),
and Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App. 2001) (finding forum
selection clause enforceable where plaintiff had to scroll through terms and accept them
before proceeding), with Specht, 306 F.3d at 31-32 (finding license terms unenforceable
where terms appeared only on portion of web page below software download button).
316 Courts have recognized that specific terms may nevertheless be unenforceable. See,
e.g., Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1173-77 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding arbitration clause substantively unconscionable).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 79:2164

applies when the owner of a computer system purports to restrict uses
of her system through terms of use. The case law suggests that, where
a computer system owner sets forth the terms of use and requires the
user to click a button before proceeding, the terms will be enforceable. Indeed,'courts have arguably gone further than that, in allowing
mere use of a system to qualify as a manifestation of assent to terms.
Register.com, for example, claimed that it had an enforceable contract
with Verio because a user submitting a query would see a legend
restricting use of the data returned by Register.com's system. 31 7 The
district court found Register.com likely to succeed on its breach of
contract claim despite the fact that Verio was not required to click "I
318
Agree" or "I Accept" when it encountered Register.com's terms.
Rather, the court found that mere use by Verio of Register.com's
system constituted assent to Register.com's terms. 31 9 On appeal, the
Second Circuit took a slightly different approach, observing that Verio
had actual knowledge of Register.com's terms because it submitted so
many queries. 32 0 On the issue of assent, the Second Circuit concluded
that an explicit statement of agreement (such as clicking an "I Agree"
icon) is not essential to the formation of a contract in all circumstances. 32 ' Similarly, in the Ticketmaster case, Tickets.com's spiders
were not required to click "I Agree" before retrieving Ticketmaster's
pages, and Tickets.com therefore argued that mere use of
Ticketmaster's site could not form the basis of a contractual agreement. 322 Although the district court initially denied injunctive relief,

317 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 396, 398-402 (2d Cir. 2004). The
legend stated: "By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you will use this data only
for lawful purposes and that under no circumstances will you use this data to ...support
the transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitation via email." Id.
at 396.
318 Register.corn, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
319 Id.
320 Register.com, 356 F.3d at 401-02.
321 Id. at 403. For a discussion of the unusual posture of this case, see supra note 282.
Judge Parker would have held that Register.com was not likely to succeed in demonstrating that a contract was formed with Verio. Id. at 407. Judge Parker argued that even
though Verio had actual knowledge of Register.com's terms, Verio could reasonably have
believed that Register.com was required to make the information in question publicly
available. See id. at 431 (Parker, J.) ("Verio ...may repeatedly submit WHOIS queries to
Register.com based on an (accurate) understanding that Register.com does not own
WHOIS information and that such information must be made freely and publicly
available ....").
322 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2000 WL 525390, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000).
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seemingly skeptical of Ticketmaster's theory,323 it later declined to
324
enter summary judgment against Ticketmaster on that claim.
It is important not to overstate the holdings in Register.com and
Ticketmaster. In both cases, the courts ultimately found that the
defendant had actual notice of the terms. Because the courts found
actual notice present, these particular cases do not raise some of the
controversial issues of notice that arise with respect to mass-market
software licenses. On the question of assent, however, the courts
clearly took the view that use of a system can be deemed assent to
relevant terms; the danger is that if courts accept more limited forms
of notice, the result will approach a default rule of closed access.
4.

Summary

As this discussion illustrates, across the different doctrinal contexts, courts have taken a variety of approaches to efforts to exclude
unwanted uses of network resources. Figure 3 below modifies Figure
1 to summarize the legal rules accepted and rejected in the case law.
Figure 3 demonstrates that, notwithstanding the fact that the
leading bulk e-mail and robot cases, CompuServe and eBay, involved
actual notice of limitations on a system, a number of courts have
drifted toward relying on weaker forms of notice, such as terms of use
without an "I agree" requirement and policy statements posted at a
given location on the network. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
cases such as Ticketmaster and Hamidi explicitly reject the notion that
actual notice triggers a right to enjoin an unwanted use, and implicitly
reject the notion that implementation of technical mechanisms triggers a right to enjoin an unwanted use.
Having clarified the current legal landscape, I consider in the next
two sections what the law should be.
B.

Curtailingthe Drift Toward a Closed-Access Default

In this Section, I focus on the extent to which courts have drifted
toward relying on policy statements and terms of use as setting the
limits of permissible uses of the system, without adequate inquiry into
notice issues. With respect to all cyberproperty claims, I will argue,
this approach is doctrinally and normatively inappropriate. I thus
323 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) ("The contract theory lacks sufficient proof of agreement by
defendant to be taken seriously as a ground for preliminary injunction.").
324 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2003 WL 21406289, at
*1-*2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (observing that "a contract can be formed by proceeding
into the interior web pages after knowledge (or, in some cases, presumptive knowledge) of
the conditions accepted when doing so").
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LEGAL RULES ACCEPTED AND REJECTED IN CASE
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Zefer [dictum]
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CompuServe [held]
eBay [held]
IMS [held]

Ticketmaster [held]
Hamidi [held]

5 Referer Variable
6 Host Authenticati on
r.
7 Password/User An thentication

Ticketmaster [implicit]
CompuServe [presented]
eBay [presented]

Ticketmaster [implicit]
Hamidi [implicit]

'Policy statement approach central to holding only in LCGM and Natl Health, which involved damage claims for
conduct that took place prior to AOL's sending of cease-and-desist
letters. In all other cases plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief and defendants had actual notice of objection, but courts
did not rely on that actual notice.

make the case for rejecting weak forms of notice in favor of stronger
ones. A necessary corollary of this analysis is that courts should never
proceed from a default rule of closed access.
Decisions allowing owners of network resources to enjoin
unwanted uses of their systems are controversial partly because
system owners seek at the same time to grant and deny access to the
same types of communications. From a technical perspective, bulk email looks like ordinary e-mail; a recursive data request generated by
a software program is the same as a data request generated by an
individual user. As a result, those seeking to defend against unwanted
access claims argue that one who connects a system to the Internet
and configures it to accept or respond to certain communications
thereby "consents"-implicitly, if not explicitly-to the use of the
system for communications to which the system is configured to
respond.
Courts have generally accepted this default rule of consent, but
they have held that the system owner can limit or revoke that consent
in relevant ways. 325 If we accept that a system's open configuration
does provide a default rule of consent, then the question is: What
must a system owner do to limit or revoke that consent in a way that
will be legally effective? Even if we approach this question from a
doctrinal perspective, it becomes clear that the law should require
325 See supra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

December 20041

DEFENDING CYBERPROPERTY

2247

fairly strong signals of the limitations on use of a system-and that
policy statements posted at some location on a network and user
agreements that need not be viewed or formally "accepted" before
one proceeds should not qualify.
Turning first to the trespass-to-chattels doctrine, recall that for a
network resource owner to sustain a trespass claim, she must show
that a particular use of a system is "unauthorized." Although scholars
have resisted reliance on analogies between access to real property
and access to Internet-connected network resources, 326 a realproperty analogy, properly understood, is actually helpful in this context. Two rules governing trespass to real property are relevant: the
general default rule for trespass, and the rule that applies once a landowner invites access. The general rule is that a property owner can
recover for trespass even if she neither fences her property nor posts a
"No Trespassing" sign. 327 This approach can only be justified by a
theory that the would-be trespasser is in a good position to know, or
to discover, that he is entering onto another's land and that the entry
may be unwelcome, and thus should bear the burden of making that
determination. 328 Once a landowner invites access, however, the
burden shifts back to the landowner to limit or revoke the invitation.
In particular, a revocation of consent is not effective until the wouldbe trespasser knows or has reason to know of it.329
326 See supra note 12.
327 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
328 Indeed, scholars distinguish between circumstances in which a property rule (such as
trespass) is preferable to a liability rule (such as nuisance) based on the clarity of the
entitlement holder's right. For example, Professor Ian Ayres has noted:
When Rose steals my watch or builds an encroaching wall or becomes a holdover tenant, Rose usually knows at the time that she is unlawfully impairing
my entitlement. In contrast, it is more difficult for Rose to know in advance
whether her noise or dust emission will constitute a nuisance.
Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 829 (1998).
329 See Brabazon v. Joannes Bros. Co., 286 N.W. 21, 25-26 (Wis. 1939) (reversing judgment on trespass claim where court erroneously placed on defendant burden of showing
that plaintiff consented to entry; because defendant had implied license to enter, trespass
could only be found upon showing that plaintiff terminated consent); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. i (1979) ("[C]onsent is terminated when the actor knows
or has reason to know that the other is no longer willing for him to continue the particular
conduct."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 171 ("Subject to the privileges of
reasonable egress and removal of things, the actor's privilege to enter land created by
consent of the possessor is terminated by... (b) a revocation of the possessor's consent, of
which the actor knows or has reason to know .... "); see also Bullick v. Colebrookdale
Township, No. CIV.A.96-CV-1266, 1997 WL 587248, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1997)
(declining to dismiss trespass claim because factual issue remained as to whether defendant
knew or had reason to know that plaintiff revoked consent to entry); Minshew v. State, 542
So. 2d 307, 311-12 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (holding that, for purposes of criminal trespass
statute, even if defendant's initial entry had been licensed, any license to remain on premises was terminated by virtue of defendant's scuffle with homeowner); Mitchell v. Mitchell,
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These real property rules show why a default presumption of
closed access is inappropriate in the Internet context and why policy
statements or terms of use posted at some location on a network (and
not requiring explicit acknowledgment by a user) are inappropriately
"weak" signals to trigger trespass-to-chattels liability. Looking to the
default rule, a user moving between sites over the Internet does not
experience the concept of "entry" in the same way as he would in
physical space. When a system is technically configured to allow particular uses, the default presumption should be that the system owner
consents to the allowed use because the system owner is in a better
position to set and convey limits than a user is to discover them on his
own. Moreover, if a system is technically configured to allow particular uses, whatever notice to the user the system owner provides must
be strong enough to overcome that consent-to place the user in a
position to know or have reason to know that consent has been
revoked or limited.
Most of the cases suggesting that policy statements or terms of
use posted at some location on the network are sufficient to limit or
revoke consent (such as LCGM, Hotmail, Register.com, National
Health Care Discount, and Zefer, all presented as validating Rule 2 in
Figure 3) have not explicitly considered, at least with respect to the
trespass to chattels and CFAA claims involved, whether such statements or terms place a user in a position to know or have reason to
know of limitations on the use of the system. Courts' failure to consider such statements is surprising, since in some cases actual knowledge of the limitations was present; in Register.com, the court called
330
explicit attention to this fact in connection with the contract claim.
As a general matter, policy statements articulating limits on use of a
system that is otherwise configured to accept communications will not
be sufficient to give a user knowledge of limitations on the use of the
system. Taking first the example of a mail server configured to accept
e-mail from any point on the Internet, one who sends e-mail to such a
server would be most unlikely to know that his contacts are unwelcome (since the policy statement is only available at some location on
the mail server's network). 331 Indeed, the vast majority of e-mailers
55 N.W. 1134, 1135 (Minn. 1893) (concluding that plaintiff's explicit request that defendants leave house constituted revocation of license to enter); St. Louis County v. Stone,
853 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that, despite implied consent of owner to
entry, circumstances were sufficient to place defendants on notice that they were not
allowed to enter).
330 See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
331 Hunter, supra note 12, at 508-09 (describing scenario in which individual could violate "term of use" prohibiting sending of joke e-mails to university's mail server, even
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are probably not even aware that their mail resides on a server, and
would have no idea how to locate a mail server's open network. Similarly, if it is possible to navigate a website without encountering an
indication that policies limit such access, one who so navigates a website cannot be said to know or have reason to know of the limitations.
For web browsing, the strongest argument that online policy statements do constitute appropriate signals of limitations is that users
should know that such policies exist and are on notice to inquire about
the terms when they visit any site. But in light of the consent the
system's code conveys, it is difficult to see policies merely posted at
some location on the network as a limitation on consent. When a
system owner implements some technical block, and the user must
take steps to evade it, the situation is different, and revocation of consent can reasonably be inferred.
A similar result is appropriate for contract claims in this context. 332 When a policy statement is simply posted at some location on
a network, without purporting to bind users to its terms, no contract
claim will lie. The harder question is whether a system owner can
attempt, through the language of her terms of use, to deem "use" of
the site to constitute agreement to the terms and limitations. 3 33 This
sort of approach is widespread among website owners; eBay's site provides a useful example. Although eBay requires users listing or bidding on items to register with the site, and to accept a user agreement
in the process, users merely browsing the site need not do so. This
fact is particularly relevant for robots extracting data from eBay's site:
A robot would not encounter any technical impediment to its data
extraction. 334 Despite the fact that eBay's site is open in a technical
sense, the eBay home page does state that "Use of this Web site constitutes acceptance of the eBay User Agreement and Privacy
Policy. ' 335 That User Agreement does not itself appear on the eBay
home page; it requires a click-through to another page on the
system. 336 Through this mechanism, eBay has tried to create a conthough he would have no notice of such limitation); see supra note 167 and accompanying
text.
332 I do not consider CFAA claims here because I argue below that the CFAA should be
limited to code-based access controls. See infra notes 348-70 and accompanying text.
333 For discussion of cases that implicitly or explicitly adopt this approach, see supra
notes 308-11, 317-24 and accompanying text.
334 I discuss the significance of the robot exclusion standard in greater detail below. Use
of that standard does not in fact block access; it simply directs compliant robots not to
query certain portions of a site. See infra notes 383-85 and accompanying text; see also
supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
335 See http://www.ebay.com (last visited Aug. 21, 2004).
336 See User Agreement, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html
(last visited Aug. 21, 2004).
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tract even with those users who need not click "I Agree" in order to
proceed further on eBay's site. As noted earlier, cases involving standard-form "shrinkwrap" and "clickwrap" licenses are themselves controversial in part because courts have conducted only limited inquiries
into issues of notice and assent. 337 Relying on a posted statement that
use of a site constitutes assent to its terms of use pushes that line of
cases one step further. For that reason, at least one court declined to
enforce a license associated with the download of software where
users did not have to click "I Agree" to proceed. 338 To the extent that

the denial of summary judgment in Ticketmaster and the Register.com
district court decision suggest that mere use of a site, without more, is
sufficient to bind a user to terms posted at some location on a network, 339 they are inconsistent with established rules of contract interpretation and therefore should not be followed.
Normative considerations reinforce these conclusions. To
continue with the eBay example, the statement on eBay's home page
that use of the site constitutes acceptance of the terms of eBay's User
Agreement is a very weak form of notice of limitations on permissible
uses of the site. If that notice were enough to trigger eBay's right to
block unwanted uses, then eBay's ability to control its site would
approach the degree of protection available in a closed-access default
rule.
Quite apart from the unfairness of such a rule to users who are
unlikely to have notice of the terms of use, treating such terms as the
basis for trespass or breach-of-contract claims allows a system owner
to achieve the benefits of closed access whenever she wishes, without
internalizing any of the costs of closing access. Recall the observation
in Part II that rules requiring some kind of notice to trigger a right to
enjoin an unwanted use have both liability-rule and property-rule features and might usefully be described as "loperty" rules. 340 Protecting
an entitlement through a "loperty" rule has two benefits. First, it
eliminates the need for negotiations in cases in which a resource
owner is willing to permit access. Second, it provides a mechanism to
distinguish owners for whom property-rule protection is efficient from
those better served by an open-access rule, by forcing a system owner
337 See supra notes 306-24 and accompanying text.

Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32-35 (2d Cir. 2002).
339 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2003 WL 21406289, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). For discussion of these cases, see supra
notes 308-11, 317-24.
340 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
338
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to assess the value of closing access and to communicate that value to
341
would-be users.
If the law requires only very weak signals to trigger property-rule
protection of network resources, however, the benefits of taking a
"loperty"-rule approach are lost altogether. If the signals the law
requires are sufficiently weak that users are poorly situated to determine whether their use is permissible, then users must negotiate for
access in all cases. (This, of course, was the basis for scholars' objection to property-rule protection for computer networks. 342 ) And a
regime under which only weak signals are required allows a system
owner to avoid internalizing the costs of closing access.
If the law is to allow notice of permissible uses of a system to
trigger legal protection for system owners, it must force stronger
forms of notice than current case law appears to require. The system
owner should generally bear the burden of proving that the defendant
had actual notice of the objection to the challenged use. Courts could
also identify other steps by a system owner that would presumptively
qualify, such as employing a technical measure (even a weak one) that
a user would have to defeat to gain access. eBay's configuration again
provides a useful example. In order to list or bid on an item on eBay's
pages, one must actually register as an eBay user. In that registration
process, the user is presented with the terms of eBay's User Agreement and must click "I Agree" before completing the registration process. eBay's system is thus technically open to all users who wish
merely to browse, but it is not technically open to users who wish to
bid or sell. Even if we treat the initial openness of eBay as conveying
consent, when it comes to bidding and selling, eBay has constructed its
system to negate the consent that the code conveys-by requiring
users to review and accept the user agreement before they navigate
further. In this context, it is more reasonable to treat the limitation as
a valid indication of the bounds of the system owner's consent to use.
Even to the extent that a provider does not work on a subscription or
membership model, it may configure its system so that one cannot use
the network without agreeing to certain terms, by routing all traffic to
a main page that requires acknowledgment of terms; there too, the
fact that there are limits to the system owner's consent is conveyed to
the user. 34 3
341 Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 101, at 53-54 (describing benefits of "fencing
out" rule).
342 See supra notes 163-76 and accompanying text.
343 My argument that the law must require stronger forms of notice than current law
seems to require, in part to force system owners to evaluate and internalize the costs of
closing access, is somewhat consistent with one expounded by Michael Madison. He has
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The key in each of these examples is that, once the system's code
signals that there are some limits on use of the system-by forcing the
user to acknowledge the existence of these limits-it is no longer reasonable for a user to assume that the system owner consents to any
and all uses. Because this approach places the burden on the system
owner to configure the system in order to alert users of the limitations
on access, it forces the system owner to weigh the benefits of closing
access against that burden and thus captures the benefits of a
"loperty" rule approach.
C.

The Choice Between Notice-Based, Code-Based, and
Commons Approaches

In the previous Section, I argued that, for doctrinal and normative reasons, courts must at a minimum curtail the drift toward a
closed-access default rule, by requiring stronger signals of the limitations on use of a system to trigger a right to enjoin unwanted uses.
That still leaves open the question of which of the remaining
approaches is preferable-a notice-based approach (as narrowed by
the discussion above to mean actual notice or adoption of a system
configuration that makes it plain to the user that use is restricted); a
code-based approach; or a commons approach. Recall that both
notice-based and code-based approaches can be characterized as combining liability-rule and property-rule treatment of a network
resource. The difference between the two approaches is that more is
required under a code-based approach to trigger the property-rule
protection: The system must use a technical measure that actually
controls access to some degree.
The choice between these approaches, too, has both doctrinal and
normative components. I first consider the doctrinal issues. Doctrinal
considerations establish that, under the CFAA, courts should recognize a legal right to exclude unwanted uses only in connection with
technical measures that are effective in controlling access to a
system.3 44 Although a similar doctrinal argument could be made for
argued that courts should require a system owner wishing to enforce an access limitation to
demonstrate "a salient or visible boundary between open, public information and information subject to access constraints." See Madison, supra note 12, at 491. Madison, however,
would conclude that "[g]iving actual notice of the access restriction to the individual user
may not be sufficient." Id. In addition, under Madison's view, "[a] mere 'No Trespassing'
'sign' on the Internet, such as the robots.txt file ... is easily ignored as a triviality on the
Internet as a whole." Id. at 498.
344 See infra Part III.C.1. Two recent articles identify problems with current judicial
approaches to the CFAA similar to those that I identify. See Galbraith, supra note 142, at
323-24 (arguing that, although CFAA was designed to combat computer crime, statute "is
now being used to control access to and the use of information contained on publicly avail-

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

December 20041

DEFENDING CYBERPROPERTY

trespass to chattels, I conclude that it is not compelling. 345 The

remaining questions are largely normative. The main normative consideration that has been overlooked thus far is that recognizing strong

code-based approaches will tend to give system owners incentives to
achieve through code what they cannot achieve through law alone.
Analyzing cyberproperty claims in light of that consideration leads me

to an approach under which an appropriate form of notice-either
actual notice or use of a particular configuration that presumptively
satisfies the notice requirement-triggers a system owner's right to

enjoin unwanted uses.
1.

Doctrinal Issues: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

As discussed earlier, plaintiffs seeking to control access to network resources typically invoke sections of the CFAA that prohibit

"access" to a protected computer that is "without authorization" or
that "exceed[s] authorized access. ' 346 The question is whether

"access" to a protected computer "without authorization" or
"exceed[ing] authorized access" encompasses only breaches of code-

based limitations on access, or if other activities inconsistent with a
system owner's policies or terms of use also qualify. Turning first to
the statutory language, the critical questions are how we should interpret the term "access" and how we should define what conduct is
without or in excess of "authorization."
We can posit two possible readings of the term "access." First, it
is possible to adopt a broad reading, under which "access" means any
interaction between two computers. In other words, "accessing" a

computer simply means transmitting electronic signals to a computer
that the computer processes in some way. 347 A narrower underable websites"); Kerr, supra note 202, at 1599 (arguing that "broad judicial interpretations
of unauthorized access statutes could potentially make millions of Americans criminally
liable for the way they send e-mails and surf the Web"). Although we all agree that current judicial interpretations of the CFAA are problematic, our arguments differ in important respects. Professor Galbraith effectively concedes that the literal language of the
CFAA "appears to include protection for any type of information," Galbraith, supra note
142, at 331, and thus rests her arguments on the CFAA's legislative history. In addition,
Gailbraith argues for an amendment to the statute rather than an alternative judicial interpretation. Id. at 366-67. I argue that there is in fact a textual basis for a narrower interpretation of the CFAA. See infra notes 348-55 and accompanying text. Although Professor
Kerr proposes an alternative judicial interpretation as well, he would rely on the "without
authorization" language of the statute to supply a limiting principle, see Kerr, supra note
202, at 1646-60, whereas my approach would also find an outer boundary on the term
"access." In addition, Kerr's main arguments are policy-based rather than textual. See id.
at 1648-60 (discussing policy reasons for interpreting statutory terms in particular ways).
345 See infra Part III.C.2.
346 See supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
347 Professor Kerr adopts this approach. See Kerr, supra note 202, at 1646-47.
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standing of "access" would focus not merely on the successful
exchange of electronic signals, but rather on conduct by which one is
in a position to obtain privileges or information not available to the
general public. The choice between these two meanings of "access"
obviously affects what qualifies as unauthorized conduct. If we adopt
the broader reading of access, and any successful interaction between
computers qualifies, then breach of policies or contractual terms purporting to outline permissible uses of a system can constitute unauthorized access to the system. Under the narrower reading of access,
however, only breach of a code-based restriction on the system would
qualify.
Which interpretation is correct? Several prohibitions in the
CFAA describe conduct that could only be accomplished through
breach of a code-based limitation. As a result, the narrower reading
of "access" is in fact the more natural one. The provisions clearly contemplate conduct that involves obtaining information not generally
available to the public, including national security information and
financial and other records, 348 or conduct that involves access to computers that are nonpublic. 34 9 Since the information is not available to
the public, it is necessarily segregated by code-whether by a password or other technical measure, or by being placed on a system not
generally accessible to the public. If "access[] without authorization"
is to be read consistently throughout the statute, then it must extend
only to breaches of these sorts of code-based limitations. Some provisions of the CFAA, of course, also contemplate conduct that
"exceed[s] authorized access," and it is conceivable that restrictions in
policy statements or terms of use should be relevant there. Because
such provisions are designed to target activities by persons whose
access to the system is not constrained by code in the same way as the
general public's, such provisions align with a reading of "access[ ]
without authorization" that depends on breach of code-based limitations on access. In fact, in applying a separate federal statute that
protects electronic communications, courts have read the language
"access[ ] without authorization" to require breaching code-based
350
access limitations.
348 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (2)(A) (2000).

349 See id. § 1030(a)(3).
350 The statute, a portion of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act often referred
to as the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2709, 2711-2712 (West
2000 & Supp. 2004) prohibits "access[ing] without authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided ...

and thereby obtain[ing] ...

access to a

wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system." Id.
§ 2701(a)(1). Plaintiffs in a number of courts have attempted to invoke the statute's civil
liability provision to block others from retrieving information from their systems. See, e.g.,
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In addition, a broader reading of access-as encompassing any

interaction between computers-would create other statutory anomalies. In 1994, Congress added a computer damage provision to the
CFAA; 351 as amended in 1996,352 this provision prohibits one from
"caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code, or comKonop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2002); Sherman & Co. v.
Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 817, 820-21 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Educ.
Testing Serv. v. Stanley H. Kaplan, Educ. Ctr., Ltd., 965 F. Supp. 731, 740 (D. Md. 1997).
Because the statute covers the facilities of those who provide electronic communications
services to others, id. § 2701(a)(1), and not the facilities of the users of those services, and
because the statute defines "electronic storage" narrowly, see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2000 &
Supp. 1 2001), the statute should not be read to protect servers that merely make information available for retrieval indefinitely or computer systems that do not involve the provision of communication services. Courts have ignored these threshold requirements in
several cases and have proceeded to consider other aspects of the claims. In doing so,
however, courts seem to presume that the relevant limitations on authorization are those
established by the system's code. In Educational Testing Service (ETS), for example, the
district court considered ETS's claim that Stanley Kaplan employees violated the Stored
Communications Act by copying down questions they accessed through ETS's computerized GRE testing system in order to undermine public confidence in the test and to gain an
advantage in developing test preparation software-uses that exceeded the authorization
embodied in terms of use conveyed by ETS at the start of the test. Educ. Testing Serv., 965
F. Supp. at 737, 740. The ETS court rejected that argument, concluding instead that the
scope of authority to access a system depends on the computer system's technical restrictions, not on notice-based restrictions announced to end-users about how the information
can or cannot be utilized: "[T]he wrongful acts targeted by the [SCA] are those committed
while a user is in electronic 'contact' with a computer facility, not those committed after
the user has signed off." Id. at 740.
Similarly, in Sherman, the court considered an SCA counterclaim based on Salton
Maxim's allegation that its former product representative to K-Mart, Sherman, improperly
gained access to Salton Maxim's confidential sales data on K-Mart's computer after Salton
Maxim terminated him but while he was still representing other companies to K-Mart.
Sherman & Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d at 819. The court rejected Salton Maxim's counterclaim,
holding that Sherman's access was not "without authorization" because there was no clear
or explicit restriction on access to Salton Maxim's files with K-Mart, nor was that access
restricted by any technical means. Id. at 821; see also Konop, 302 F.3d at 879 n.8 ("There is
some indication in the legislative history that Congress intended the configuration of the
electronic communication system to 'establish an objective standard [for] determining
whether a system receives privacy protection."' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 41)
(emphasis added)).
Because § 2701(a) of the SCA does not apply to communications obtained "through
an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public," 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g) (2000), it is unlikely
that a website owner could invoke the SCA to block access to her site. The systems
involved in the cases discussed above were not readily accessible to the general public, and
none of the cases cited § 2511(2)(g). The courts' views that the SCA requires a breach of a
technical limitation on access thus appear to flow from the "access[ ... without authorization" language itself, not from § 2511(2)(g).
351 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 290001(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2097-98.
352 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, sec. 201, § 1030(a)(5)(A), 110
Stat. 3488, 3492.
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mand, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage
without authorization, to a protected computer. '353 In the 1996

amendment, Congress also enacted a provision prohibiting intentionally accessing a protected computer without authorization and thereby
causing damage. 354 If access is so broadly conceived as to cover any
transmission of electronic signals that are successfully received by a
computer, then the two provisions-§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii)-would become redundant because under the

broad reading of access, one who "caus[es] the transmission of...
code" to the protected computer actually "access[es]" the computer as
well. It is a well-established canon of statutory interpretation that
courts should not interpret provisions of a statute in a way that makes
355
other provisions superfluous.
The legislative history of the statute also supports a narrow
reading. When it passed the first version of the computer crime
statute in 1984,356 Congress clearly sought to target hacking activities.
The House Report accompanying the statute stressed both govern-

ments' and businesses' growing reliance on computers and the threat
that increased networking would make society more vulnerable to
hacking incidents. 357 As initially enacted, the statute covered a fairly
narrow range of computers, none of which were available to the general public. In particular, the statute protected access to three types of

computers: those containing national security information; those containing financial data; and those operated by or on behalf of the government. 358 When Congress amended the statute in 1986, it retained
the three offenses of the 1984 act, while tweaking some elements, and
added three new offenses. 359 Two of the new offenses were, like the
offenses in the original 18 U.S.C. § 1030, unauthorized-access
offenses. Both of these new offenses covered access to "Federal
353 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) (Supp. I 2001) (original version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)). For an explanation of the shift in the numbering of the statute, see supra
note 264.
354 Economic Espionage Act, sec. 201, § 1030(a)(5)(C), 110 Stat. at 3492. The provision
now appears at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) (Supp. I 2001).
355 See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 609 (1998) ("Statutory interpretations that 'render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' are
strongly disfavored." (citation omitted)); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-41
(1994) (stating that courts should be particularly wary of finding statutory provision superfluous "when the words describe an element of a criminal offense").
356 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse (Counterfeit Access
Device) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190.
357 See H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 8-12 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689,
3694-97.
358 Counterfeit Access Device Act § 2102, 98 Stat. at 2190-91.
359 See CFAA, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213, 1213-14.
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interest computers, ' 360 a term defined in two ways. The statute first
defined the term to include computers
exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States
Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such
use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States
Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects the use
operation or the Government's operaof the financial institution's
361
tion of such computer.
This definition still tied the offenses to those computers containing sensitive confidential information. The statute also defined
"Federal interest computer" as a computer "which is one of two or
more computers used in committing the offense, not all of which
are located in the same State. ' 362 This definition was far broader,
in that it allowed coverage of unauthorized access merely if
the offense involved an interstate element. Nothing in the debate over the statute's passage or the accompanying reports, however, indicates that Congress intended to extend the statute's coverage to publicly available information on such computers; on the
contrary, the legislative record continued to stress issues of security and confidentiality. 363 These same concerns are reflected at
the time of the passage of the 1996 amendments, 364 which adop360 Id. sec. 2(d), § 1030(a)(4)-(5), 100 Stat. at 1213-14.
361 Id. sec. 2(g)(4), § 1030(e)(2)(A), 100 Stat. at 1215.
362 Id. sec. 2(g)(4), § 1030(e)(2)(B), 100 Stat. at 1215.
363 See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 28,821 (1986) (statement of Rep. Hughes) (noting that bill
was designed to "deter[ ] the emergence of the computer criminal"); id. (statement of Rep.
Wyden) (discussing dangers of hacking); id. at 27,640 (statement of Sen. Trible) (discussing
need to ensure that "our criminal justice system is capable of addressing the types of
offenses that have accompanied the rise of new technologies" and pointing in particular to
acts of "theft, vandalism, and trespass" of computer data); id. at 27,639 (statement of Sen.
Thurmond) (stating that legislation was designed "to address the real and growing danger
of computer crime"); id. at 12,109 (statement of Rep. Rodino) (noting that legislation
seeks to deter "future attempts by high technology criminals in our society"); id. at 7816
(statement of Rep. Hughes) (stating that legislation targets "the computer sophisticated
criminal who combines his technological skill with old-fashioned greed and criminal intent
to rob banks or destroy business records or steal trade secrets").
364 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. 27,118 (1996) (remarks of Sen. Leahy) (stating that act will
protect "privacy, security, and reliability of computer networks"); id. at 25,910 (statement
of Rep. Goodlatte) (stating that act will provide "much needed protection for our Nation's
important information infrastructure and help maintain the privacy of electronic information"); id. at 23,783 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (stating that act will "strengthen current public
law on computer crime and protect the national information infrastructure" and "protect
banks, hospitals, and other information-intensive businesses which maintain sensitive computer files from those who improperly enter into computer systems"); id. at 23,784 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (arguing that existing statute fell short in protecting "privacy and
confidentiality of information").
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ted the "protected computer" language that now appears in the
365
statute.
Other considerations support a narrow reading of the statute as
well. Although the cases discussed earlier involve actions under the
CFAA's civil suit provision, 366 the CFAA is a criminal statute, and
interpretations of a statute in a civil context will carry over into the
criminal context. The approach some courts have taken thus fartreating as unauthorized access any conduct inconsistent with policies
posted at some location on a network 367-might raise due process
concerns, in that criminal liability would attach without a user having
fair notice of the prohibited conduct. 368 This approach seems particularly troubling in light of the fact that the CFAA is a criminal statute:
The approach used by these courts would suggest that a violation of
the statute could occur in circumstances when a court would not even
find a breach of contract. 369 Even in cases where a system owner uses
strong signals (but without a technical control) to identify limitations
on use of the system, an interpretation that tied liability to activities
inconsistent with such limitations would criminalize a broad range of
conduct, even an employee's use of a computer for personal activities
in violation of an employer's policy. 370
Courts would better serve both the statutory intent of the CFAA
and public policy by limiting its application to unwanted uses only in
connection with code-based controls on access.
2.

DoctrinalIssues: Trespass to Chattels

Because the substantive elements of the CFAA and state-law
trespass claims have been interpreted quite similarly, my conclusion
that the CFAA should be read to cover only breaches of code-based
access controls raises the question whether trespass-to-chattels doctrine should be limited in this manner as well. Does one "use" or
"intermeddl[e] with" a system when one merely sends electronic signals that cause the system to respond in some way, or does "use" or
"intermeddling" require a further showing that the defendant evaded
a technical or physical limitation on use of a system? Although
scholars have criticized many aspects of trespass-to-chattels doctrine,
365 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 201(4)(A), 110 Stat. 3488,
3493 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2000 & Supp. I 2001)).
366 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (Supp. 1 2001); see supra note 257 and accompanying text; supra
Part III.A.2.
367 See supra notes 264-305 and accompanying text.
368 See Kerr, supra note 202, at 1659.
369 Lemley, supra note 12, at 528 n.29.
370 See Kerr, supra note 202, at 1632-37 (discussing use of CFAA in employee misconduct cases).
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they have not addressed this precise question. As I show below,
although there is an argument to be made for tying trespass to chattels
to breach of a code-based limitation, the case for doing so is not as
compelling as in the CFAA. I sketch the argument here but ultimately conclude that (like the issue of harm) the question cannot be
resolved at the level of doctrine.
To understand the basis for arguing that trespass to chattels
requires breach of a code-based limitation, recall one of the threshold
conclusions in the CompuServe case: that electronic signals are sufficiently "tangible" to give rise to a trespass cause of action. 371 Scholars
have disputed this conclusion on the ground that the case law on
which CompuServe relied does not support the conclusion. 372 Even if
one accepts the conclusion, as the CompuServe court did, that electronic signals are sufficiently "tangible" to support a trespass-tochattels cause of action, it does not necessarily follow that any transmission of signals constitutes intermeddling. The CompuServe court
simply concluded that sending electronic signals does qualify as intermeddling. One might argue that there is a missing link in this analysis:
Even if transmission of electronic signals causes a recipient computer
to take some further action, that does not automatically constitute use
of or intermeddling with the system, considering that the system is
simply processing electronic signals that it is designed to process.
Under an alternative approach, a court might find use or intermeddling only if a defendant evaded a technical or physical limitation on
use of a system, and thereby caused the system to process electronic
signals in a way that it was not configured to process them. In other
words, the issue is not so much whether electronic signals are sufficiently "tangible" to give rise to a trespass, but whether those electronic signals evade a technical limitation on the system.

371 CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio
1997); see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
372 In particular, Professor Burk has argued that CompuServe relies heavily on ThriftyTel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996), and that Thrifty-Tel erroneously
intermingles trespass-to-land and trespass-to-chattels cases. See Burk, supra note 14, at
32-33. A second criticism of the Thrifty-Tel case often attributed to Burk's article is that
the court relied for tangibility on "particulate trespass" cases that in fact involved dispossession. See id. at 33-34. The cited cases did not in fact involve dispossession, and the
implication that they did apparently arose only from an editorial error in Burk's article.
See DAVID McGOWAN, THE TREsPAss TROUBLE AND THE METAPHOR MUDDLE 7 n.31

(Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 04-5, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=521982 (disputing that particulate trespass cases on which Thrifty-Tel relied involved dispossession).
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One could further argue that Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 373 on
which CompuServe relied to find intermeddling, 374 in fact involved a
breach of such a technical limitation on Thrifty-Tel's system. In
Thrifty-Tel, two teenage boys, the Bezenek brothers, sought to use
Thrifty-Tel's system to make long-distance calls without paying for
them. Thrifty-Tel's system contained two layers of code-based protection. To make phone calls, Thrifty-Tel customers had to enter both an
access code and an authorization code. 375 The Bezenek boys obtained
an access code from a friend; they then attempted, both manually and
through the use of a modem and automated software, to guess a legitimate authorization code. 376 The California appellate court's opinion
suggested that Thrifty-Tel's system was structured so as to dedicate a
phone line to one who entered an access code alone, even if one did
not enter a proper authorization code. 377 In other words, as the boys
attempted to guess an authorization code that would allow them to
make long-distance calls, they tied up Thrifty-Tel's phone lines. The
court thus found that the Bezenek boys had made unauthorized use of
Thrifty-Tel's "chattels"-i.e., its computer and phone system-and
caused harm by depriving Thrifty-Tel of the ability to serve its legiti378
mate customers.
The CompuServe court simply used Thrifty-Tel's trespass analysis
to support the proposition that electronic signals transmitted to CompuServe's equipment were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass
cause of action. 379 To the extent that Thrifty-Tel focused on the
Bezenek boys' search for an authorizationcode, having already gained
access to the Thrifty-Tel phone lines by entering the access code, the
parallel between the boys' activities in Thrifty-Tel and the bulk emailer's activities in CompuServe was strong: In both cases, the
alleged trespassers transmitted electronic signals to systems designed
to receive them, but in unusually high volume. The CompuServe
court, however, could just as easily have read Thrifty-Tel to foreclose
CompuServe's claim. In particular, had the court focused on the boys'
prior use of an access code to cause Thrifty-Tel's system to dedicate
54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996).
CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1021 ("Electronic signals generated and sent by computer have been held to be sufficiently physically tangible to support a trespass cause of
action." (citing Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473)).
375 Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
373

374

376

Id.

See id. (noting that Bezenek boys' use of computer software in attempt to identify
authorization codes generated over 1300 calls, "denying some subscribers access to phone
lines").
378 Id. at 471-73.
379 CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1021.
377
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phone lines to their use in the first place, it might have concluded that
Thrifty-Tel involved the boys' "entry," through the use of an access
code, into a private area of Thrifty-Tel's phone system. In other
words, use of the access code itself evaded a technical limitation on
Thrifty-Tel's system. When Thrifty-Tel is viewed in this light, Cyber
Promotions's conduct is distinguishable: Cyber Promotions simply
caused CompuServe's system to process the sorts of signals that CompuServe's system was designed to process.
Even though the Thrifty-Tel case could have supported a different result in CompuServe and subsequent cases, the choice between
notice-based and code-based trespass claims is not as easily resolved
as a matter of doctrine as is the same choice under the CFAA. The
textual arguments made under the CFAA simply do not apply, and
the concept of "intermeddling" is underdeveloped in trespass-tochattels case law. Choosing a code-based approach to trespass essentially requires identifying what constitutes a "restricted" area of a mail
server or web server, and nothing in the existing case law resolves why
the only relevant restrictions are those incorporated into code. I
therefore turn now to a normative discussion to help resolve these
issues.
3. Normative Considerations: The Problem of Code
Having set aside the CFAA on the ground that, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, coverage of unauthorized "access" should be
limited to activities that breach some technical limitation on access,
we are left to consider the normative bases for choosing among different possible rules for other cyberproperty claims. It may be helpful
at this point to return to Figures 1 and 2. As emphasized earlier, the
normative choice is not merely between a property-rule approach and
a liability-rule approach. Rather the choice is between a closed-access
default, several different "loperty"-rule approaches (those labeled
Rules 2-7 in Figure 1) with different triggers for injunctive relief, and
"commons" approaches under which injunctive relief to control access
is unavailable. In this last category, there are actually two different
possibilities. One is a pure liability rule, under which a system owner
could not enjoin unwanted access to a system, regardless of the noticebased or technical measures she employed. Because such a rule
would still leave a system owner free to employ technical measures,
the law would not guarantee open access-the system owner's choice
whether or not to use technical measures to control access, and users'
ability to circumvent any measures used, would determine the degree
of access. The second possibility is a technology-displacing rule, which
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would displace technical measures in particular circumstances,
thereby preserving the desired level of open access.
Recall that the main concern among scholars who oppose application of trespass-to-chattels doctrine in the Internet context is that
users would have to bargain for access in a significant number of
cases, thereby precluding complex transactions and preventing
socially valuable uses from occurring. 380 As should be clear, however,
this concern does not arise with many of the "loperty"-rule
approaches. Rather, it arises only with approaches that are nearer to
a closed-access default (such as Rule 2 in Figure 1). To be sure, the
critics' concern has some basis in the case law, insofar as the literal
language of some opinions suggests that courts have relied on actions
inconsistent with policy statements or terms of use to trigger liability
under trespass, CFAA, and contract theories, without any detailed
inquiry into whether users had notice of or assented to the relevant
terms.381 As I discussed in Part III.B, normative concerns about the
extent to which bargaining must occur push us away from approaches
closest to a closed-access default. They do not, however, provide a
basis for choosing among the remaining rules.
Choosing among the remaining rules involving a right to enjoin
unwanted uses (Rules 3-7 in Figure 1) is difficult because the rules are
not conceptually distinct. Under each rule, a system owner's entitlement is initially subject only to liability-rule protection, in that the law
does not back with injunctive relief a system owner's attempt to set
the terms of access. The system owner is entitled to an injunctive
remedy to back the conditions of access only if she satisfies a specified
condition. Each rule thus reflects features of liability-rule and property-rule protection. What distinguishes the rules is that each rule
demands a different, and perhaps increasingly costly, mechanism to
trigger property-rule protection. In that sense, each rule presents for
system owners a different cost-benefit calculus: They must measure
the benefits of controlling access against the costs of maintaining that
configuration, as well as the costs that the configuration will generate
in blocking beneficial access, and make a decision.
It is again useful to examine eBay's approach because it illustrates some of the dilemmas system owners face. Recall that, at a
technical level, eBay's site is initially open to browsing. eBay does,
however, attempt to restrict the activities even of unregistered users,
by deeming use of its site to constitute acceptance of eBay's user
380 See supra notes 163-76 and accompanying text.
381 See supra notes 239-46, 264-305, 316-24 and accompanying text.
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agreement. 382 The relevant terms of use include a paragraph
addressing "Access and Interference," which, among other things,
prohibits the use of robots on eBay's site without eBay's express
38 3
written permission.
In light of eBay's dispute with Bidder's Edge and this term in its

user agreement, one might expect eBay to use the robot exclusion
standard to curtail recursive queries with entries in its robots.txt file.
Yet eBay's robots.txt file directs robots to avoid only three directories
on eBay's servers. 384 The robots.txt file does contain a comment

stating that use of robots or other automated means to access eBay's
site is prohibited, 38 5 but that comment is not readable by a robot. In

other words, nothing in the robots.txt file directs robots to do anything
but avoid a small handful of directories.
Why would eBay purport to prohibit robotic activity on its site
but nevertheless allow virtually all robotic activity? We can assume

that eBay has made a judgment that some robotic activity will in fact
benefit the site, and that it is better off allowing all such activity to
proceed, and then detecting and curtailing that which it does not
382 The eBay home page contains the following language at the bottom: "Use of this
Web site constitutes acceptance of the eBay User Agreement and Privacy Policy."
http://www.ebay.com (last visited Aug. 21, 2004). The opening paragraph of the User
Agreement states: "If you do not agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of this
Agreement, do not use or access our services." User Agreement 1 1, at http://pages.ebay.
com/help/policies/user-agreement.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2004).
383 User Agreement
7, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html
(last visited Aug. 21, 2004) ("You agree that you will not use any robot, spider, scraper or
other automated means to access the Site for any purpose without our express written
permission.").
384 The machine-readable text of the file is as follows:
User-agent: *
Disallow: /help/confidence/
Disallow: /help/policies/
Disallow: /disney/
See http://www.ebay.comlrobots.txt (last visited Aug. 21, 2004). The file simply instructs all
user agents (designated by the asterisk following the "User-agent" header) not to access
files in three subdirectories: /help/confidence/, /help/policies/, and /disney/. eBay obviously has multiple servers, but the robots.txt files for these servers appear to be identical.
See, e.g., http://keyword.ebay.com/robots.txt (last visited Aug. 21, 2004); http://pages.ebay.
com/robots.txt (last visited Aug. 21, 2004); http://search.ebay.com/robots.txt (last visited
Aug. 21, 2004).
385 The comment states:
The use of robots or other automated means to access the eBay site without
the express permission of eBay is strictly prohibited. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, eBay may permit automated access to access certain eBay pages but
[solely] for the limited purpose of including content in publicly available search
engines. Any other use of robots or failure to obey the robots exclusion standards set forth at <http://www.robotstxt.org/ wc/ exclusion.html> is strictly
prohibited.
http://www.ebay.comlrobots.txt (last visited Aug. 21, 2004).
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believe will be beneficial, rather than using robot exclusion headers to
deflect all such activity. 386 Because the prohibition in the robots.txt
file is not machine-readable, it is too weak a signaling mechanism to
trigger eBay's right to exclude. Similarly, under the approach outlined in Part III.B, the prohibition on robotic activity in eBay's user
agreement-an agreement that a user of the site is required to accept
only if she wishes to bid on items-would not provide eBay with the
basis to control access to its site. It is not the case, then, that those
wishing to index eBay's site must obtain eBay's permission; in the
absence of a technical impediment or a machine-readable instruction
in eBay's robots.txt file, such access should be allowed to proceed.
That approach, of course, places the burden on eBay to detect
unwanted activity and take steps to block it, either technically or
through legal measures.
What drives a system owner's choice among the various "loperty"
rules, then, is that each rule forces a system owner to make a different
calculation about the costs and benefits of adopting the measure necessary to trigger property-rule protection. Here we arrive at one possible argument for preferring approaches in which property-rule
protection is triggered only by actions that actually block most access
to a particular resource-that is, for preferring "strong" code-based
approaches. As discussed previously, one concern among scholars
was that system owners would undervalue the benefits of maintaining
a large-scale network. 38 7 Put another way, because the value of the
Internet increases with its size, there will be positive externalities that
system owners cannot capture through bargaining; they will therefore
have too little incentive to bargain. 388 Thus, one argument for preferring a code-based approach to a notice-based approach is that such an
approach would offset the unaccounted-for benefits of open access by
making it more costly for a system owner to achieve property-rule
protection.
It quickly becomes apparent, however, that this conception of a
system owner's cost-benefit calculus is incomplete. Part II raised the
possibility that a system owner can achieve the desired degree of control over her system through a combination of legal and technical
measures. A system owner that perceives legal protection to be too
weak is free to employ additional technical measures. In other words,
386 If the Bidder's Edge outcome is instructive of the way future courts will treat
unwanted uses of eBay's system, eBay will only need to send a cease-and-desist letter (and
possibly not even that). If the use continues, eBay can bring suit to enjoin the unwanted
activity.
387 See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
388 McGowan, supra note 14, at 380 & n.208.
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the choice of a legal rule can prompt greater or lesser reliance on technical measures. If this is so, then we cannot prefer a code-based
approach to a notice-based one simply on the theory that a codebased approach makes it more costly for a system owner to achieve
property-rule protection, and thus less likely that she will do so.
Assume that the law backs only very strong technical mechanismsan approach consistent with Rule 7 in Figure 1. A system owner may
still be able to choose weaker, but less costly, technical measures.
Even if the law does not back these measures by prohibiting their circumvention, the measures will mimic property-rule protection to some
degree.
Two questions follow. First, will system owners in fact seek to
mimic property-rule protection with technical measures? I have thus
far stated the concern as a theoretical one. If system owners are in
fact unlikely to use technical measures when legal protection is
unavailable, then those who favor requiring strong technical measures
to trigger injunctive relief-or, for that matter, those who favor a pure
liability-rule approach-may have the better argument, for such rules
would lead to a greater degree of open access than approaches under
which appropriate forms of notice or weak technical controls are sufficient to support injunctive relief. Second, even if system owners
would pursue technical measures, might a strong code-based approach
or a pure liability approach still be as good as or preferable to a
notice-based or weak code-based approach? If indeed different legal
rules will be combined with technical measures to yield the same
degree of control for the system owner, then perhaps the choice
among approaches does not matter. Alternatively, a strong codebased or pure liability approach might be preferable because the possibility of circumvention still exists-under the code-based approach,
for any technical measures short of the strong measures backed by
law; and under the pure liability approach, for any technical measures
at all. I address these issues in turn.
Turning first to whether system owners will in fact seek to fill
legal gaps with technical measures, the available evidence suggests
that they will. Those system owners who are content with open access
(at least in the absence of harm) are, of course, unlikely to pursue any
remedy at all, legal or technical. So we need only consider those
system owners for whom fully open access is not an acceptable alternative. In the major trespass cases discussed throughout this
Article-CompuServe, eBay, Ticketmaster, and Hamidi-the system
owner used technical measures in an attempt to block unwanted activ-
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ities, before ever seeking legal relief.389 In each of the cases, of
course, the measures in question were not wholly effective, which is
why the legal disputes followed. A denial of legal relief simply would
have left the system owners and the would-be users to pursue everescalating blocking and evasion techniques. At some point, the
system owners might have decided that their blocking efforts were too
costly. Of course, the would-be users might just as easily have decided
that the evasion techniques were too costly. Moreover, as I discuss
below, the blocking measures and evasion countermeasures might
impose costs on entities other than the system owners and would-be
users.

390

If I am correct that system owners are likely to employ technical
measures to mimic property-rule protection, the question becomes
whether this should influence our choice among legal rules. One
might argue that a strong code-based or pure liability-rule approach is
still preferable to notice-based or weak code-based approaches
because the pure liability-rule and strong code-based approaches still
allow users to evade technical measures-under a pure liability-rule
approach, any technical measure; and under a strong code-based
approach, any technical measure short of the strong measures backed
by law. Or one might conclude that the choice among legal rules does
not matter.
If we choose an approach under which actual notice (or a technical configuration making restrictions clear to the user) can trigger
property-rule protection, then the system owner who uses such a
mechanism will achieve control through operation of law. This is the
case, of course, because once actual notice has been given, unwarranted access may be enjoined; technical measures will not be necessary. If we choose an approach under which only technical measures
trigger property-rule protection, then the system owner will achieve
control through operation of the technical measure, in combination
with the operation of law. If we choose a pure liability-rule approach,
then the system owner will achieve control through operation of the
technical measure alone.
Setting up a simple choice between these approaches, however,
presumes that the balance between legal and technical measures in
producing particular levels of access does not matter. That may not be
the case. In other contexts, scholars have offered a number of reasons
why technical measures are dangerous regulatory tools. Although
much of this literature focuses on how the availability of technical
389 See supra notes 95-96, 233 and accompanying text.
390 See infra note 406 and accompanying text.
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measures adds to the government's regulatory toolbox, I argue that
the concerns the literature reflects should make us wary of choosing
legal approaches that are likely to induce greater reliance on technical
measures to achieve protection of network resources.
The observation that technical measures can produce regulatory
effects similar to laws is typically made in the context of debates over
the feasibility and legitimacy of government efforts to regulate
Internet-related activities. 39 1 In response to claims that the Internet
would largely resist state regulation, for example, Professor James
Boyle has argued that the state can achieve its regulatory objectives
through technology-by requiring private parties to hardwire certain
governmental policy choices into technology; 392 by enforcing private
choices embedded in technology; 39 3 or merely by influencing the
development of technology in such a way as to facilitate a desired
policy outcome. 394 The government, as Boyle put it, "is working very
hard to design its commands into the very technologies that, collectively, are supposed to spell its demise. ' 395 Even without the active
involvement of the state in its development, the architecture of the
Internet-its "code"-constrains behavior. Professor Lawrence
Lessig offers the example of the code that defined one's experience as
a member of America Online in 1998: One could not enter AOL's
"space" without a password; one could assume any one of five identities while in that space; one could disguise one's identity with respect
to other users, but not with respect to AOL; and one could "gather"

391 Three of the leading works in this field are LESSIG, supra note 134; James Boyle,
Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L.

REV. 177 (1997); and Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REV. 553 (1998).
392 See Boyle, supra note 391, at 202-04 (describing requirement to incorporate V-chip
into television sets and requirement that digital audio tape players incorporate serial copy
protection).
393 The key example is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which prohibits circumvention of technical measures designed to control access to copyrighted works and prohibits trafficking in technologies designed to circumvent access controls or copy
protections. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000) (circumvention of technical measures
controlling access); id. § 1201(a)(2) (trafficking in technology designed to circumvent
access controls); id. § 1201(b)(1) (trafficking in technology designed to circumvent copy
controls).
394 Boyle offers the example of the development of the Platform for Internet Content
Selection (PICS), a technological specification that supports the labeling and filtering of
Internet content. See Boyle, supra note 391, at 191-95. The government influence in this
instance, however, was indirect, in the sense that PICS was partly a response to perceived
overreaching by the government in regulating sexually explicit speech directly.
395 Id. at 204.
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with others in AOL's chat rooms, but only twenty-three users would

396
be allowed to do so at a time.
Although some scholars have suggested that regulation through
code offers far greater flexibility than regulation through law alone,
and that the government therefore should use technology as a regulatory tool so as to preserve certain public-order values, 397 others have
cautioned that code can pose significant dangers. Architecture can
shape and constrain behavior over the Internet, 398 just as it does in
"real space." Scholars have argued, however, that computer code is a
3 99
more powerful regulatory force than other forms of architecture.

Though invisible to most users, the architecture of the Internet is
uniquely pervasive, in that the Internet is defined entirely by codeby hardware and software elements, by the communications protocols
that allow these elements to communicate with one another, and by
the applications running at the endpoints. The pervasiveness of code
400
has led to two overlapping sets of concerns among scholars.
One set of concerns relates to the process by which code-with its
profound regulatory effects-is developed. First, the fact that code is
often privately developed tends to obscure the influence of the government. While one might assume that decisions about the develop-

ment of code are neutral, technical decisions, in fact the government
influences the development or selection of particular technologies. In

40 1
some cases, as when the government mandates technical standards,
the involvement of the government is clear. In other cases, however,

the state may shape technology indirectly, and the assumption that
technology reflects neutral, private choices is mistaken. 40 2 In still
supra note 134, at 66-71.
397 See Reidenberg, supra note 391, at 593.
398 Cf Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002)
(explaining how architectural decisions can impact crime, and advocating greater government involvement in architecture).
399 This is a major theme in Professor Larry Lessig's work. See LEssIG, supra note 134.
For earlier works on this same theme, see generally Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and
Code, 27 CUME. L. REV. 1 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST.
396 LESSIG,

JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Reg-

ulatory Standardsand the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759 (1999); Lawrence
Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996); Lawrence
Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace,48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996).
400 1 leave aside here a third significant thread in the scholarship that argues that code is
problematic simply because it expands the government's regulatory power. This line of
argument proceeds from the premise that less government regulation is better than more
government regulation, and thus requires acceptance of a particular view of the appropriate scope of government regulation that is not specific to the Internet context.
401 See supra note 392 and accompanying text.
402 See Boyle, supra note 391, at 205 (discussing how regulation through code blurs lines
of accountability).
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other cases, private parties may embed certain substantive choices
into the technology, and enforcement of those choices yields the same
outcome as if these substantive choices had been made through adoption of legal rules. As Boyle argues, "the attraction of technical solutions is that they apparently elide the question of power-both public
and private-in the first place. The technology appears to be 'just the
way things are'; its origins are concealed, . . . and its effects are
obscured because it is hard to imagine the alternative. ' 40 3 In other
words, the appearance of neutrality obscures the lines of accountability. If one concern about the development of code is that the influence of the government is obscured, another concern is that the choice
among different possible codes is so significant that the government
must have some involvement in that choice. As Professor Lessig
argues, "Choices among values, choices about regulation, about control, choices about the definition of spaces of freedom-all this is the
'40 4
stuff of politics.
Even if we set aside concerns about how code is developed, we
are still left with a second set of concerns about the operation of the
code that is generated. This concern is best illustrated through
scholars' comparison of code and law as regulatory mechanisms. First,
because code is self-enforcing, it lacks the law's capacity to accommodate the public interest and moderate potentially unfair results.
Lessig illustrates this point in comparing a contract that purports to
limit one's ability to make a fair use of a copyrighted work with a
technical mechanism that has the same effect:
If a term of a contract is inconsistent with a value of copyright law,
you can refuse to obey it and let the other side get a court to enforce
it. The ultimate power of a contract is a decision by a court-to
enforce the contract or not .... The same is not true of code....
[Wihere do we challenge the code? When the software protects in a
particular way without relying in the end on the state, where can we
challenge the nature of the protection? Where can we demand bal40 5
ance when the code takes it away?
In other words, because code is self-enforcing, no institution will
be called upon to evaluate the choices embedded in the architecture.
Even if the choices embedded in the architecture are appropriate
ones, their application in particular circumstances may be inappro403 Id.
404 LESSIG,

supra note 134, at 59.
405 Id. at 136. Lessig perhaps overstates the point because legislatures can provide balance by regulating technology directly. Indeed, regulation to displace certain technical
measures, which I identify as a possible legal approach to cyberproperty claims, see supra
pp. 2217-18, is one type of direct regulation of technology.
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priate. For example, a technical measure designed to block access that
a system owner perceives to be economically harmful may unintentionally block more access than the system owner intends.40 6 The
absence of a legal enforcement mechanism, however, means that there
is no process in which overexpansive use of a technical measure can
be challenged.
The fact that code is self-enforcing raises a second point. Once
the code is in place, enforcement is marginally costless. Outside of the
Internet context, the costs of enforcing particular legal rights may be
sufficiently high that an entitlement holder will forgo enforcement.
Copyright again provides a useful example. Many scholars have
argued that the fact that a copyright holder cannot identify and pursue
all infringers has provided "space" for uses to occur that do not undermine the value of the holder's copyright. 40 7 To the extent that code
facilitates costless enforcement of a right, however, it allows an individual to protect an entitlement without any calculation of the marginal costs and benefits of pursuing legal action in particular
circumstances.
The copyright example identifies one more concern about the
nature of code in relation to law. Consider again the fact that protection of copyright through law alone will lead to some infringing uses;
to the extent that those uses do not undermine the value of the
author's copyright, they may in fact be socially desirable. If a copyright holder uses some technical measure to block such uses, some
users will still be able to circumvent the blocking. Leaving aside application of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (which presumably
would prohibit circumvention in this context),40 8 note how even if the
technical mechanism is not perfectly effective, it limits those who can
engage in the contested activity to a technically savvy elite. Put
another way, the nature of software is such that the impact of technical controls will be quite uneven, even when their evasion is legally
permissible. As technical measures become stronger, the unevenness
of their effects is likely to be magnified.
These concerns shed some light on why the choice among rules
for legal protection of network resources matters. The choice of a
pure liability rule, or of a rule under which only strong technical measures trigger property-rule protection, might in theory result in the
same level of access as other legal rules involving a different mix of
legal and technical protection. But the nature of code raises concerns
For a discussion of Ticketmaster's problems in this regard, see supra note 96.
See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward,71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1203, 1243 (2000).
408 See supra notes 7, 135-36 and accompanying text.
406
407
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that a simple focus on the sum of legal and technical protection does
not take into account. In particular, we must be wary of choosing
legal rules that are likely to prompt too much reliance on exclusionary
technical measures. Of course, my earlier doctrinal discussion of the
CFAA suggests that that statute does in fact strike a balance that
heavily favors technical measures as a predicate for legal protection.
But for the remaining cyberproperty claims, the picture is more
complicated.
As discussed above, a pure liability rule, or a rule under which
only strong technical measures trigger a right to exclude, will not lead
to greater open access than notice-based or weak code-based
approaches. Recall scholars' concerns that recognizing a right to
exclude will lead to "overpropertization" of the Internet, by forcing
would-be users, under the threat of legal penalty, to negotiate for
access in a wide range of circumstances. I dismissed the most extreme
forms of this argument on the ground that they wrongfully equated
property-rule protection with a default presumption of closed access.
Even if the overpropertization problem remains, however, it is also a
problem under the pure liability-rule and strong code-based
approaches because the very same uses that scholars fear will be
blocked by legal measures can be blocked by technical measures.
Those technical measures lack the flexibility the legal process provides
and progressively narrow the range of users who can gain access to
network resources. The advantages that liability-rule and strong codebased approaches offer over approaches allowing injunctive relief in a
broader range of circumstances, in sum, are illusory. A baseline under
which actual notice of permissible uses or weak code-based mechanisms are sufficient to trigger property-rule protection is far more
appropriate than scholars have thus far recognized.
Even if recognizing a system owner's right to exclude unwanted
uses in this broader range of circumstances provides the correct baseline, however, it does not follow that injunctive relief will be appropriate in every situation where the triggering conditions for propertyrule protection are present. If, for example, it is possible to identify a
range of cases in which the prevailing motivation for denying access is
anticompetitive, property-rule protection may be inappropriate. Here
again, though, pure liability-rule or strong code-based approaches are
not the answer, for they will still permit technical measures to prevail
(albeit with different opportunities for circumvention). To ensure
access in situations of anticompetitive behavior, the law would have to
displace technical measures, through the approach represented as
Rule 8a in Figure 2. In other words, what is required is a legal
approach that not only denies a system owner's legal right to enjoin
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unwanted uses, but that also dictates the scope of the technical measures the system owner is entitled to employ. Such an approach is the
conceptual equivalent of the sort of copyright preemption analysis
scholars advocate, 40 9 except that what is being displaced is not a state
law doctrine that threatens a preferred balance of rights but technical
measures that threaten that balance. Debates over cyberproperty
claims have for the most part not considered the role of law in dis410
placing technical measures.
In sum, an approach recognizing a system owner's right to set the
conditions of access, so long as she provides adequate notice of those
conditions (through actual notice or adopting a system configuration
that makes restrictions plain to the user), provides a better baseline
for access to network resources than a pure liability rule or one
requiring strong technical measures to trigger injunctive relief. In
addition, where necessary to compensate for the inadequacies of this
sort of property-rule protection, we must look to technology-displacing rules rather than pure liability or strong code-based
approaches to achieve the appropriate level of access.
CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to offer a more complete framework
for analyzing network resource owners' attempts to block unwanted
uses of their systems. The law governing cyberproperty claims
remains multi-dimensional and very much in flux. It remains to be
seen how the California Supreme Court's approach to electronic trespass disputes in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi will apply in other functional
and doctrinal contexts. Although the weight of scholarship favors the
Hamidi approach, I have argued here that property-rule protection
for network resources is more appropriate than scholars have thus far
recognized. A default rule of closed access is not an inevitable feature
of property-rule protection; to the extent that concerns about the
range of circumstances in which users must bargain for access drive
opposition to property-rule protection, those concerns are adequately
409 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
410 In the context of debates over the anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, scholars have proposed legal responses rejecting property-rule protection, including: revising the DMCA, see Samuelson, supra note 136, at 543-46; adopting
a "misuse" doctrine barring copyright holders from invoking the DMCA in certain circumstances, see Burk, supra note 132, at 1132-40; or recognizing users' rights to circumvent in
some circumstances, see Cohen, supra note 144, at 1141-42 & n.200; Julie E. Cohen, Some
Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12

L.J. 161, 177-78 (1997). None of these proposals entails legal displacement of the underlying technical measures.
BERKELEY TECH.
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addressed through hybrid liability/property rules, under which system
owners must take certain steps to trigger property-rule protection.
More fundamentally, the literature has thus far neglected the
complex relationship between law and technical measures in this context-in particular, the possibility that too-weak legal protection will
induce greater reliance on too-strong technical measures, whether or
not the law in fact backs those measures. This observation calls into
question the apparent assumption of scholars that pure liability-rule
approaches or strong code-based approaches to network resources
will produce open access, and it calls for further attention to how features of computer code affect the choice of an appropriate legal
approach for controlling access to computer systems.
Pure liability-rule and strong code-based approaches are likely to
lead to the use of technical measures that mimic property-rule protection. Because technical measures lack the flexibility of legal measures, allow costless enforcement, and have uneven effects even where
circumvention is permitted, pure liability-rule and strong code-based
approaches do not supply as promising an alternative to stronger legal
protection as scholars suggest. To achieve an appropriate balance
among the competing interests at stake in cyberproperty claims, we
should look to a rule that demands adequate notice of the conditions
of access and backs those conditions with property-rule protection,
but is limited where necessary by technology-displacing rules.
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